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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on three missions—access, 
individualization, and social problem-solving—that have 
been recommended as priority agendas for higher education. 
The study also describes the planning and development 
of three special programs—the University Without Walls, 
the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and 
the Institute for Man and His Environment—which serve as 
vehicles for the assumption of these missions in one 
university—the University of Massachusetts. The aim of 
the study is to provide information on the viability of the 
missions of access, individualization and social problem¬ 
solving within existing public universities and to con¬ 
tribute to the study of institutional change. 
In a review of related research and theory, special 
emphasis is placed on the articulation of new missions 
and objectives for higher education by educational theorists 
including Clark Kerr and David Riesman, and several specially 
created study commissions and task forces including the 
Truman Commission on Higher Education, the Newman Task 
Force, and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. 
Also ©mphasized are "the characteristics of universities 
as organizations and theories of change as articulated by 
Ronald Havelock, Lon Hefferlin, Jack Lindquist, Warren 
Bennis, Victor Baldridge and others. 
Data for the study has been gathered from partici¬ 
pant observation, from University documents and from 
approximately forty interviews. Case studies provide 
descriptions of the University of Massachusetts and of the 
planning and implementation of the three programs—the 
University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with 
Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and 
His Environment. Each case focuses particularly on those 
elements which could be considered important factors 
to implementation and institutional change. 
Each case is analyzed in order to assess the 
feasibility of the missions of access, individualization 
and social problem-solving for the University of Massa¬ 
chusetts and other public universities and to determine 
and compare the factors important to the change process in 
the University. 
The study shows that all three missions have been 
considered priority agendas for the University of Massa¬ 
chusetts and that special units were developed and ap¬ 
proved by the formal governance bodies in order to 
commit the University to the fulfillment of these missions. 
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The separatie program cases • however^ revealed variations 
in the extent to which these missions could be considered 
viable for special units and/or for University-wide 
implementation. The Bachelor’s Degree with Individual 
Concentration program shows that the mission of individuali¬ 
zation was accepted and adopted. The University Without 
Walls program shows that although the provisions of 
educational opportunity for non-traditional students and 
the fulfillment of the mission of access would require 
comprehensive changes, many at the University of Massa¬ 
chusetts were willing to make these changes. The case of 
the Institute for Man and His Environment reveals the 
difficult organizational, attitudinal, and behavioral changes 
that are required to adopt the mission of social problem¬ 
solving. 
The study corroborates the importance of those 
change factors which had been cited by Lon Hefferlin-- 
resources, leadership, support, and environmental factors 
of reward and approval—and shows very clearly the im¬ 
portance of the political dynamic suggested by Lindquist 
and Baldridge. The study does not unearth new change 
factors, but suggests that timing might be a change factor 
deserving more attention and study. It shows the advantage 
of creating special focus programs as a vehicle through 
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which the University can accomplish change. It also makes 
clear that the process of change involves a whole net¬ 
work of factors and dynamics that cannot be easily isolated. 
It shows that it is difficult for universities as organi¬ 
zations to adopt new missions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
^atement of the Problem. Higher education has 
increasingly moved toward center stage in American society— 
a higher percentage of the population attends collegej 
a steadily increasing percentage of public funds support 
our colleges and universities; and more and more agencies 
and individuals look to university professors for solu¬ 
tions to complex problems. As a result, the number and 
stridency of the voices seeking to determine the priorities 
and direction of higher education have increased. Many 
people feel that colleges and universities are not pro¬ 
viding sufficiently individualized education for students, 
and they are not applying their energies and resources 
to the solution of society's most complex problems. 
Educational theorists and policy makers over the 
last two decades have defined access, individualization and 
social problem-solving as "new" missions for higher 
education.^ 
Colleges and universities have been slow to respond 
to these renewed priorities. This failure results less 
from deliberate refusal or inattention and more from the 
^See Chapter I for review of theorists and policy 
makers defining missions for higher education. 
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organizational patterns and structures necessitated by 
rapid growth. In order to educate the millions of appli¬ 
cants, most universities have become large, complex, and 
bureaucratic organizations. Whatever their original 
purposes, established bureaucracies often begin to assume 
a single objective—maintenance of the status quo. It is 
difficult for such organizations to change. 
However, the centrality of higher education to 
our society makes it imperative for our institutions of 
higher education to be able to change their objectives, 
priorities, and practices in order to assume new missions. 
The manner in which this change is accomplished is the 
focus of this study. 
It is important to consider together missions and or¬ 
ganizational adaptability because each informs the other— 
the type of mission affects how it can be introduced into an 
organization and organizational characteristics often de¬ 
termine the viability of the mission. This study will focus 
on the missions of access, individualization and social 
problem-solving and the implementation or change process 
within an organization. 
The study will consider how one university, the 
University of Massachusetts, has adopted the missions of 
access, individualization, and social problem-solving. The 
most important and visible method of adoption is the 
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establishment of three programs—the University Without 
Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, 
and the Institute for Man and His Environment. The pri¬ 
mary objectives of each of these programs correspond 
respectively to the missions of access, individualization 
and social problem-solving. Descriptive case studies of the 
establishment of these programs as well as of the University 
of Massachusetts form the core of this study. 
Each case study will describe the planning and 
implementation of the program as a way of describing the 
change process. In each, particular attention will be paid 
to those factors which organizational change theorists 
have cited as critical to the process of change: extra- 
institutional influence, resources, leadership, and or¬ 
ganizational environment, but other factors important to 
the program's development will be treated as well. The 
purpose is to validate the work of change theorists and 
to contribute new information to the study of change. 
Significance of the Study. The aim of the study 
is twofold: to provide information on the viability of 
the missions of access, individualization and social 
problem-solving within existing public universities and 
to contribute to the study of institutional change. 
It is informative to consider these two aspects together 
and within the context of a particular institution. 
Limitations of the Study. The author of the study 
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has been associated with the University of Massachusetts 
for five years. This can be seen as a limitation to the 
study as it raises the possiblity of bias. It can also 
be viewed as an advantage in that the author has for three 
years been actively involved with the programs in a role 
analagous to that of "participant observer." 
While the University of Massachusetts serves in a 
sense as the case for the study, no attempt is made to 
investigate all the ways in which the University of 
Massachusetts has attempted to assume the missions of access, 
individualization and social problem-solving. Nor does this 
study investigate the totality of the change process at 
the University. The study does, however, focus on three 
programs which were used at the University of Massachusetts 
as vehicles for change. This limits the study in terms of 
"generalizability" but provides a more in-depth look at 
complex processes. 
The case studies focus on the views of the faculty 
members and administrators who were instrumental in the 
planning and development of the programs rather than on 
the perspectives of the students or others being served 
by them. No attempt is made to evaluate the programs, 
and the case studies are limited to the specific focus 
of change within an organization. 
Methodology of the Study. A descriptive case 
study was deemed appropriate for analyzing the processes 
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of assuming new missions and affecting change within an 
institution and was chosen as the methodology for the study. 
The University of Massachusetts is the locus of the 
three programs which are taken as case studies and in a sense 
serves also as a case. The study considers the history, or¬ 
ganizational structures, academic program, leadership and 
governance of the University of Massachusetts over the period 
1950-1970• It describes the University in order to provide 
background material for the specific cases and review the 
general factors which were important for the creation of pro¬ 
grams reflecting new missions and supportive of internal 
institutional change. 
The programs selected as case studies were chosen be¬ 
cause each takes as its primary objective one of the missions 
advocated by educational policy-makers. The Institute for Man 
and His Environment attempts to solve complex environmental 
problems; the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration 
provides for individualized education; and the University With¬ 
out Walls operates chiefly as an access route for those who 
have not previously enjoyed equal opportunity for higher edu¬ 
cation. They have been chosen, in addition, because the his¬ 
tory of their development within the University of Massachu¬ 
setts provides three similar but distinct lenses through 
which to view the process of change within an institution. No 
attempt has previously been made to study these programs with 
a focus on institutional change. 
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Data for the study was collected from documents in 
University files. Those documents describing the planning 
and implementation of the three programs taken as case 
studies and documents more generally related to the Uni¬ 
versity and recent change efforts were a primary source of 
information. 
Because these programs are of relatively recent 
origin and because they have not previously been studied in 
relation to the change process or as vehicles for accomplish¬ 
ing university missions, the study of documents was supple¬ 
mented by approximately forty interviews. 
For each case study, interviews were conducted with 
individuals who were in a position to provide information on 
the particular program. Those interviewed had been involved 
with the initial preparatory stages of the program, with the 
process of implementation, or with some aspect of the programs 
relationship to the University. Many of these individuals 
were already known to the author, others were named in the 
documents on the programs and others were suggested by program 
directors or others currently associated with the programs. 
Appendix I contains a list of those interviewed. 
Interviews were non—scheduled to encourage 
different information and perspectives but they were in 
some respects standardized so that each of those inter¬ 
viewed would consider certain issues. All of those 
interviewed were asked open-ended questions about pro- 
gram goals and objectives, the process of planning and 
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implementation, and the characteristics of the University 
of Massachusetts in terms of possibilities for change as 
compared to other universities. Interviewees were asked 
to consider the importance of specific factors in the 
change process: extra-institutional influence i resources? 
leadership; and organizational environment including re¬ 
ward systems, approval process, and communications. 
Appendix II contains a list of the questions used as a 
basis for discussion during the interviews. 
These questions were field tested on two individuals 
who are directors of programs at the University of 
Massachusetts which are similar to those under study in 
orientation, size, and relationship to the University, 
yet distinct in terms of objectives, personnel, and 
process. The field tests led to some revisions of wording 
and considerable reduction in the number of questions. 
In addition to data gathered from University 
documents and interviews, the study contains a review of 
the literature. It reviews generally the work of the major 
study commissions and groups who have been concerned 
with overall missions and objectives for higher education 
in the past two decades, and the work of organizational 
theorists and researchers on the change process. It 
reviews specifically the work of commissions and in¬ 
fluential individual authors that related to the missions 
of access, individualization and social problem-solving. 
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and the work of those focusing on universities as or¬ 
ganizations and the process of change and academic reform 
in colleges and universities. Concepts and change factors 
emerging from this review of the literature informed the 
perspective of the description of the University of 
Massachusetts as an organization and each of the case 
studies. An analytical section makes these connections 
more precisely and attempts to draw conclusions from the 
data. 
Organization of the Study. The study contains 
an introduction and seven chapters. Chapter I discusses 
the missions of access, individualization, and social 
problem solving as advocated by those commissions and 
groups that have most informed policy concerning higher 
education. It also reviews the literature on organiza¬ 
tions and change theory. 
Chapter II considers the University of Massachusetts. 
It provides a general description of its evolution as a 
university over the past two decades; an overview of the 
policies and activities of the university with respect to 
access, individualization and social problem-solving; an 
assessment of those characteristics that make the Uni¬ 
versity capable of change; and a description of its 
special unit change strategy. 
Chapter III contains the case study of the Uni¬ 
versity Without Walls program. It describes its re- 
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lationship to the Union for Experimenting Colleges and 
Universities and the National University Without Walls 
program; its planning period, and its year as a pilot ex¬ 
perimental program with a small number of students. 
It focuses on those factors that were crucial to the 
implementation of the program. 
Chapter IV contains the case study of the Bachelor's 
Degree with Individual Concentration program. It dis¬ 
cusses general issues and trends in curricular structure 
and reform over the last two decades and relates the BDIC 
program to them. It describes the planning and implementa¬ 
tion process of the program and focuses on those factors 
that have been critical to that process. 
Chapter V is the case study on the Institute for 
Man and His Environment. It traces the complex evolution 
of the Institute, highlighting in the process the crucial 
change factors. 
Chapter VI is an analytical chapter which draws 
the general issues and processes described in the review 
of the literature together with the data provided by the 
case studies. It analyzes the feasibility of the missions 
of access, individualization and social problem-solving 
for the University of Massachusetts and other public 
universities. It considers the process of change at the 
University of Massachusetts by focusing on those factors 
which were important to the development and implementation 
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of the three programs under study. It corroborates those 
factors suggested in the literature on change theory as 
important to the process of change and suggests additional 
change factors. 
Chapter VII concludes the study with a summary 
statement! some speculations which were generated by the 
investigation about the process of change, and several 
recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER I 
MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION^ AND CHANGE 
For as long as colleges and universities have been 
in existence, there have been arguments about what functions 
they ought to perform and about their appropriate role in 
society. Like other social institutions, colleges and 
universities have changed over time; they have discarded 
outmoded functions and taken on new missions and objectives. 
Many people have sought to have a voice in the determina¬ 
tion of missions and objectives for higher education. 
Social scientists, recognizing the close relationship 
between organizational form and the ability to carry out 
functions and respond to new objectives, began to study 
colleges and especially universities as complex organiza¬ 
tions. A few have focused on the change process within 
organizations. This chapter reviews the works of those 
individuals and groups who have had the greatest impact 
in the last twenty years on the articulation of missions 
and objectives for higher education, reviews the work 
of major organizational theorists who have spoken to 
the issue of how universities as organizations adopt and 
carry out missions and objectives, and reviews recent 
research and theory on the process of change. 
12 
Missions for Higher Education 
The literature on higher education over the last 
twenty years has contained an enormous number of recommended 
missions and objectives for higher education. Although the 
range has been substantial, the predominant themes for the 
period from the end of World War II to the early 1970's have 
been access--the provision of equal educational opportunity; 
individualization—more attention to individual student 
needs; and social problem-solving—the application of the 
resources of the university toward the solution of complex 
social problems. Each of these missions has been urged by 
educational policy-makers and each has itself evolved in 
meaning, emphasis, and practice over the period. It is im¬ 
portant to be aware of these missions and of their evolution, 
for they encompass the demands of the society on institu¬ 
tions of higher education.^ 
The sheer volume of the demands for access, in¬ 
dividualization, and social problem-solving has caused an 
impact on higher education and society as a whole. Yet 
it is extremely difficult to trace a path or diffusion 
process from individuals to policy decisions at the 
national level, to policy decisions at the institutional 
level, and to institutional functioning. There- 
^Since 1970, the emphasis has shifted. The pre¬ 
dominant themes have become finances and power. These 
themes, however, have served to add new urgency to those of 
access, individualization and social problem-solving. 
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fore, it is almost impossible to assert direct causal 
relationships between ideas and events in so broad an 
area as higher education. 
One can, however, say that those individuals and 
groups who would have been most likely to have an impact 
on events in higher education would include commissions 
established specifically to study higher education as a 
whole, and those individual authors on higher education 
whose books have been widely read. For the period 194? 
to 1973 these include: The Truman Commission, The White 
House Conference on Education, The Newman Task Force, The 
American Council on Education’s Special Committee on 
Campus Tensions, The Assembly on University Goals and 
Governance, The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 
and Christopher Jencks, David Riesman, and Clark Kerr. 
Even among these groups and individuals, some have 
been more influential than others because they caught 
the mood of the times and voiced the majority view, 
because they engaged in a political advocacy process or 
because their reports were widely disseminated. The most 
influential have been the Truman Commission, the Newman 
Task Force and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. 
Appendix III gives an overview of these commissions 
and the main thrust of their recommendations while this 
section treats their observations on access, individualiza¬ 
tion, and social problem-solving. 
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Access. The priority of increasing educational 
opportunity for individuals who have not previously 
enjoyed the benefits of higher education is hardly a new 
fad. In its most general sense, the history of American 
higher education is the history of the evolution from 
small private colleges for the classical training of the 
elite to the agreement in principle (though not yet in 
practice) that there should be universal higher education. 
The proportion of the population entering college 
grew slowly yet steadily throughout the last two centuries. 
After Word War II it seemed to leap dramatically. In 
part this was due to the economic benefits that were part 
of the GI Bill but more important were the realization of 
the importance of knowledge to the economy and the positive 
correlation between educational attainment and income. 
The Truman Commission in 194? articulated the arguments for 
universal higher education* 
The swift movement of events and the growing 
complexity of our national life and of world 
affairs make it imperative, at the earliest 
possible time, to translate our democratic 
ideal into a living reality; to eliminate the 
barriers to equality of educational opportunity; 
and to expand our colleges and universities to 
assure that the only factors which limit en¬ 
rollment are the ability and interest of the 
prospective students.2 
^Higher Education for American Democracy,_The—Presi^- 
dent's Commission on Higher EducatiorTiFrederick Zook, 
ChairmarT, 6 Vols. (New York* Harper, 194?) 2*1. 
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The Commission felt that at least fifty per cent 
of high school graduates should receive higher education. 
The period of the fifties and sixties was a period 
of tremendous expansion for higher education. By the late 
sixties the Truman Commission's fifty per cent goal had 
been realized and replaced by a goal of universal access. 
In Priorities for Action.^ the Carnegie Commission 
provided a list of tables which charted the attitudes on 
certain issues of twelve different commissions and task 
forces (starting with the Truman Commission). To the 
statement — "The United States should have a system of 
universal access to higher education"—four gave strong 
4 positive endorsement and six gave moderate endorsement. 
The Truman Commission recommended that government 
and the private sector remove the barriers of race, 
religion, economic status, and residence that were in¬ 
hibiting access. 
In many of its reports the Carnegie Commission gave 
strong emphasis to the notion of equal educational oppor- 
^Priorities for Actioni Final Report of the 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Educatioi^Clark Kerr, 
Chairman (New Yorki McGraw Hill,1973)• 
^The four giving strong endorsement included* 
The Truman Commission, The Committee on Education Beyond 
the High School, 1956, The White House Conference 1971. 
and the Carnegie Commission. 
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tunity. In one of its first, A Chance to Learn, it sets 
short and long range goals t 
By the year 2000, ethnic origin, geographic 
location, age, and quality of prior schooling 
should no longer stand in the way of access to 
higher education and success within it.5 
The commission reemphasized the theme in their final report. 
Priorities for Action, and they recommended a variety of 
steps through which this goal could be achieved including 
the provision of additional places in existing institutions, 
new institutions, the financing of student costs, and 
adjustments of existing institutions to students from a 
wider variety of backgrounds. 
The theme of access, however, is a complicated one 
for it speaks to the larger issue of the role of higher 
education in society and to questions of equality of 
opportunity and equality of outcome. 
Christopher Jencks and David Riesman spoke to the 
role of higher education in an economically stratified yet 
democratic societyi 
One of the central functions of higher education 
--along with providing jobs for scholars--is to 
control access to the upper-middle social strata. 
Since demand for upper-middle class jobs and 
living standards far exceeds the supplyi colleges 
must (in Erving Coffman's terminology) cool out 
large numbers of youngsters whose ambitions exceed 
their ability. Not only that--these individuals 
^A Chance to Learnt An Action Agenda for Equal 
Opportunity in Higher Education, Report of the Carnegie 
Commission on Higher EducationT Clark Kerr, Chairman 
(New York I McCraw Hill, 1970)» P* 
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must be eliminated in such a way as to preserve 
at least the appearance of fairness to all social 
strata • . . the distribution system must be in 
keeping with traditional American mythology, 
which portrays America as a land of opportunity 
with unlimited room at the top . . , ,o 
Jencks and Riesman do not feel that universal 
higher education will result in an egalitarian classless 
society, and they feel that what is important for America 
is not more mobility, but more equality. 
The Carnegie Commission did not advocate an 
egalitarian classless society and pointed only to the 
positive correspondence between education and income for 
those who had achieved higher education. The Carnegie 
Commission called for universal access, but it made it 
quite clear that it was not recommending universal 
attendance. In Quality and Equality'^ and Priorities for 
Action the Commission saw the mission of higher education 
to provide equality of opportimity, not equality of 
results. 
Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic 
Revolution (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Double¬ 
day and Company, I968), pp. 99-100. 
'^Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal 
Responsibility for Higher Education, Rieport of the 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Clark Kerr, 
Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, I968). 
18 
The Carnegie Commission has been criticized 
for its failure to examine thoroughly the role of higher 
education in society, especially in areas of access, 
equality, and the economic order. Norman Bimbaum felt 
that with its five year study and five million dollars, 
the Carnegie Commission should not have avoided the 
difficult issue of meritocracy vs. egalitarianism in the 
American social order. He felt thatt 
If the Commission were serious about the idea of 
an educational revolution, its work would have 
been remarkably different. Beginning with a 
rational critique of our institutions, particularly 
our economic ones, it would have sought to devise 
new ones consonant both with our productive powers 
and our egalitarian and democratic ideas.° 
Finally, it is a very complex argument. There 
have been obvious economic gains for individuals and 
groups because of the provision of greater educational 
opportunity yet there are obvious limits to what an 
equalized educational system can achieve in an unequal 
and stratified social order. 
There is no doubt, however, that during the sixties, 
attention was drawn especially to the subject of access 
for minority group members who remained significantly 
Q 
Norman Birnbaum, 
The Carnegie Commission," 
"The Politics of the Future: 
Change. 5 (November 1973)* P* 29* 
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under-represented in colleges and universities. More 
equalized educational attainment, it was assumed during 
the Kennedy and Johnson years, would lead to a more 
democratic and tolerant society. Many blacks who received 
degrees during that period in fact moved to high level 
positions in government, business, and industry and 
there was no question that the society as a whole became 
more democratic. By the late sixties, however, it 
became clear that many wanted equality of opportunity for 
the few but not for the many. 
Other groups who were being discriminated against 
were receiving attention as well. Many suggested equal 
education access for women as a means of achieving 
greater equality between the sexes. Others recommended 
the provision of education for those persons beyond the 
traditional college age. as a means of providing a second 
chance to those who had not taken advantage of higher 
education in earlier years and/or for whom retraining 
or further education was desired. 
While access had been the goal, it had not been 
fully realized. In 1971 the Newman Task Force found 
that: 
Minorities are still underrepresented. Women 
are openly discriminated against. Arbitrary 
restrictions and a lack of imaginative pro¬ 
grams limit the opportunities for those of 
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beyond the normal college age or those for 
whom attendance at a conventional campus 
is impractical,9 
Access will continue to be an important mission for higher 
education throughout the seventies, and increasing emphasis 
should continue to be put on the provision of educational 
opportunity for particular groups. In fact the dynamic 
has changed considerably in the last few years. Instead 
of the Jenck's notion of "cooling out" the masses we 
have the Sunday Times "hard-sell." Where once the 
provision of educational opportunity was a moral issue 
it has now become an economic one. Colleges and imiversities 
are actively recruiting students to fill up empty places, 
and this economic factor should insure that the mission of 
access will remain a predominant theme for higher edu¬ 
cation. 
Individualization. Those who have called for greater 
access have been aware that the obligation "is to provide 
more than just the chance to walk' through the college 
gate—that there must also be access to a useful and per¬ 
sonally significant educational experience."^® This 
thrust toward greater individualization of education con¬ 
stitutes a major theme of the period. 
^Report on Higher Education, Report of Task Force 
on Higher Education, oy Frank Newman, Chairman (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971)« 
10 Ibid., p. 3* 
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Individualization has meant many things to many 
people and is a "new" mission only in the context of the 
times and circumstances. Students have been central to 
colleges for centuries. American higher education during 
the twentieth century, however, increasingly replaced 
student interests with those of faculty. The "new" mission, 
therefore, signifies an emphasis on the students and a con¬ 
cern for their educational and developmental needs as indi¬ 
viduals. It also means providing students with the freedom 
and responsibility of making their own educational choices. 
It has led to a call over the last twenty years for academic 
reform and has had two major foci—one concerned with the 
inadequacy of the curriculum for current and more tra¬ 
ditional students, and the other concerned with the edu¬ 
cational development of non-traditional students. 
Oddly enough, individualization has become a 
predominant theme because of the successful provision 
of access. Colleges and universities have expanded so 
rapidly in response to demand that many of the large ones 
resemble factories and treat students as units to be 
processed. 
The current situation on college and university 
campuses was eloquently described by Jencks and Riesman. 
^^Machine and computer analogies are made re¬ 
peatedly in the literature on higher education from the 
1960's, 
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They hold that a central feature of college life is the 
confrontation between the old and the young. This con¬ 
frontation has been exacerbated as faculty become more 
and more academic and retreat from any concern with 
students—especially undergraduates—even to the extent 
of handing the teaching function over to graduate students. 
On the other hand, the specialization of knowledge, the 
narrow vision of disciplines and departments, and the 
aloofness of the faculty, have made the students feel that 
they have nothing to contribute in an academic sense so 
they retreat into a host of subcultures which in fact 
define their entire collegiate experience. 
As colleges and universities differ considerably 
in orientation and style, students also are quite diverse 
from institution to institution and on a particular campus. 
They tend to define and group themselves as collegiate 
(fraternity-sorority-athletic), academic (serious), vo¬ 
cational (clear career focus), or non-conformists (po¬ 
litical and more recently deviant life-style activists). 
These affiliations dominate the collegiate experience for 
students and define the educational component much more 
pervasively than do curricular or departmental units created 
by the university for that purpose. 
Clark Kerr is somewhat more optimistc than 
Jencks and Riesman about the possibilities for students 
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within large imiversities. He defines the multiversity 
as a city which provides a plethora of options. 
The multiversity is a confusing place for the 
student. He has problems of establishing his 
identity and sense of security within it. But 
It offers him a vast range of choices, enough 
literally to stagger the mind. In this range 
of choices he encounters the opportunities and 
the dilemmas of freedom. The casualty rate is 
high. The walking wounded are many. 'Lern- 
freiheit'—the freedom of the student to pick 
and choose, to stay or to move on—is triumphant. ^ 
Many students and faculty do not agree with Kerr's 
concept of free choice for the student. They feel that 
in a society which continues to use educational credentials 
as a sorting device students do not in fact have the option 
of non-attendance. Furthermore, they claim that while 
universities have appropriated the role of credentialer 
in society, the university curriculum is appropriate 
only to specialized disciplinary study and research and 
is therefore not helpful in preparation for most careers. 
Furthermore, they feel that universities have not pro¬ 
vided a curriculum that is concerned with the complex 
and important issues of the day because it is so frag¬ 
mented by specialization. Finally, many students—who 
in terms of age and maturity are more adult than previously— 
feel that universities have failed to recognize them as 
^^Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (New 
York: Harper, 19^3)t p» ^2. 
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adult individuals and have failed to provide them the 
opportunity to make decisions about their own lives and 
educations. 
For all of these reasons, students and many faculty 
became involved during the sixties with academic reform 
movements. Many students had tested their power and 
organizational skills in political activism but had been 
frustrated by attempts to effect political changes. They 
turned their energies inward and demanded a more "relevant" 
curriculum and more power to the individual student in 
determining his or her academic program. 
Concurrent with and in part resulting from the 
student movement, many educators were becoming concerned 
with the issue of reform on campus. Several were becoming 
I 
alarmed at the pervasive institutional trend termed by 
Jencks and Riesman "the academic revolution," and they 
tried to think of ways to reintroduce a community of 
scholars. The prevailing patterns that academic reforms 
have taken over the past decade include* 
A. Attempts to reintroduce the "community of 
scholars" through cluster or residential colleges. 
B. Greater course options for students within 
core and major requirements. 
C. New courses, majors and departments that are 
more closely aligned with student interests and/or career 
goals. 
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D. More opportunities for experiential learning 
and field experiences. 
E. Greater variety in means for crediting learning 
experiences including credit for prior learning. 
F. Movements toward external degree programs and 
open universities often initiated on the state level. 
Recommendations for these and other reforms have 
pervaded the commission reports over the last twenty years. 
It was the Truman Commission that first voiced concern 
over the increased specialization and emphasized that 
education should contribute to the general quality of life. 
The Commission recommended a unified concept of general 
education. The American Council on Education's Special 
Committee on Campus Tensionsand the President's Com¬ 
mission on Campus Unrest,while focusing primarily on 
governance issues and ways to include students in decision¬ 
making, also recommended curricular reforms to give students 
more power over their own education. The Assembly on 
University Goals and Governance called for experimentation 
^^Campus Tensions: Analysis and Recommendations« 
Special Committee on Campus Tensions, The American Council 
on Education, Sol Linowitz, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: 
American Council on Education, 1970)* 
^^Campus Unrestt Report of the President's ^ 
Commission on Campus Unrest, William W. Scranton, Chair¬ 
man (Washington, D.C.t Government Printing Office, 
1970). 
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and flexibility.^^ Much of the report of the White House 
Conference on Youth was concerned with education and it 
stated that higher education should become more humane 
and more oriented to the self-development of the individual 
student.Martin Meyerson felt in I97O1 
Perhaps the most important task is to deal with 
the students* demands for relevance in their 
education. One of the great tasks for the 1970's 
is to try to integrate the liberal learning and 
the professional learning so that the scholar, the 
student, and society each benefit .... These 
are the tasks: transforming professional edu¬ 
cation for undergraduates and graduates alike by 
making it more humane and intellectual; adding 
to the intrinsically valuable academic studies 
that devotion to social purpose which is so 
typically a part of the spirit of service of the 
professions ... .17 
The Newman Task Force was perhaps the most outspoken 
in its criticism of existing institutional practices. The 
^^First Reportt The Assembly on University Goals 
and Governance, Martin Meyerson, Chairman (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
1971). 
^^Renort of the White House Conference on Youths 
Task Force on Education, Robben W. Fleming,Chairman 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1971). 
Martin Meyerson, "New Paths to New Destinies, 
Saturday Review» 53 (January 10, 1970)» P» 
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Newman Task Force felt that institutions of higher educa¬ 
tion were not responsive to society, to different kinds 
of students, or to the needs of individual students. Their 
opinion of the current reform efforts was also devastating: 
In the last several years, largely due to the 
escalation of student protests, a great deal of 
thought and energy has been given to the problem 
of making colleges and universities more responsive 
to the educational needs and interests of 
students .... 
On campuses where reforms have been implemented, 
students have greater responsibility for their 
educational programs, and see more of their 
teachers than they did before .... But, by 
and large, this movement toward reform was begun 
at selective institutions, and has been shaped 
by elitist premises. Characteristically many of 
the reforms are designed to make undergraduate-, 0 
education more like graduate education .... 
The basic position of the Newman Task Force was 
that reform was not really possible within existing in¬ 
stitutions and could only be achieved through the creation 
of new institutions which would be more responsive and 
flexible. Their critiques of existing practices and 
reform efforts were impressive and very influential, but 
one would have liked more substance in their recommendations 
for alternatives. 
Although many have criticized the Carnegie Commission 
for its failure to deal with substantive issues, several of 
its reports deal with issues of academic content and re¬ 
form in order to provide greater individualization. In 
Reform on Campus: Changing Students. Changing Academic 
^®Newman, Renort on Higher Education, pp* 21-22. 
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Programs the Commission surveyed attitudes of thousands 
of students and faculty toward the curriculum and found 
considerable satisfaction with current educational programs. 
However, the Commission felt that there was enough evidence 
of malfunctioning to warrant reform and called for efforts 
in two directions. First they called for diversity among 
institutions and diversity of program within institutions. 
Second, they called for provision of a number of coherent 
and internally consistent options within the curriculum. 
Each option would provide a broad learning experience. 
"Relevance is achieved when courses and programs relate 
directly to the individual interests of students and to 
ig 
current social problems.” ^ 
The Carnegie Commission's Less Time—More Options: 
Education Beyond the High School, holds that most college 
programs are inappropriate for many kinds of students and 
it calls for a diversity of program options for diverse 
studentsIt focuses perhaps too much on the structural 
aspects of the curriculum such as three year degree pro¬ 
grams, more points of entry and exit, and greater flexi¬ 
bility in time and space, and too little on the content 
^^Reform on Campus: Changing Students. Changing 
Academic Programs, Report of the CarnegieCommission on 
Higher EducationV Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1972). 
20, ^Less Time. More Potions: Education Beyond The High 
School, Report of the Carnegie Commissipn^on Higher Educa- 
tion, Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970J. 
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of the curriculum. Yet it has been disseminated widely, 
and clearly had an impact on educational thinking, it 
provided the framework for much of the activity on college 
and university campuses over the past two years. In New 
Students and New Places Policies for the Future Growth 
and Development of American Higher Education, the Commission 
recommends state-wide expansion of external degree pro¬ 
grams and open universities.^^ 
Priorities for Action makes clear the Commission's 
attitudes toward students. It also summarizes the Commission's 
recommendations for reform into three directions t "toward 
more options for students in their attendence patterns; 
toward more diversity of programs both among and within 
individual institutions, thus expanding the range of choice 
for students; and toward enrichment of programs. 
Students vary greatly in their capacities and in 
the intensity of their interests. They are 
generally capable—or at least as capable as 
anyone else—in many situations of making de¬ 
cisions among alternatives that directly affect 
themselves. They will be more satisfied with 
their situations if they are able, within reason¬ 
able limits, to structure—student by student— 
New Students and New Places: Policies for the 
Future Growth and Development of American Higher Education^ 
Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 
Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971)• 
^Apriorities of Action. Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education, Ibid., p. 46. 
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alternatives that each student 
believes will best fit his or her individual 
wisi^0s • ^ 
By 1971p the notion of non-traditional study had 
gained broad enough acceptance that a commission to study 
and make recommendations concerning it was established 
by the Educational Testing Service and the College Entrance 
Examination Board. The Commission defined "non-traditional 
study" as an attitude, rather than a system; that places 
emphasis on the student; that encourages diversity of 
individual effort, competence, and performance; and that de- 
emphasizes time and space. The Commission recommended 
a wider range of educational options, increased emphasis 
on learning and less on degree structures, and a national 
assessment capability to advise students of alternative 
ways to complete a degree program. 
It seems clear that as student bodies continue to 
grow and become more diverse, the mission of individualiza¬ 
tion through academic reform will continue to be an 
important issue in higher education. 
^^Ibid. 
24 Diversity by Design. Report of the Commission 
on Non-Traditional Study, Samual B. Gould, Chairman 
(San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1973)• 
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Social Problem-Solving. A third mission for higher 
education is the application of knowledge and other resources 
toward the solution of complex social problems, it is a 
theme that has taken a number of complex twists over the 
years but generally stated it is believed that as problems 
—ranging from overpopulation, resource depletion, urban 
decay, environmental pollution, health care delivery 
and the like—become more visible, complex and urgent, 
colleges and universities must take on the responsibility 
of looking for solutions. The traditional missions for 
American higher education have included public service 
as well as teaching and research. Social problem-solving 
is related to public service, but it is more specific 
in that it establishes definite areas for service and 
implies attention to complex and difficult problems. 
Problem-solving is seen as a responsibility of higher 
education for several reasons: 
1. Public colleges and universities are supported 
by the public through taxation. That support has increased 
dramatically over the last twenty years in line with the 
tremendous increase in the number and size of higher 
education institutions. More support has led to a demand 
for increased accountability. 
2. Universities produce knowledge and knowledge 
is essential to problem-solving. As Ikenberry put it: 
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Knowledge is the fuel central to a scientific, 
technological, and socially complex societyj it 
is the nourishment society must have to function 
rapid escalation of the power 
of the university results from its role in the 
knowledge industry as a principal producer and 
distributor. From this point of view, one could 
argue persuasively that the raison d'etre of the 
contemporary university is not knowledge for its 
own sake but knowledge for society's sake.25 
Universities—especially after World War II—continued to 
place high priority on the production of knowledge, 
primarily through the expansion of the frontiers of the 
disciplines. They did not, however, hold in high priority 
the transmission or application of that knowledge through 
applied research or service activities, so social problem¬ 
solving has become a mission. 
3» Universities are the -only institutions that 
maintain the freedom and distance from the rest of society 
and its institutions which may be necessary to effectively 
solve problems created by those social institutions. 
Those who hold a classical view of the purposes of the 
university say that the mission of the university is to 
house scholars and students—it is not the mission of the 
university to involve these scholars in the solution of 
contemporary problems. 
^•^Stanley Ikenberry and Renee Friedman, Beyond 
Academic Departments, (San Franciscos Jossey BassV1972), 
p. 98. 
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The classical view is that the university has 
no purposes, at least none as defined in 
utilitarian terms. The pursuit of truth is 
synonymous with purpose and the mean's are ends 
in themselves. The primary function of the 
corporate body, therefore, is to provide a 
setting for scholarly activity. 
This view of the university predominated in Europe more 
than in the United States where the establishment of 
land-grant universities from the 1960*s in every state 
established a stronger precedent for service to society. 
The role of the university as the producer of 
knowledge and the ultimate good of higher education for 
society were assumed concepts by many of the commissions 
created to study higher education from the late forties 
to the mid-sixties. 
The Truman Commission—following shortly upon 
World War IT,—wanted American higher education to concern 
itself with solutions to the global problems created by 
the war. A White House Conference on Education convened 
by Johnson in his first years as President claimed that 
education had emerged as the primary instrument for the 
solution of domestic social problems—racism, poverty, 
27 
urban problems, environmental problems and the like. 
^^Ibid. 
^"^These problem-solving efforts of the Johnson 
era might have borne more fruit had they not been quickly 
overshadowed by the imperatives of the Viet Nam War. 
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Clark Kerr's Uses of the University faced head 
on the question of the role of the university in society 
and sent both positive and negative shock waves throughout 
higher education. Kerr argued that the major impacts upon 
current universities were the land grant movement and 
federal support of scientific research during World War IIj 
that the universities had lost their community aspects and 
become cities or multiversities that were characterized by 
a variety of communities and a variety of purposes held 
together by a corporate structure. Many of their purposes 
were determined by the federal government's funding policies. 
Universities had become predominantly service institutions 
2 8 for the society. 
The Newman Task Force claimed, in 1971, that the 
system of higher education had not been at all responsive 
to society and that it therefore needed to be dramatically 
overhauled. The Task Force called for more public debate 
on higher education, for greater clarification of in¬ 
stitutional priorities, for greater "real" diversity * for 
the creation of explicit research universities, and for 
professional training programs. These last would have 
the specific mandates to advance knowledge and provide 
^^Corson provided the most apt terminology in a 
Saturday Review article by claiming that higher education is 
rapidly taking on the status of a "public utility See 
John Corson, "Social Change and the University," Saturday 
Review 53 (January 10, 1970)* P* 7^. 
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skilled manpower to attack socisa problems. 
The Carnegie Commission saw attention to critical 
social problems as a mission for higher education but fo¬ 
cused more on the related role of criticizing and evaluating 
other social institutions. It listed as fifth among the 
major purposes for higher education: "evaluating society, 
for the benefit of its self-renewal, through individual 
scholarship and persuasion. 
Universities, because of the safeguarded tenets of 
academic freedom and tenure have the opportunity to criticize 
other social institutions. This ability to criticize is as 
important as the active involvement in applied research 
and service activities to the solution of problems in¬ 
volving large social systems. The Carnegie Commission, 
while including problem-solving as a purpose did not, 
however, set it as a priority. 
Public service as a traditional mission for higher 
education has received far less attention in the literature 
than have teaching and research. Similarly, social problem¬ 
solving, although generally accepted as a responsibility 
for higher education by taxpayers, the federal and state 
governments, and many educators, has not received primary 
attention by any but the Newman Task Force. There is no 
^Apriorities for Action. Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education, Ibid., p. 26. 
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question however that accountability to the public has 
become a predominant theme and mission for higher education. 
Universities as Organizations and 
Organizational Change 
The missions for higher education, and calls for 
change will remain rhetorical, however, unless they are 
adopted by institutions of higher education. This section 
reviews some of the theory and literature on universities 
as organizations and on organizational change*^® considers 
some of the organization difficulties that prevent 
institutions from assuming the missions of access, 
individualization, and social problem-solving, and describes 
the strategy of the creation of new organizations! units 
as a way of dealing with this problem. 
The formal organizational structure of universities 
has consisted of discipline-based departments organized into 
schools and colleges and administrative support units. The 
traditional fimctions for public, land-grant universities 
have included teaching, research, and public service. 
Governance structures have reserved for the faculty de¬ 
cisions concerning the curriculum, personnel, and overall 
^^Only those works on organizational theory and 
change theory that are directly related to this study are 
reviewed in this chapter. Appendices IV and V contain 
additional reviews of works on organizational and change 
theory that are pertinent as background information to 
this study. Appendix IV is a supplementary review of the 
literature on organizational theory. 
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policies; and administrative units are organized hierar¬ 
chically with decisions made at top levels. Independent 
governing boards have final legal responsibility for the 
university and therefore authority for all decisions. 
A recent work, the University as an Organization, 
contends that: 
Organizationally the xmiversity is, in fact, one 
of the most complex structures in modern society; 
it is also increasingly archaic. It is complex 
because its formal structure does not describe 
either actual power or responsibilities; it is 
archaic because the functions it must perform are 
not and cannot be discharged through the formal 
structure provided in its charter . The predica¬ 
ment of university organization has arisen in 
part because of its conflicting missions?^ 
Parkins would contend that actual power over 
universities—especially public ones—is increasingly held 
outside the institution at the state level and that the 
department and school structure is appropriate only to 
the teaching function of the university. 
Neal Gross argued that universities were ex¬ 
periencing "organizational lag"—changes in organizational 
goals and functions had outrun the capacity of the 
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organizational structures.-^ 
James Perkins.ed.The University as an Organization- 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1973)f P» 3« 
^^Neal Gross, "Organizational Lag in American 
Universities," Harvard Educational Review. 33 (Winter 
1963). 
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E.D. Duryea noted "three pervasive organizational 
inadequacies" that further clarify the notions of organi¬ 
zational lag and archaic structures. These inadequacies 
he attributed to size and complexity^ specialization and 
departmentalization, and shifting patterrs of institutional 
government.They point as well to reasons why systems- 
wide change in universities will be difficult to achieve. 
The size and complexity of many universities has 
resulted from huge educational bureaucracies. Duryea 
found two bureaucracies—"the academic bureaucracy with 
departments, senates, and councils and the administrative, 
management bureaucracies."^^ Organizational theorists have 
long agreed that one of the characteristics of a bureau¬ 
cratic organization is an inability to change rapidly 
no matter how imperative or desirable the change. 
The second organizational inadequacy Duryea found 
in universities is g)ecialization and departmentalization. 
He claims that departments continue to exert the principal 
force in the operational definition of goals and purposes 
because of their power over the curriculum and personnel 
decisions. Current practices and policies reflect their 
decisions, and change efforts are inhibited because 
departments have the largest vested interest in the 
^^E.D. Duryea, "Evolution of University Organization," 
in The University as an Organization. Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 36. 
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maintenance of the status-quo. 
The third organizational inadequacy consists of 
outmoded governance structures. One of the most dynamic 
forces operating in universities today is the struggle 
to gain power and control over decision-making in the 
universities: a) Much real power—i.e., budgetary 
power—is moving outside of the institution into the 
hands of state governing boards and legislative committees, 
b) Presidents continue to assert the power and authority 
delegated to them by Boards of Trustees and frequently 
exert control over all areas of the university by careful 
manipulation of the internal allocation of resources, 
c) The collective faculty insists upon more involvement in 
all areas of university governance because of their 
hegemony over curriculum and personnel, and d) Subgroups 
within the university—professional staff, classified 
staff, faculty, graduate teaching assistants, and 
students increasingly demand power over decisions affecting 
them. As a result of these governance shifts it is 
difficult to pinpoint the final authority for any decision, 
and systems-wide change efforts are often blocked or 
confused by issues of power and influence. 
The relationship between organizational form and 
governance is a complex one which remains ill-defined in 
the literature. Another recent work The Multicampus 
University looks closely at a new organizational 
4o 
phenomenon in higher education and asks the question about 
which organizational form is likely to solve the problems 
of higher education in the 1970’s.^^ Multicampus 
universities have developed in many states, including 
Massachusetts, as a response to needs for more state¬ 
wide attention and coordination of higher education, 
as well as needs to limit at some point the size of single 
institutional units* The study finally does not answer 
the question of organizational form but it raises important 
issuesi 
Indeed, our inability to understand the political 
and social context of organizational form has 
beclouded our understanding of the dynamics of 
university governance. None of the alternative 
patterns of organization is better or worse in 
the abstract. They take shape and can be evalua¬ 
ted only in terms of the environment within which 
they are set .... 
The organization of higher education, therefore, 
is critical "in combination” with its environment. 
Organizational form affects the access and power 
of the different participants in academic govern¬ 
ance with respect to specific decisions. It in¬ 
fluences the agenda of all institutions of higher 
education* the manner in which that agenda will 
be handled, and the very substance of educational 
plans and programs. Organizational form affects 
the goals and values that control the life of the 
universities and colleges—singly and collectively-- 
^^Eugene Lee and Frank Bowen, The Multicamnus 
University: A Study of Academic Governance (New Yorki 
McGraw Hill, 1971)• 
^^The University of Massachusetts was not considered 
in the Lee and Bowen study, however, because of the Uni¬ 
versity's recent evolution to multi-campus status. 
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however, have pointed to the inability to change and 
those who have studied imiversities as organizations have 
pointed to additional reasons why it is hard for univer¬ 
sities to change rapidly. All of these provide some in¬ 
sight into why it would be difficult for universities as 
whole systems to assume the new missions of access, 
individualization, and social problem-solving. 
Those who recommend universal access for higher 
education find that the structures and forms of higher 
education were created to deal with full-time residential 
students who enter at more or less the same knowledge and 
experience level. Changing those structures and forms— 
administrative as well as academic—will be a very diffi¬ 
cult undertaking. 
Those who argue for greater individualization and 
responsiveness to student needs and interests find the 
discipline-based curriculum emanating from the organizational 
structures of departments more a reflection of faculty 
interests than student interests. Although departments 
were originally created to perform the teaching function, 
the increase in knowledge and consequent specialization 
have rendered them appropriate, in many cases, for teaching 
only at the graduate level. Full provision for individuali¬ 
zation would require a revamping of the academic program 
and would probably be beyond the financial capabilities 
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of universities. 
Those who recommend social problem-solving as a 
mission find that while departments and schools allow for 
research that pushes back the frontiers of knowledge in 
the various disciplines, they rarely allow for attention 
to problems that cut across disciplinary lines. Adequate 
attention to even a handful of the most pressing social 
problems would require a change in the entire departmental 
system. 
Because of the difficulties of accomplishing 
systems-wide organizational change efforts in a university, 
many have advocated the creation of special units as 
parallel structures or temporary systems. They have 
recommended them for two major reasons: 
1. It would be more possible to implement them 
in a university environment; and 
2. Once implemented such units bring pressure for 
change on existing organizational structures. In this way 
they become part of a larger organizational change 
strategy. 
The point is made by a number of organizational 
39 
theorists. Everett Rogers talks about models for emulation 
^^Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New 
The Free Press, 19^2). York: 
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and Mathew Miles about temporary systems.Ikenberry makes 
the point most directly in connection with his study on 
research institutes and their relationships with the 
university. A large number of university administrators 
that he interviewed felt that: 
1. Institutes enable the university to establish 
new goals and respond to new constituencies more readily 
than do departments. 
2. Institutes make visible the university's 
commitment to a particular area of specialization in a 
manner not possible in the department. 
3. Institutes are useful in assembling inter¬ 
disciplinary teams. 
4. Institutes generate financial support. 
5« Institutes more than departments allow for a 
rapid shift of resources to meet new institutional 
4l 
responsiblities. 
Ikenberry concluded that independent research in¬ 
stitutes provided the best organizational form for inter¬ 
disciplinary research and service activities. 
^^Mathew Miles, ed., Innovations in Education 
(New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964). 
^^Ikenberry, Beyond Academic Departments, Ibid., 
pp. 104-105• 
^5 
Distinct, parallel units would make the organizational 
forms and functions even more complex but, according to 
many theorists, represent the most viable means for the 
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assumption of new missions. 
Change Theory 
While study commissions and others have articulated 
missions for institutions of higher education; organizational 
theorists have begun to study the characteristics of colleges 
and universities as complex organizations, and many theorists 
have suggested new organizational units as a means of 
accomplishing change within complex institutions 5 others 
have been devoting their energies to studying the process 
of change. This work on change theory serves as important 
^^The author here disagrees with the conclusions of 
Perkins in the University as an Organization. Perkins 
predicts that there will be changes in mission and function, 
as well as in organizational form in universities over the 
next twenty years. He argues that large scale research 
and many—though not all—public service activities will 
shift to non-university institutions and that consequently 
organizational forms will be simplified and governance 
clarified. The author feels that pressure for more public 
service--particularly in the area of social problem¬ 
solving; for more research; and for greater access will 
increase and that new missions will emerge in the years 
ahead. As a direct consequence organizational structures 
will become even more complex and as a consequence of 
that, governance will continue to be fuzzy. 
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background for this study for several reasons. 
1. It helps clarify the question of how 
universities—as total systems—can adopt new missions. 
2. The preceding section described the near 
impossibility of achieving system-wide change, but pointed 
to the creation of separate units as one possible change 
strategy. Change theory provides further elaboration on 
this strategy. 
3« Assuming that the university has adopted the 
strategy of creating new units, it remains important to 
ask what factors have been important to the creation of 
those units. Close scrutiny of the change factors in a 
single unit might lead to a clear understanding of those 
factors in larger units. 
Social scientists have been scrutinizing the change 
process in a variety of different social systems and they 
have been using a variety of different research methodolo¬ 
gies related to different disciplines—predominantly 
sociology, anthropology, and psychology—in their studies. 
They are working toward a generalized theory of change that 
would be applicable to all situations. Much of their work 
remained separate and distinct within the disciplines, 
however, until Everett Rogers in 1964^^ and Ronald Havelock 
^^Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, Ibid. 
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in 1968 began to synthesize it. Ronald Havelock claims 
in 1968 that there is an emerging discipline in the social 
sciences focusing on processes of change, innovation, and 
knowledge utilization: 
the quantity and even the quality of available 
literature indicates that the basic conceptual 
and empirical ingredients of this new discipline 
are now present. 
Havelock surveyed over 4,000 literature titles. 
The rudimentary state of the "discipline," however, 
precludes simple analysis and easy generalizations. It 
remains necessary to trace change theory through many re¬ 
search strands each of which contributes insights to the 
process. Appendix V reviews some general attitudes toward 
change, and some recent change theory, while this section 
treats more specifically those works which have dealt with 
the change process in colleges and universities and which 
were directly relevant to this study. 
The most important researchers on change in colleges 
and universities are J.B. Lon Hefferlin and Jack Lindquist. 
Four additional authors—Joseph Fashing, Steven Deutsch, 
^^Ronald J. Havelock, Planning for Innovation 
Through Dissemination and UtillFation of Knowledg^(Ann 
ArborV Michigan^ Center for Research and Utlization 
of Scientific Knowledge, University of Michigan, 1968), p. 16. 
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Victor Baldridge, and Warren Bennis wrote case histories 
of change or reform efforts in colleges and universities 
which contributed to the theory of change and to this 
study. 
—* One of the most important works for 
this study was Dynamics of Academic Reform by J. B. Lon 
Hefferlin. Hefferlin's book, published in I969, reports 
on a four year major study—the study of Institutional 
Vitality—conducted by the Institute of Higher Education, 
Teachers College, Columbia University. 
In simple terms the purpose has been to uncover 
the forces within institutions which tend to 
preserve and nourish a readiness to change as 
they face new social conditions, new types of 
students, and new developments in teaching 
methods and materials,45 
To carry out the study Lon Hefferlin and others surveyed 
existing information on organization change in general 
and academic change in particular, made a series of 
sixteen case studies of the evolution of particular 
practices at a number of institutions, developed a question¬ 
naire called the Institutional Functioning Inventory, and 
tested their ideas about academic reform on a randomly 
selected stratified sample of 110 American colleges and 
universities. 
^^J.B. Lon Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform 
(San Francisco I Jossey-Bass, 19^9), p. x-xi7 
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Lon Hefferlin, like most authors considering change 
in higher education, felt that most changes in higher 
education are attributable to forces external to the 
university. Changes are made within the institution in 
order to respond to the existing or perceived priorities 
of those outside of the institution who control the flow 
of resources to the institution. These groups include 
state legislators, the federal government, foundations 
and the general public. The redirection or reorientation 
of any institution must come from without. Data in the 
Hefferlin studies supported this conclusion. 
Lon Hefferlin concludes, in addition, from his 
study that three dominant sources of change in higher 
education have been resources, advocacy, and openness. 
As resources constitute the key external factor, 
they also are the key internal factor. 
In short, the first key to academic reform is 
that of resources: an existing program will 
continue to exist as long as it can find support. 
A new program will be tolerated if it costs no 
money or it brings its own support. It will 
be resisted if the new funds it requires could 
be used for the expansion of existing programs. 
And it will be actively opposed and accepted 
only under duress if existing resources must 
be divided to include it.^° 
46 Ibid., p. 39* 
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The second factor is advocacy: 
Call it inspiration, leadership, persuasion, 
or politicking{ without it change is unlikely. 
All the evidence from history as well as 
from the observations of men and women engaged 
in academic life about the importance of in¬ 
dividual initiative in stimulating change is 
borne out by the statistical evidence of this 
study: academic change tends to be highest at 
colleges and universities where the most in¬ 
fluential members of the institution are seen k_ 
as forces for change rather than for stability. 
Leadership or advocacy needs to be exercised at three 
different levels. Some individual (often from outside 
the institution) must act as initial advocate or change 
agent, another individual who has influence over the 
faculty must exercise opinion leadership and a third 
individual occupying a position of power and control over 
resources must be willing to financially support an 
innovation. 
In addition to the individual leadership and action, 
however, there must exist a critical mass of support from 
the faculty for a reform to be adopted. The absolute 
number of the critical mass is impossible to determine 
as that varies with other factors—amount of financial 
resources, need for innovation, position power of person(s), 
exercising leadership, etc., but it is clear that a number 
47 Ibid., p. l4l. 
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of individuals must be supportive. The critical mass of 
support is necessary from among the faculty and ad¬ 
ministrators, and while students can contribute to the 
critical mass, although critical numbers here are far 
higher than for faculty, student support alone does not 
seem sufficient to bring about change. 
The third factor important to reform, according 
to Lon Hefferlin, involves the openness of the system 
or a conducive institutional environment. This includes 
a shifting combination of organization structure, 
governance, ethos, communications, growth, and other 
institutional characteristics. Lon Hefferlin concluded 
from the literature on organizational change that organi¬ 
zations generally are inherently passive, and tend toward 
ritualism and self-maintenance of their members. He 
concluded from his study on academic organizations that 
they were even more resistent to change than other 
organizations because their purposes and support are 
conservative, they are vertically fragmented and struc¬ 
tured to resist change, and the norm of professionalism 
breeds independence among institutional members. 
Lon Hefferlin found, however, some characteristics 
that lead to change and reform.These include: 
^^These characteristics are discussed in Chapter VI 
"Sources of Reform," Lon Hefferlin, pp* 13o“190* 
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1. A market is essential: 
“Market means both a demand for change and a 
corresponding reward for change. 
2. New models are needed for emulation. 
‘These may be extra institutional models or 
internal models housed in distinct or separate 
units. ^ 
3» Ideas need circulation. 
“Communication between institutions should not 
be dependent only upon faculty growth but 
should be encouraged by workshops, seminars, 
and inter-institutional meetings. 
4. A number of "marginal" members are helpful. 
“Marginal members of institutions are those who 
are committed to it but not dependent upon it 
for livelihood. 
5» For major reorganization, new members seem necessary. 
“ 'The most dynamic institutions tend to be those 
where the faculty is both expanding and changing 
the most, where the junior faculty appear to have 
more influence in affecting educational policy 
than at other institutions, and where the. 
proportion of tenured faculty is lowest."^9 
6. The right people must be retained. 
-The atmosphere and environment must be conducive 
to change and supportive so that the vital 
people and advocates of new ideas stay on at the 
institution. 
7. Initiative is decentralized. 
-"We suspect that the major restriction to 
continuous reform on many campuses is the 
debilitating effects of a sense of power¬ 
lessness . . . ."30 
8. Patriarchy is avoided. 
-"In a patriarchal institution, power is not 
merely concentrated in one person or group, 
but it is assigned on the basis of seniority 
^^Ibid., p. 163* 
•^^Ibid., p. 166. 
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and is thus held interminably or indefinitely 
by senior members.”51 Patriarchy is an in¬ 
adequate form of government in a rapidly 
changing society. 
9* Collegial consensus is also avoided. 
-"Collegiality is well-suited to those colleges 
and universities that operate as holding 
companies for their faculty members—those 
institutions that exist for the purpose of 
providing professors with space, equipment, 
and apprentices, and where the combined in¬ 
terests of the faculty constitute the pur¬ 
poses of the whole."52 
Lon Hefferlin and others would maintain that 
colleges and universities are not meant to be 
such holding companies and that such governance 
control by the collegium has resulted in con¬ 
servative institutions which are not easily 
adaptable to social change. It is very diffi¬ 
cult to accomplish anything if everyone must 
agree. 
10. The institution is avuncular. 
-The term avuncular is derived from the Latin 
term avunculus referring to an uncle. The 
characteristics that identify the avuncular 
institution are: a) initiative is neither 
permanently centralized nor dispersed and all 
connected with the institution participate at 
one time or another in determining policy} 
b) high status is assigned on the basis of 
expertise and c) positions of status shift 
according to different tasks rather than in 
strict rotation. "Expertise tempers the 
authority of patriarchy and the equality of 
the collegium."53 
^^Ibid., p. 169» 
^^Ibid., p. 175. 
^^Ibid., p. 180. 
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Lon Hefferlin's study was very impressive. It 
started from a broad theoretical base concerning both 
higher education and the general process of change, used 
imaginative research methodologies^^ and analyzed per¬ 
ceptively the factors for change in universities. 
Jack Lindquist. Next to Lon Hefferlin's, the most 
immediately helpful and the most recent work on the process 
of change in colleges and universities is that being under¬ 
taken by Arthur Chickering and Jack Lindquist in the 
"Strategies for Change and Knowledge Utilization" Project 
that is being conducted under the auspices of the Union 
for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and supported 
by the National Institute for Mental Health. The project 
has both research and action objectives. 
The research seeks to identify structures, values, 
and processes which correlate highly with utilization 
of knowledge in ongoing, educational problem-solving. 
The action seeks to institutionalize within Project 
colleges and universities (currently eight) such 
self-renewing structures, values, and processes as 
well as specific academic innovations.55 
combination of evolutionary case studies, "In¬ 
stitutional Functioning Inventory," interviews. Index of 
Institutional Vitalization, etc. 
^^Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities. 
"Strategies for Change and Knowledge Utilization Brochure 
on Project," supported by the National Institute of Mental 
Health. Arthur Chickering, Director, p. 1. 
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The project was a three year project begun in 
1969/70 and although the project is completed, the final 
report is not. A valuable article by Jack Lindquist, 
however, contains a review of the background research for 
the project, a description of the project methodologies, 
and some preliminary conclusions.^^ 
The first step in the research component of the 
project was to analyze literature regarding the adoption 
of innovations, and decision-making in complex organi¬ 
zations, including the study of academic reform and 
governance in higher education. Lindquist's analysis 
of the literature suggested seven characteristics of change 
and of higher educational institutions which formed ob¬ 
stacles to academic innovation. These include: 1. most 
changes threaten secured positions, 2. institutions of 
higher education are extremely differentiated organizations, 
3, academic power is pluralistic rather than monolithic, 
4. universities display "value resistance" to innovations 
which challenge meritocracy and graduate research speciali¬ 
zation, 5. educational outcomes and future demands on the 
5^Jack Lindquist, "Political Linkage in the Academic 
Innovation Process." Journal of Higher Education. XLV 
No. 5 (May 197^)• 
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institution are inadequately measured, 6. most college 
and university members are isolated from new teaching¬ 
learning information* and ?. universities are invested 
with organizational inertia. 
Lindquist moves from a review of the barriers to 
academic reform to a discussion of various conceptual 
models of change process. He reviews those which had been 
abstracted by Havelock from diffusion studies in a wide 
variety of disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, 
psychology, and education and which were meant as general 
to 
theoretical models.^ Lindquist then proposes one that 
will, by taking into account the barriers to change in 
academic institutions, be appropriate for colleges and 
universities. 
Havelock's first major perspective or conceptual 
model is "Research Development, and Diffusion." It serves 
as a relevant paradigm for technical and social change in¬ 
cluding the following features* a. rational sequence from 
^"^Ibid., pp. 324-327. 
^^Lindquist's review of Havelock is taken from:^ 
Ronald Havelock, Planning for Innovation Through Dissemina¬ 
tion and Utilization of Knowledge, Ibid. 
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research, to testing, to production, to distribution to 
consumers, b. planning, c. division of labor, d. defined 
audience, e. high investment for maximum pay-off. Havelock 
finds it a useful model for consideration of issues at 
macrosystemic and policy levels, and Lindquist finds it 
only minimally applicable to colleges and universities 
because it assumes aspects of packaging and marketing that 
university faculty are likely to mistrust. An example 
that strengthens Lindquist's point can be found in 
Richard Evans' Resistance to Innovation in Higher Education 
where he reported on the negative response to Instructional 
Television in Selected Universities.^^ ITV could be con¬ 
sidered a research development and diffusion-type inno¬ 
vation, and it clearly failed at the university level. 
The second conceptual model suggested by Havelock 
and reported by Lindquist is the "Social Interaction 
perspective. This perspective has its roots in anthro¬ 
pology and social psychology and its major theorists 
include Newcomb, Lewin, E. Rogers, Carlson, Mantard and 
Ross. It assumes a constant empirical innovation and 
measures its flow through the social system by concentration 
on the communications network, and on the process of 
^^Richard Evans, Resistance to 
Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 196b). 
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adoption. Major points derived from theories in this 
tradition include: a. the importance of the social 
relations network, b. the importance of opinion leader¬ 
ship, c. the importance of informal personal contact, and 
d. the significance of the individual's group identity. 
Havelock and Lindquist felt that the shortcoming of this 
perspective was that it concentrated more on the individual 
than on the group or social system. 
The third model is the "Problem-Solving" perspective, 
It is closely associated with the human relations tradition 
of planned change and represents basically a psychological 
and user-oriented approach. Its major proponents include 
Benne, Libbitt, Miles and Watson. Major points stressed 
by theorists with this perspective are that knowledge 
utilization must include a diagnostic phase where user 
need is the primary consideration; that the role of the 
outsider is primarily to serve as a catalyst, collaborator 
or consultant on how to plan change; and that self¬ 
initiation by the user or client system creates the best 
motivational climate for lasting change. Bennis' study 
on the failure at Buffalo of major institutional reform 
corroborates this point/® The motivation for change 
^°Warren Bennis, The Learning Tvorv Tower (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973)• 
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at Buffalo did not come from the faculty or the students, 
but from a small group of individuals and the overall 
reform effort could not be sustained* Lindquist points, 
however, to the inadequacy of this model for higher 
education by claiming that most educational changes in 
fact are made in response to external, rather than internal 
influences. 
Havelock added to these conceptual frameworks of 
change his own model—the "Linkage Model." The key concept 
is the aspect of linkage between user and external know¬ 
ledge resources. The task of intervenors, or linking 
agents, is to bring the knowledge-disseminating, and the 
knowledge-consuming subsystems into effective and continuing 
interaction. 
Figure 1 depicts the four diffusion perspectives 
synthesized by Havelock. 
Lindquist adapted Havelock's "Linkage Model" to 
a college and university environment by creating a new 
model, the "Political Linkage Model." Figure 2 depicts this 
model. 
Lindquist's model adds to Havelock's the formal 
governance or decision-making process in a university. 
The model looks at ways teaching-learning innovations enter 
an institution. Most often students and faculty within 
the institution become aware of research and practices 
(Continued on Page 62) 
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Figure 2 
SOURCES OF NEW ACADEMIC INFORMATION 
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at other institutions. It looks at ways these ideas 
connect with needs, wants, or demands that have been 
articulated on the campus, and it studies the stages in 
the political governance system through which a proposal 
for any change in program policy or procedure must pass. 
Important to this political governance system are the 
gatekeepers who decide which proposals enter and the 
formal authorities who make the final decision. The 
next step in the process is a diffusion step within the 
university so that the program or policy will be imple¬ 
mented. 
Lindquist's model was meant as a deductive frame¬ 
work rather than a rigidly testable model, but it does 
capture some essential steps in the process of change. The 
model has been further elaborated by Lindquist and is 
currently being tested in the "Strategies for Change" 
project. Research results from that project are not yet 
available. 
On the whole, Lindquist does not think colleges 
and universities are organizations susceptible to 
innovations. He restates the Mohr hypothesis; 
Innovation is directly related to the motivation 
to innovate, inversely related to the strength of 
obstacles to innovation, and directly related to 
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"the availability of resources for overcoming 
such obstacles. 
Lindquist said that such resources as internal 
research on teaching and learning, regular in-service work¬ 
shops and training, funds for academic experimentation, 
an abundance of cosmopolitan locals, structures for aca¬ 
demic planning, professional rewards for innovators, and 
open collaborative governance are not found in many higher 
educational institutions. 
He concluded; 
The probability of academic innovation is not 
high under current conditions. Dabbling in 
educational R & D, linkage to diffusion 
channels, self-study, and collaborative problem¬ 
solving may not help much, for the problem is 
beyond mere tinkering. 
Lindquist did suggest systematic attention to re¬ 
search and development of academic innovations, attention 
to diffusion channels, collaborative problem-solving, 
professional development, and intervention into ongoing 
institutional functions. He also suggested a number of 
strategies for change; 
6l]^wrence Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation 
in Organizations," American Political Science Review, 
63 (March 1969)» pp. III-I26. 
^^Lindquist, "Political Linkage," p. 343* 
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1. hold workshops and retreats 
2. conduct faculty seminars on teaching and 
learning 
3» sponsor new faculty orientation or in-service 
training 
4. provide student orientation to learning options 
and problem-solving 
5» hire new personnel and recruit new kinds of 
students 
6. introduce an alternative learning experience 
7. restructure governance 
8. build into the institution an Educational 
Development Office and/or Research and Planning 
Committee 
9» conduct a major self-study 
10. bring in experts 
11. visit other campuses 
12. utilize social gatherings 
13• utilize administrative perogatives 
14. develop a change agent team 
15. join a consortium^^ 
Case Histories of Innovation at the College and 
University Level. The case history most closely related 
in focus to this study was a study completed by Fashing and 
^^Jack Lindquist, "Strategies for Changing Campus 
Programs,” supplement to remarks made at Commissioner's 
First Annual Conference on Non-traditional Study, Glens 
Falls, New York, November 2, 1973* 
65 
Academics in Retreat. It is a study of the process 
of educational innovation in six colleges and universities 
with reference to specific developments such as student- 
initiated experimental colleges, other experimental units, 
and ethnic studies programs. According to the authors: 
"Our central focus is on the sources of educational inno¬ 
vations, and particularly, their impact on the governance 
of the institutions in which they are undertaken.The 
timing of the study, the thinly veiled political perspective 
of the authors, and their concern with student activism and 
power reveal something of a bias to their study of the 
process of change in an institution, but the authors made 
two points well worth considering. 
They felt that the inhibitors to university reform 
were the lack of consensus about what changes are de¬ 
sirable or required, the nature of the university organi¬ 
zation with its hierarchies and divisions along narrow 
disciplinary lines, university governance structures with 
decisions reserved for the top administration and govern¬ 
ing boards, and its multiplicity of official interest groups 
within the university. 
Reviewing materials on innovation processes and 
innovative programs in a number of colleges and universities. 
^^Joseph Fashing, and Steven Deutsch, Academics in 
Retreat: The Politics of Educational Innovation (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1971)i P» 5* 
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Fashing and Deutsch found "that such programs are not only 
limited in their scope, but that they are usually set apart 
as a distinct unit from the 'normal' university.Such 
units were in addition usually given little financial 
backing and were low on the institutional priority list, 
which meant that in periods of budget crises they were 
likely to be eliminated or severely curtailed. They con¬ 
cluded, therefore, that innovative program units, like 
ethnic studies programs or experimental colleges within 
institutions, were accepted by administrations and faculty 
as "cooling out" mechanisms. 
Such attempts move to restore equilibrium without 
altering established procedures or units in any 
significant way. . . . Such moves can be in¬ 
terpreted as means to temporarily avoid the 
central issue—reform of already existing ones 
(departments). In addition, experimental pro¬ 
grams often have limited life-span and have in no 
sense been considered permanent additions to the 
institutions 
I find Fashing and Deutsch's analysis compelling 
for the period of generalized unrest and institutional 
response to that unrest of the late sixties but somewhat 
weaker as we move into the seventies and a period of 
reduced student activism. The creation of special program 
units can also represent less of an intentional device 
^^Ibid., p. 22. 
^^Ibid., p. 24. 
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for avoiding institutional change than a vehicle for ob¬ 
taining it. 
Bennis' case study also provided insights to this 
study. In The Learning Ivory Tower. Bennis describes in 
detail three events that were meaningful and important to 
him and which are related to three universal organizational 
phenomena—leadership succession, resigning, and a new 
administration's attempt at massive organizational reform. 
His intention is to provide a more thorough and realistic 
understanding of the university through describing it in its 
complexity and changes, and he counts upon the reader to 
generalize to other similarly complex situations. He 
attempts, in short, a new kind of social science, one that 
combines action and analysis. I found his method fascinating, 
and his last two chapters—where he reflects upon the failure 
of attempts to bring about radical reform at the State 
Univorsity of New York at Buffalo and offers guidelines on 
how to bring about changes in a university setting par¬ 
ticularly helpful. 
Based on his negative experience at Buffalo, 
Warren Bennis offers eleven guidelines on how to bring about 
clBnge in a university setting: 
1. Recruit with scrupulous honesty.^ 
-avoid the disparity between vision and reality 
2. Guard against the Crazies. 
68 
3* Build support among like-minded people, whether 
or not you recruited them. 
Given economic sufficiency, persons stay in 
organizations and feel satisfied in them because 
they are respected and feel competent. They are 
much freer to identify with the adaptive process 
and much better equipped to tolerate the high 
level of ambiguity that accompanies change when 
these needs are heeded."67 
4. Plan for how to change as well as what to change. 
If' change is to be permanent it must be gradual. 
The incremental-reform model depends on a rotating 
nucleus of persons who continuously read the data 
provided by the organization and the society 
around it for clues that it is time to adapt. 
5» Don't settle for rhetorical change. 
6. Don't allow those who are opposed to change to 
appropriate such basic issues as academic standards. 
7* Know the territory. 
8. Appreciate environmental factors. 
9. Avoid future shock. 
10. Allow time to consolidate gains. 
11. Remember that change is most successful when "those 
who are affected are involved in the planning. 
Another case study which provided insights on the 
dynamics of change in universities is Power and Conflict in 
the University, by Victor Baldridge. It is particularly 
important because it suggests a way for looking at the 
^"^Bennis, The Leaning Ivory Tower. Jbid., pp. I38-I39. 
68 Ibid., p. 140. 
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dynamics and interacting forces among the factors of 
change. 
Baldridge conducted an extensive research study of 
New York University. The three major thrusts of his re¬ 
search were: a. the study of policy formulation—"the 
dynamics involved in setting long-range goals and arranging 
69 basic decision structures;" ^ b. the study of conflict 
processes in the University—"the type of conflict that 
develops when interest groups try to influence policy 
decisions;" and c. the study of change dynamics in the 
university. 
Baldridge incorporates all three thrusts into the 
notion of governance but found existing theories of 
decision-making and governance—the bureaucratic and 
collegial theories—inadequate to deal with the process 
of change in the university. According to Baldridge: 
When we look at the complex and dynamic 
processes that explode on the modem campus to- 
dayi we see neither the rigidi formal aspects of 
bureaucracy nor the calm, consensus-directed 
elements of an academic collegium. On the con¬ 
trary, if student riots cripple the campus, if 
professors form unions and strike, if administra¬ 
tors defend their traditional positions, and if 
^^Victor Baldridge, Power and Conflict in “the 
University (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971)i P* 3* 
’^^Ibid. 
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external interest groups and irate governors 
invade the academic halls, all these acts must 
be seen as political. They emerge from the com- 
social structure of the university 
publics, drawing on the divergent concerns 
and life styles of hundreds of minature subcultures. 
These groups articulate their interests in many 
different ways, bringing pressure on the decision¬ 
making process from any number of angles and using 
power and force whenever it is available and 
necessary. Power and influence, once articulated, 
go through a complex process until policies are 
shaped, reshaped, and forged out of the competing 
claims of multiple groups. All this is a dynamic 
process, a process clearly indicating that the 
university is best understood as a 'politicized' 
institution--above all else the Political 
University.71 
Baldridge selected policy decisions as being the 
most important decisions and the key to studying organizational 
conflict and change, and developed a new theory of decision¬ 
making which he called a political model. His model 
suggests that the organizational analyst should focus 
on the nature of the organization's social structure, on 
interest articulation dynamics, the legislative process, 
and on the execution of policy. 
Summary. The research studies of Lon Hefferlin 
and Jack Lindquist and the case studies of Fashing and 
Deutsch, Bennis, and Baldridge all are concerned with the 
process of change in colleges and universities, and they 
all show the complexity of that process. All would have 
71 Ibid., p. 19-20. 
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agreed with Lon Hefferlin's observation concerning the 
change process: 
We have unearthed no academic philosopher's stone; 
no one device, no one mechanism, no one technique 
that seems alone adequate to bring about academic 
change. Instead a whole network of factors 
(attitudes, procedures, mechanisms, pressures) 
appear to be involved. Colleges and universities, 
like other organizations, are systemic by nature. 
To alter their operations significantly requires 
effort on several fronts at several levels and 
by several means.72 
The following chapters will consider this network 
of factors for one institution, the University of Massachusetts, 
by describing its attempts to take on the important missions 
of access, individualization, and social problem-solving. 
"^^Lon Hefferlin, Ibid., p. 1^0. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
The University of Massachusetts is a large, public, 
land grant.institution. This chapter contains: a) a brief 
overview of its history; b) a more complete description of 
its development since it achieved university status in 1947; 
c) an overview of the policies and activities of the 
University with respect to the missions of access, indi¬ 
vidualization, and social problem-solving; d) an assessment 
of those characteristics that make the University of 
Massachusetts amenable to change; and e) a description 
of its special unit change strategy. 
Brief History of the University 
Massachusetts Agricultural College. The University 
of Massachusetts is fundamentally a land grant institution, 
but it could have been other things. According to its 
historian Harold Whiting Cary: 
... it was clear that this was not to be the 
University which Massachusetts' Governor 
John A. Andrew had dreamed of in 1863» a state 
university of schools partly private and partly 
public gathered around Harvard College as their 
nucleus. And it was not the University in Boston 
which the leaders of the labor organizations had 
strongly urged in the 1930*s* This University 
was to develop where Levi Stockbridge and 
William S. Clark had cleared land of swamps 
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and bramblas "to crsab© in I867 "the Massachuseb'ts 
Agricultural College. 
The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 which promised 
federal financial assistance in agricultural education 
spurred on many years of effort within the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts to develop a school for the education 
of farmers. Finally, Massachusetts legislators determined 
not to attach the state's land grant monies to an existing 
private institution, but to create an entirely new public 
2 
institution. The institution was incorporated as 
Massachusetts Agricultural College in April I863 and it 
opened its doors to a handful of students in 186?• 
The first announcements from "Mass Aggie" 
emphasized that the new college was designed primarily 
for those who could not afford to attend the private 
colleges,^ and its main purpose was to provide "an 
4 
education for farming." 
^H.W. Cary, The University of Massachusetts; A 
History of One Hundred Years (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1962), p. 2. 
^This meant, in fact, dividing up federal land 
grant monies so that a portion would go to the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology for education in technology. 
\o this day, U. Mass, continues to be a place for 
those who cannot afford to attend the private colleges of 
the Commonwealth. In studies of entering freshmen con¬ 
ducted by the American College Testing Service each year, 
a significantly large percentage {^7% for 1968) cite low 
tuition as a major reason for attending the University. 
4 o Cary, p. 3o, 
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Between 186? and 1931. the college grew slowly 
to an enrollment of 1200, but its basic curriculum was 
centered in agriculture. Not all of those who wanted low 
cost public education, however, wanted agricultural 
education, so students, faculty and alumni pressed for 
designation as a State College rather than an agricultural 
college. A State College would enable a broader curriculum 
and a liberal degree, and would be a step in the direction 
toward a university. 
Massachusetts State College. Designation as a 
State College came in 1931* Changes were slow during this 
period but the State College gradually formed a division 
of agriculture and horticulture, a division of biological 
sciences, a division of physical sciences and mathematics, 
a division of humanities, and a division of social sciences. 
Within divisions, departments were slowly being established. 
University of Massachusetts. Enrollment grew 
slowly from 1931 'to 1945. l^ut World War II was to have a 
significant impact on the college. 
Not only was there a backlog of young people 
whose opportunity for education had been post¬ 
poned, but a new pressure of numbers was about 
to develop as a result of the increase in population 
and the desire of a larger percentage of the people 
for college training. A new emphasis upon edu¬ 
cation for professional needs, resulting in part 
from the rapid advances in technology, led to the 
demand for programs in engineering, business 
administration, and teacher training.-^ 
^Ibid., p. 173* 
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Many in the Commonwealth argued for the creation 
of a State University in Boston that would be distinct 
from the Massachusetts State College in Amherst, but in¬ 
fluential alumni as well as faculty and students were 
pushing instead for a change of status for the institution 
in Amherst. They were able to engage enough political 
support so that on May 8, 19^7f the Massachusetts State 
College became the University of Massachusetts 
The University of Massachusetts 
From 1950 to 1970 
Organization. The broadening of scope to become a 
university required new organization, new buildings, 
expansion of curriculum, and increase of staff. These 
changes took place during the decade of the fifties. All 
activities related to agriculture—education provided by 
the Stockbridge School, research, and extension activity— 
were unified in a School of Agriculture. 
In 1953 the college was responsible for the 
agricultural education of some 700 students 
and stood sixteenth among fifty land-grant 
colleges.in the total enrollment in agri¬ 
culture . ^ 
The college of Arts and Sciences—merging several divisions 
was created in 1955. A- large number of specialized 
departments were established within this college during 
the period. The department of Home Economics was trans- 
^Ibid., p. 179* 
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formed into School status in 1947* More important were 
the achievement of School status by the divisions of 
Engineering (1947)» Business Administration (1950), 
Nursing (1954)t Education (1956)» and Physical Education 
(1959). 
In comparison with other state universities, the 
University of Massachusetts was slow in its development 
of professional schools. Its Schools of Engineering and 
Business Administration were created quite latej a very 
small Medical School in Worcester did not appear until the 
sixties, and only discussions about the possibilities of 
a Law School were in evidence by 1970. 
In i960, then, the University of Massachusetts 
was not a large institution, but the basic organization at 
Amherst was established. 
Its College of Arts and Sciences was 
surrounded by six other colleges and schools 
offering vocational curricula (Agriculture, 
Engineering, Business Administration, Educa¬ 
tion, Nursing, Physical Education). A student 
body of 6500, and a resident faculty of 580 
members seemed large by standards which Amherst 
people had had in the past.7 
The decade of the sixties was going to be an era 
of more dramatic changes for the University of Massachusetts. 
Its enrollment nearly quadrupled. By the Fall of 19711 
University enrollment exceeded 25#000 students and faculty 
numbered more than I600. 
"^Ibid., p. 198. 
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Organizational changes were radical as well# The 
University became a multi-campus system with an urban 
campus in Boston, a Medical School in Worcester, and a 
systems office for its president in downtown Boston. 
It became part of a more formalized structure for public 
higher education in the Commonwealth with the passage 
of the Willis-Harrington Act in I965.® 
Its budget and facilities grew spectacularly. 
With growth at Amherst and new campuses more than seventy 
new buildings were built. The budget quadrupled so that 
the fiscal operating budget of 1971 exceeded 110 million. 
Library holdings quadrupled. 
An important achievement was legislation granting 
fiscal autonomy to the University in 1962. This allowed 
the University to set its own salary schedules and thus 
compete successfully for faculty. Marked improvements in 
the quality of the faculty were a result. 
Its academic program expanded and improved in 
quality upon the foundation built in the 1950's» Table 1 
lists university departments by college or school and the 
degree programs offered as of June 1972. 
®The Willis-Harrington Plan set up and defined 
a state-wide university system, a State College system, 
and a community college system, a coordinating Board of 
Higher Education, and an Advisory Council on Education. 
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TABLE 1 
DEPARTMENTS AND DEGREE PROGRAMS 
A - Associate 
M - Master S 
(Stockbridge) B - Bachelor D - Doctorate 
“ Master, more than 42 required credits 










College of Agriculture 
Agricultural and Food Economics 
Entomology 
Environmental Science 
Food and Agricultural Engineering 
Food Science and Technology 
Forestry and Wildlife Management 
Hotel, Restaurant, and Travel Administration 
Landscape Architecture 
Plant Pathology 
Plant and Soil Science 
D S M B 




D S M B 
D* M B 
D* M B 




D* M B 
M B 
College of Arts and Sciences 






French and Italian 
Germanic Languages and Literature 





Slavic Languages and Literature 






D S M B 










D M B 
D* M B 
D* M B 




Geology and Geography 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
A - Associate (Stockbridge) B - Bachelor D - Doctorate 
M - Master S - Master, more than 42 required credits 
D. M B 
M B 
D M B 
D* M B 
Mathematics and Statistics 
Microbiology 







School of Business Administration 
Accounting 
General Business and Finance 
Management 
Marketing 











Industrial Engineering and Operations 
Research 






School of Home Economics 
Home Economics Education 
Human Development 
Management and Family Economics 
Nutrition and Food 
Textiles, Clothing, and Environmental Arts 






School of Physical Education 
Exercise Science 
Physical Education for Men 














TABLE 1 (Continued) 
A - Associate (Stookbridge) B - Bachelor D - Doctorate 




Bachelors Degree with Individual Concentration 
Continuing Education 
Honors Program 
Institute for Man and His Environment 








Five College cooperative PHD offered. 
SOURCE: Patricia Bourke, Richard Story, and 
Richard Wagner, “I97I-I972 UM/A Data Sheets" (Amherst: 
Office of Institutional Studies, 1972). 
The number of graduate programs had doubled since I960; 
new research programs had been established in computer 
science, polymer science, and marine science; and new 
service centers were created in labor relations, water 
resources, and governmental services. A graduate Dean had 
been established and a new facility for graduate research 
begun. A Division of Continuing Education had been 
established in 1970 to provide credit and non-credit 
educational programs throughout the state. 
One of the most important changes at the University 
of Massachusetts involved the School of Education. In 
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1968 a new Dean was hired and given the mandate to revamp 
the education program. He did this almost with a ven¬ 
geance. Within the space of two years the School of 
Education had a new and quadrupled faculty* a thousand 
graduate students, innumerable activities and outreach 
programs throughout the state and nation, and an entirely 
new curriculum that was strikingly different from the 
rest of the University. The objective of the School of 
Education was to act as an agent of change for elementary, 
secondary, and higher education. It clearly affected the 
rest of the University. 
Leadership. The leadership of the University of 
Massachusetts during the period from 1950 to 1970 was quite 
strong, but underwent significant changes which in turn 
affected the basic orientation of the University. 
Ralph Van Meter, President of the University 
from 1947 to 1954, had begun the transformation from a 
college to a university. Jean Mather, President from 
1954 to i960 had devoted most of his attention to building 
the physical plant to accommodate the influx of students 
and faculty. He was committed to growth. 
The obvious need for developing greater oppor¬ 
tunities in public higher education for the 
tidal wave of youngsters now coming up through 
the elementary and secondary schools of 
Massachusetts is a real challenge. The very 
preponderance of private colleges and liniver- 
sities in the state, all committed to a program 
82 
of limited enrollment, makes the challenge 
here the greatest, I believe, in the 
country.9 
Mather also worked for the achievement of fiscal autonomy 
for the campus although this was not fully achieved until 
1962, during the presidency of John Lederle (I960-I970). 
Lederle, too, was concerned with providing 
educational opportunity to citizens of the Commonwealth. 
We are pledged to the democratic principle 
of the right of every individual, regard¬ 
less of race, religion, or economic back¬ 
ground, to that amount and kind of education 
of which he is capable and for which he has the 
desire and will.^^ 
He was concerned, perhaps, with building a great, public, 
research-oriented university on the model of Michigan 
and Berkeley. Under Lederle and his Provost, Oswald Tippo, 
hundreds of new faculty members were brought to the Uni¬ 
versity. They recruited primarily young men trained at 
Harvard, Yale, Michigan, or Berkeley and committed to 
graduate education and research. During this period, 
the University of Massachusetts took a leading place among 
state universities. 
^Jean Mather, "Inaugural Address," quoted in 
Cary, Ibid., p. I89. 
^^John Lederle, Report of the President for i960, 
quoted in Cary, Ibid., p. 197•^ 
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Spectacular growth on the Amherst campus was 
augmented by the establishment of a branch campus in 
Boston and plans for a Medical School in Worcester. In 
1969* plans for system-wide reorganization were announced, 
and Robert Wood in succeeding Lederle in 1970 became the 
President of the University of Massachusetts system. 
His office was moved to Boston. 
Robert Wood de-emphasized graduate education 
and research and concerned himself more with the role 
of the University within the Commonwealth. 
But I am inclined toward research that will 
actually solve problems and toward education 
that really helps the student concerned .... 
But the real challenge comes in bringing the 
University and the real world together in new 
ways .... The knowledge and skills that 
exist in this University are among the state's 
great natural resources. The Commonwealth has 
a right to that knowledge and those skills. 
They represent opportunities to bring about not 
only incremental improvements but institutional 
change .... I am persuaded that the real 
hope for change lies in an 'institutional' 
approach. The University as an institution 
that represents both knowledge and change can 
work with other institutions that need know¬ 
ledge and are receptive to change. This 
process—properly undertaken—can feed back to 
and strengthen the University's own educational 
and research capacities. 
This re-orientation toward social problem-solving 
and public service would prove difficult for the faculty 
hired by Tippo and Lederle in the 1960'^ but unquestionably 
^^Robert Wood, "Inaugural Address," The Alumnus 
2 (February/March 1971)* 3”8. 
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the interests of the leadership of the University of 
Massachusetts from 1950 to I970 combined to make the 
University of Massachusetts responsive to the pressures 
for providing access, individualization, and social 
problem-solving. 
Administration. As a result of growth and the 
move to a multi-campus system, the administrative organi¬ 
zation of the University was in flux during the period 
from 1950 to 1970. The president had a small systems 
®^^ice staff in Boston. Each of the three campuses was 
headed by a chancellor. At the Amherst campus (by far 
the largest campus in the system), the chancellor had 
reporting to him a Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs 
and Provost and Vice-Chancellors for Student Affairs and 
Administrative Services. Deans of the Schools and Colleges 
reported to the Provost. During this period, the number 
of top level administrative positions and the turnover 
in these positions was considerable. 
Robert Wood's arrival, his move of the president's 
office from the Amherst campus, and his stated intentions 
of re-orienting the University toward public service and 
away from graduate education, and the "Michigan/Berkeley 
Model" led to an inevitable power struggle with the then- 
chancellor, Oswald Tippo. Tippo would resign in 1971, 
but the dynamics of power and conflict was significant 
during 1970 and 1971* 
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Goye_mance» The basic governance structures at 
the University of Massachusetts were similar to those at 
other universities. The Board of Trustees made all final 
decisions on the recommendation of the president. The 
president in turn sought the advice in academic areas 
of a representative faculty senate, and in student life 
areas, of a representative student senate. An academic 
Matters Council considered proposals for new course, 
major programs, and other academic programs, and forwarded 
these to the faculty senate. 
During the late sixties, student dissatisfaction 
and considerable faculty sentiment that the administration 
was making too many policy decisions without consulting 
the faculty led to a reexamination of governance by 
several committees. A variety of proposals for reorganiza¬ 
tion were made and widely debated on the campus. Students 
suggested an all-university senate and rumblings about 
faculty unionization and collective bargaining were heard. 
What emerged by the early seventies was a system of multiple 
governance units—faculty senate, student senate and 
administration--with final decisions allowed to that unit 
which had been granted responsibility in the particular 
area. 
The Evolution of Mission and Objective from 1950 to 
1970. It is difficult to define the missions and objectives 
of the University of Massachusetts from 1950 to 1970 for it 
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was clearly a ’'multiversity" in both the positive and 
negative definitions of the term coined by Clark Kerr. 
There were many goals, a large number of sub-groups 
among students, faculty, and administrators, whose in¬ 
terests sometimes corresponded and sometimes clashed, 
and an array of activities ranging from undergraduate 
education to large scale research and service efforts. 
The dynamic forces and the pace of change at the University 
of Massachusetts were considerable and the University's 
sense of its mission evolved in response to these forces. 
One way of describing the missions of the University 
of Massachusetts and their evolution is to look at state¬ 
ments from major plsinning documents during the period. In 
1962, the Long Range Academic Planning Committee of the 
Faculty Senate issued its report and supported a multiple 
role for the University of Massachusetts as a land grant 
institution of higher learning supported by the Common¬ 
wealth. 
As such, the University carries a strong mandate 
for rendering appropriate educational services on 
behalf of the people, the Commonwealth and the 
common good. But as our institution of higher 
learning, it also carries a primary obligation to 
other universities to uphold intellectual stan¬ 
dards and ideals. 
12 
1962 Report of the Long Range Academic Planning 
Committee, by Maxwell Goldberg, Chairr^n (Amherst? 
University of Massachusetts, 1962)1 p» 6. 
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Under multiple roles Uie committee called for 
teaching, research, extension, equality of opportunity, 
and excellence, but it clearly stressed excellence as 
defined by a student body dravm from the top twenty per 
cent of their high school graduating class, a faculty 
holding doctorates from elite institutions, and a large 
number of graduate programs. 
A September 1970 report of a different Faculty 
Senate Long Range Planning Committee reverses this posture 
to some extent and stresses the notion of equality of 
opportunity. 
... a public university in a democratic 
society cannot pursue an educational philosophy 
which, in effect, outlines a policy of ex¬ 
clusivity. A democracy implies diversity. A 
public university must, to Y^atever extent 
practicable, reflect that diversity.^3 
The many recommendations in the report reflected 
the changes the Committee felt were needed for the 
University of Massachusetts to accomplish its mission 
of diversity as a public university. It called for more 
and more diverse students, a commitment to academic 
experimentation and innovation in response to student 
dissatisfactions, a commitment to public service, and a 
better articulation of the role of the University in the 
^^Directions for the Seventies;^ A Report of the 
Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee, by Joseph 
Marcus, Chairman (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 
September 1970)1 P« 
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Commonwealth. Overall, however, the report emphasized 
the improvement of undergraduate education. 
This report had been completed and distributed in 
September 1970. In December 1970, Robert Wood was 
inaugurated as president and he used the occasion to name 
a new committee—The Committee on the Future University of 
Massachusetts. In contrast to long range planning 
committees, this was not solely a faculty committee, 
but a committee including students, faculty, alumni, 
and leading members of the professional and business 
community. It was headed by Vernon Alden, Chairman of 
the Board of the Boston Company and former president of 
Ohio University. After a year, the committee issued its 
report, commonly called "The Future Report," with the 
following intentions: 
... to outline a set of goals and directions for 
the University for the coming years that will help 
generate a renewed sense of public trust that the , 
University belongs to the people of the Common¬ 
wealth and is serving them, inspire a renewed 
sense of purpose and mission within the University, 
and instill in the elected leadership of the State 
a renewed confidence and shared vision that the 
University deserves jPull and unstinting support 
in the years ahead. 
The Future Committee too called for teaching, research, 
service, and academic excellence. It stressed under- 
^^Reoort of the President’s Committee on the Future 
Universitv~~of Massachusetts, by Vernon Alden,Chairman 
(Boston; University of Massachusetts, 1971)• P* 
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graduate education, and, most importantly, called for a new 
involvement of the University in society. "We believe 
universities should be responsive rather than disengaged, 
appliers as well as creators of knowledge, questioners as 
well as conservers of values,The Committee called 
for a series of changes on all campuses of the University 
in such areas as admissions, educational programs, academic 
organization, and administrative priorities. They ordered 
these recommendations around five major themes: accessi¬ 
bility, diversity, undergraduate teaching, service, and 
productivity. The Committee wanted the University of 
Massachusetts to be a "new model for the public university 
in America—one defined by its stronger emphasis upon the 
quality of the undergraduate learning experience and 
service to society. 
Therefore, while the mission of the University of 
Massachusetts from 1950 to 1970 continued to include the 
traditional functions of teaching, research and public 
service, and a committment to academic excellence, the 
emphasis changed considerably over the period from a stress 
on graduate education and research to higher priority for 
undergraduate education and public service. 
^^Ibid., p. 52 
^^Ibid. 
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The University of Massachusetts and 
Access, Individualization, and 
Social Problem-Solving 
Access* It has been pointed out that the pre¬ 
dominant preoccupation of the University of Massachusetts 
for the period 1950 to 1970 ' was institutional growth 
and expansion. The University's rationale for its ex¬ 
ceedingly rapid growth rate was the provision of educational 
opportunity to the citizens of the Commonwealth. 
Between 1950 and 1959» the overall enrollment 
(graduate, undergraduate, and Stockbridge School) grew 
seventy-five per cent from 3#524 students to 6, 131. 
Between i960 and 1969* enrollment on the Amherst campus 
grew 191 per cent, from 6,495 to 18,865.^’^ If the enroll¬ 
ments of the Division of Continuing Education and the 
Boston and Worcester campuses are added, the figure reaches 
24,989.^® 
^*^Diraction for the Seventies, Ibid., Table 2, p.8. 
^^Opening Fall Enrollment in Higher Education, 1970, 
Report on Preliminary Survey (U.S. Dept, of H.E.W., 1970), 
cited in Future Report, Ibid., p. 1-4. It is worth noting 
as well the comparative enrollment increase among institu¬ 
tions of higher education in the Commonwealth. 
Reflecting the changes in the relative roles of the 
public and private sectors in Massachusetts, there has been 
a spectacular increase in the size of the public sector. In 
ten years the State system has grown from 17,190 students^ 
in sixteen institutions to 74,002 in twenty-nine institutions: 
from 6,371 at the University to 22,851; from 8,373 at the 
eleven State Colleges to 26,652; from I5I at one community 
college to 17,850 at thirteen of them; and from 2,295 at the 
technological institutes to 6,650. Fourth Annual Report of 
the Chancellor, Board of Higher Education (January 1971)* 
cited in Future Report, Ibid., p. 15» 
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Not everyone on the Amherst campus approved of 
such rapid expansion, however, and a review of major 
recommendations for admissions policies shows a shift in 
emphasis over the period similar to the shift in priorities 
among University missions. 
The 1962 Long Range Planning Committee had been 
very conservative and had recommended the University slow 
its growth rate to approximately ten per cent a year and 
concentrate on increasing the proportion of graduate 
students in the overall student body. The admissions 
policies throughout the sixties have been characterized 
by the Director of Admissions at the University, Robert 
Doolan: 
The admissions function is but a reflection of 
the University's philosophy and objectives. Like 
the institution it too has been quantitative, 
means-oriented and concerned with logistics over 
the past quarter of a century .... It was 
an era perhaps best described ... by the phrase 
'pursuit of excellence' .... The demands for 
the higher-qualified student from an increasing¬ 
ly larger base of selection became the basic 
admission philosophy for the time.^" 
The proportion of graduate students in the overall 
student body did rise dramatically during the sixties. And 
^^Robert Doolan, Report on the Present and Future 
Status of Undergraduate Admissions at the University, of 
Massachusetts at Amherst (Amherst^University of Massachu¬ 
setts, January 197^)» 1» 7* 
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the Admissions Office was able to recruit the higher- 
qualified students because it used predictive formulas, and be¬ 
cause the applicant pool was quite large. But the University 
far exceeded the Long Range Planning Committees recommenda¬ 
tions concerning enrollment growth. 
By the late sixties, the concept of access was 
taking on new meaning. It began to connote the provision 
of educational opportunity for those groups that had 
previously not been part of higher education—youth from 
poor families, minority groups, persons beyond the normal 
college age. The Long Range Planning Committee of 1970 
took the view "that it is not necessary to have highly 
selective standards of admissions to have a quality public 
20 
university." The Committee recommended a more flexible 
admissions policy to provide access to those who had been 
turned away by the rigid prediction formulas. 
^^Directions for the Seventies, Ibid., p. ^8. 
The committee view was informed by the work of Alexander 
Astin, who after study of the relationship between under¬ 
graduate achievement and institutional excellence concluded 
that there was no direct correlation between the two and 
therefore that admissions standards could be lowered with¬ 
out negative effect on bright students, less able students, 
or the quality of the institution. 
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The Committee on the Future University laid even 
greater stress on access: 
The opportunity for higher education has not 
yet been extended to all who should have it. 
Ability knows no lines of income or race. A 
public university, especially, has an obliga¬ 
tion to all the citizens who support it, to 
say nothing of its obligation to facilitate 
mobility as part of the American committment 
to equal opportunity.21 
They looked at the trends in the economic background of 
the student body and were concerned to find the percentage 
of students from lower-income families decreasing. They 
recommended changes in admissions policies, more recruit- 
22 
ment and, as a critical factor, more financial aid. 
The Future Committee also recommended attention to 
a more diverse student body in terms of age. Having already 
recommended admission of more low income persons, and 
recognizing a potential conflict in the fact that the 
traditional older student clientele tends to be more 
affluent, the Committee in turn recommended that the 
University "design or adopt programs which would tend to 
have more appeal to lower-income older people, 
and then recruit students specifically for those 
^^Future Report, Ibid., p. 53' 
22. "'‘^The Future Report did not recommend an open ad¬ 
missions policy for the University because it 
that would not be physically possible or 
desirable, but it did suggest that as a whole, public high 
education in Massachusetts move to open admissions. 
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programs, 
Thus the Future Committee recommended a specific, 
and immediate program response as a vehicle through which 
the University could provide greater access. 
Individualization. During the fifties and early 
sixties, the University had put all of its energies into 
development as a major graduate university and into growth 
to accommodate a very large influx of students. Even in 
curricular planning and academic programming, the emphasis 
was on numbers not on individualization or responsiveness 
to the developmental needs of individual students. The 
1962 Long Range Planning Committee devoted only a few 
pages to discussion of the curriculum. They called for 
a number of new departments and schools and further 
study of the academic program, but they did not relate 
their recommendations to student needs. 
By the late sixties, however, the emphasis had 
shifted at the University of Massachusetts toward a concern 
for the undergraduate student. U.Mass students had joined 
the nation-wide student protest movement over the war in viet- 
Nam, and although there had been only a small number 
of disruptions on campus, faculty and administrators were 
^^Future Report, Ibid., p. 26. 
95 
showing a new concern. Political activism was combined 
with activism focusing on academic reform. Students 
initiated a week-end conference to bring together students, 
faculty I and administrators to discuss important issues 
in the University. These week-end conferences, called 
SWAP conferences, became an annual event. In April of 
1970, students organized a moratorium on classes in order 
to spend time on educational reform issues. The faculty, 
too, had become active and had sponsored a series of 
conferences to discuss ways to improve undergraduate 
teaching, grading reforms, and other issues. The Academic 
Matters Council spent much of its time deliberating over 
the undergraduate program. 
The Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee, 
which issued its Report in 1970, therefore paid much closer 
attention to curricular and other aspects affecting student 
life. It considered that a series of academic reforms 
and other changes were needed on the Amherst campus to 
make it a better educational environment for students. 
They investigated reform efforts at other universities 
and quoted the "Muscatine Report" recommendations as their 
own I 
.... Consequently, many of our concrete 
recommendations are for substantial ex¬ 
periments, not for untested wholesale changes. 
In this spirit, we have avoided wherever possible 
the temptation to frame legislation for 'all* 
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students and 'every* department . . . chances 
are most likely to succeed if they remain 
optional, offered along with the means for their 
implementation on experimental trial, then, left 
to the judgment of those for whose benefit they 
are intended,^ 
The Committee recommended supplementing the normal pattern 
of divisional and major requirements by a number of optional 
programs for undergraduate students. 
By 1970, optional programs outside departments 
included the following: Orchard Hill Residential College. 
Southwest Residential College, Project 10, Program for the 
Collegiate Education of Black Students (CCEBS), an Honors 
Program, and International Programs in Bologna, Freiburg, 
Oxford, Madrid, Pau, and Colraine, Within Schools and Colleges, 
increased options were being made available as well. In the 
Spring of 1968, the College of Arts and Sciences conducted 
an extensive review of its educational program. It con¬ 
ducted a study of student attitudes toward undergraduate 
course requirements and found that students endorsed course 
work in the major and electives as important sources of 
education, but did not like required distributional or 
^^Education at Berkeley: the Muscatine Report, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968X p. 
as quoted in Direction for the Seventies, Ibid., p. 66. 
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core courses. "A large majority of students evidenced 
a desire to change the existing curriculum with regard 
to seven out of eight of the core requirements."^^ Several 
changes were made during the late sixties which eased these 
requirements by allowing more options for students within 
the designated core areas of humanities and fine arts, 
social and behavioral sciences, mathematics and natural 
sciences, and rhetoric. 
The Report of the Committee on the Future University 
also emphasized the notion of optional programs to provide 
choices for students. 
The University should seek to intensify its 
undergraduate focus, offering a diversity of pro¬ 
grams, places and times to learn suitable to a di¬ 
verse student body and a complex society .... 
A greater diversity of carefully designed 
options . . . including more options for inde¬ 
pendent study, broadened majors, (and) new 
problem oriented approaches to learning .... 
They felt that: 
. . . the undergraduate curriculum should avoid 
impersonality, meet real career needs and pressing 
societal needs, make the most effective use of 
educational resources and students' time, relate 
classroom work more directly to the world beyond 
the campus, educate better citizens, and promote 
physical accessibility.^^ 
^Ted Jakubowski; and H. Roy Kaplan, Seniors^ View 
the Core Curriculum; A Survey Report (Amherst: Office of 
Institutional Studies, University of Massachusetts, October 
1968), p. 1. 
Future Report, Ibid., p. 42. 
27 Ibid., p. 56. 
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Greater individualization and responsiveness to 
student needs was encouraged in the academic area 
through the provision of more programmitic options and 
through granting students the ability to choose among those 
options. 
Social Problem-Solving. It has been pointed out 
that when Robert Wood assumed the presidency of the University 
of Massachusetts in 1970, he emphasized the need for more 
public service which would be geared to the solution of 
social problems. James Pease who studied the public 
service role and activities of the University felt that 
this was a significant departure. He claims that there 
had not been a coherent, positive policy statement on 
public service from the administration or Board of 
Trustees until President Wood's inaugural address and that 
"public service responsibilities have been recognized 
and carried out largely by the efforts of individuals with¬ 
in the University. 
The Long Range Planning Committee which reported 
in 1970 had devoted only five pages to the question of 
public service and in those had emphasized Continuing 
^^James Pease, Public Service and the Public 
University: EnvironmentalProblem-Solving and Research 
(Amherst, University of Massachusetts, January 1971)• 
29 Ibid., p. 58# 
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Education rather than the application of the University's 
resources to the solution of specific problems. It had 
recommended a review of campus outreach activities "to 
insure that public service activities are sufficient to 
and compatible with the University's mission as a public 
30 
university" but had suggested that the University should 
not be turned into a service station. 
While Pease had found ambivalence and confusion 
within the University over the appropriate University role 
in public service, he found the same confusion outside. 
He administered questionnaires and interviewed 
many throughout the state and in the University and con¬ 
cluded that while action agencies and planning commissions 
in Massachusetts thought the University should be involved 
in problem-solving research, the Office of Administration 
and Finance was skeptical about the University's ability to 
deliver and therefore reluctant to support such activities 
through state appropriations. The Future Report, issued 
a year after the Long Range Planning Committee Report 
and after the arrival of Robert Wood, placed much more 
emphasis on social problem-solving. The report can be seen 
as an attempt to convince the legislature and through them, 
^^nirections Tor the Seventies, Ibid., p. 1^^ 
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the Office of Administration and Finance of the importance 
of legislative appropriations to the University for such 
activities. 
The Future Report defined public service as in¬ 
cluding three major areas; advice and technical assistance 
in problem-solving, research toward solution of public 
policy problems, non-degree training programs for govern¬ 
ment social service personnel. It called for an expanded 
public role for the University in the Commonwealth with 
emphasis on service to immediate neighbors, service to 
government agencies, and service to the poor. It felt that 
the University should help the Commonwealth provide better 
education and economic growth. 
The list of organized public service programs at 
the University of Massachusetts in the late sixties 
mentioned by the Faculty Senate Long Range Planning 
Committee Report, the Pease Study, and the Future Report 
included; 
1. The Cooperative Extension Service - involving 
University of Massachusetts from 19O8 in agriculture, land 
use, planning, and rural community development. 
2. The Water Resources Research Center. 
3. The Institute of Agricultural and Industrial 
Microbiology which was transformed into the Environmental 
Sciences Department of College of Food and Natural Re¬ 
sources . 
4. The Labor Relations and Research Center 
5* The Center for Business and Economic Research 
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of the School of Business Administration 
6. The Commonwealth Technical Services Division of 
the School of Engineering 
?• The Center for Urban Education in the School of 
Education 
8. The Division of Continuing Education 
This list does not include service activities 
of individual faculty members, and even the level of activity 
among these groups varied considerably. The Extension 
Service was quite large, involving hundreds of people 
throughout the Commonwealth for substantial amounts of 
time, while the Center for Business and Economic Research 
involved only a few individuals at sporadic intervals. Both 
the Long Range Planning Committee and Future Committee 
recommended greater coordination among service activities. 
This list is not impressive, moreover, when 
compared to other universities, for others were developing 
research institutes in addition to centers throughout 
the fifties and sixties. Stanley Ikenberry studied this 
development. He defined institutes and centers as 
a new organizational form in universities, (that) 
were formally identified by specific names or 
titles and (that) were established on a permanent 
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basis' as separate entities for carrying on 
continuing research programs.31 
Ikenberry studied the characteristics of institutes 
and centers in fifty-one land grant universities and found 
that "in some institutions, institutes and centers are 
almost as numerous as departments, with an average of some 
eighteen institutes and centers each in this particular group 
32 
of universities." Ikenberry attributed their appearance 
to the inability of discipline-based departments to focus 
on tasks and problem-solving and considered them a sig¬ 
nificant organizational alternative. 
At the University of Massachusetts, however, Oswald 
Tippo and others had been opposed to institutes during the 
sixties and had only allowed the creation of centers which 
remained closely affiliated with existing Schools and 
Departments. Thus the University's commitment to social 
problem-solving as seen in policy statements and organized 
activities was less impressive than its committments to 
access and individualization. Much of what it did accomplish 






Stanley Ikenberry, A Profile of Proliferatip_g 
(University Park, Pa.: Center for the Study 
Education, the Pennsylvania State University 
6, November 1970)i P« 3* 
^^Ibid., p. 16. 
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Characteristics That Make the 
University of Massachusetts 
Amenable to Change 
Organizational Characteristics, It can be con¬ 
cluded from the shifting priorities for missions and 
objectives over the period from 1950 to 1970, and from 
the response to the missions of access, individualization, 
and social problem-solving, that the University of 
Massachusetts had a positive orientation toward change. 
Organizational characteristics that seemed most important 
to this change orientation include: 
A. Spectacular growth in enrollment, facilities, 
and faculty. 
B. Adequate resources provided by the State to 
support this growth. 
C. Fiscal autonomy so that the University could 
internally allocate resources for redirection in response 
to its own priorities and missions. 
D. A major organizational shift from a single 
campus to a multi-campus system. The resulting unstable 
organizational environment proved conducive to change. 
E. A shifting governance structure. 
F. A critical mass of faculty who were interested 
in academic reform and public service. 
G. Many students who applied pressure for change 
and who were willing to work with faculty and administrators. 
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H. Strong yet changing leadership throughout 
the decade. 
I. A number of institutional self studies, 
committees on long range planning, and frequent open 
discussions on missions and the role of the university in 
society. 
J. An overall climate for change. Students, 
faculty, and administrators felt that it was worth working 
for change because change was possible. 
It would, however, be a mistake to oversimplify. 
Although campus leaders were prepared to place emphasis and 
"prioritize," they were not ready to become one-dimensional, 
so the University of Massachusetts remained a complex in¬ 
stitution with many missions and objectives. Also, the shifts 
in orientation from graduate to undergraduate education; and 
from pure research to applied research, public service, and 
social problem-solving were shifts more obvious in the 
rhetoric than in the organizational structure, the alloca¬ 
tion of resources, or the activity levels. 
Special Units as Vehicles for Change. The vehicle 
for change most often advocated and used at the University 
of Massachusetts was the creation of new programs or 
centers. Special programs were advocated and created 
as a means to be responsive to a new student clientele. 
^^See Chapter VI for assessments of these con¬ 
ditions in relation to the literature on change. 
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Departmental and extra-departmental educational program 
op'tions were created in an attempt to be more responsive 
to student needs, and special extension research and service 
centers were begun to more directly relate the University's 
resources to social problems. 
The University Without Walls Program allowed the 
University of Massachusetts to pay special attention to 
the mission of access. This program not only made the 
University efforts more visible, it created pressures 
for change throughout the system—in admissions, student 
support services, curricular requirements, and other areas. 
Thus in ways far beyond what its actual student enrollment 
would imply, U.W.W. helped the University of Massachusetts 
be more responsive to the mission of achieving access. 
The Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration 
Program served as a vehicle through which the University 
of Massachusetts assumed the mission of individualization. 
The BDIC program not only made the University’s efforts 
at providing for individualization more visible, in itself 
became an important vehicle in the University for gauging 
student interests. Spinoffs from BDIC became new major 
programs of study, and for the first time these programs 
were determined by students rather than faculty. In 
addition, since students could design their own majors 
as alternatives to departmental majors, departments 
began to revitalize their own offerings to keep students 
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interested, thus making the University as a whole more 
responsive to the mission of individualization. 
Although there was less enthusiasm for the mission 
of social problem-solving at the University of Massachusetts, 
and throughout the sixties the University had avoided the 
creation of separate research institutes, it did approve 
the Institute for Man and His Environment as a vehicle 
for focusing the resources of the University on environ¬ 
mental related problems. The Institute did make the 
University's efforts (and lack of them) visible in this 
area and pointed clearly to the difficulties of responding 
to the mission of social problem-solving. 
Summary. The quarter century following World 
War II was an extraordinary period of growth and development 
for the newly designated University of Massachusetts. The 
University was aware of the missions of access, individuali¬ 
zation and social problem-solving and intended to be 
institutionally responsive to them. The primary vehicle 
for this change effort was the creation of special program 
units, the University Without Walls, The Bachelor's Degree 
With Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man 
and His Environment. These programs in turn enabled more 
institution-wide responsiveness to the missions. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE UNIVERSITY WITHOUT WALLS 
The University Without Walls is a programmatic 
vehicle for fulfilling the mission of the provision of 
access and equal educational opportunity. It was planned 
and implemented at the University of Massachusetts between 
1970 and 1972. This chapter starts with information on 
the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, the 
National University Without Walls program and the School 
of Education, as necessary background for the campus 
University Without Walls unit; describes the planning pro¬ 
cess from its beginning in the School of Education, through 
the pilot year of the program; describes the evolution of 
the major objectives and concepts of the program; and con¬ 
cludes with an overview of the major change factors in the 
program. Chapter VI analyzes these factors in greater 
detail and compares them to those operating in other 
programs. 
The goals of the University Without Walls program 
are * 
A. to provide access to the University of 
Massachusetts for people who would not otherwise 
have access, and have few other options for formal 
education; 
B. to offer a competency-based B.A. degree from 
the University, one that would certify a competent 
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scholar-to-be or practitioneri 
. C. to help these students learn how to make the 
University work for them (i.e., to make it a more 
humane, student-centered place); 
D. to help these students develop into life¬ 
long learners.^ 
The University Without Walls Program was committed 
to providing access to a different student clientele, and 
it was committed to the creation of different academic 
programs that would be appropriate for its students. The 
process of defining these commitments and their realiza¬ 
tion in the organizational format of a program provides 
a lense through which to view the process of change in a 
university. 
Background to University 
Without Walls 
The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities. 
The University Without Walls program considered in this 
study was a program developed on the Amherst campus of the 
University of Massachusetts. It was also one of thirty units 
in the country which were sponsored by the Union for Ex¬ 
perimenting Colleges and Universities. The history of the 
Union and the development of the National UWW concept is 
important to the development of the University of 
Massachusetts' unit because it established the context 
^"University Without Walls," University of Massa¬ 
chusetts Proposal, Draft (March 7i 1972). 
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and parameters for that unit. It is important as well to 
the consideration of the broader issue of organizational 
response to new missions for higher education because the 
Union and UWW saw -themselves as vehicles to help existing 
colleges and universities change. 
The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities 
is an association of colleges and universities whose twenty 
institutional members include small liberal arts colleges, 
large public universities, community colleges, predominantly 
black colleges* and special interest colleges such as the 
Collegio Jacinto Trevino. The presidents of these in¬ 
stitutions formed the association to encourage research, 
2 
experimentation, and innovation in higher education. 
They recognized the difficulty of changing organizational 
structures (their own institutions included) and sought 
to encourage change through collaborative efforts. To¬ 
gether they planned a new entity—the University Without 
Walls. 
The University Without Walls. The University 
Without Walls was to be an alternative structural form 
^The presidents of the affiliated institutions were 
the institutional representatives to the Union and attended 
all Union meetings with one exception—the University of 
Massachusetts. At U.Mass., the School of Education was -the 
affiliate member and the Representative was a then Associate 
Dean—Robert Woodbury. Both of these anomalies will be im¬ 
portant to the development of the University Without Walls 
unit at U.Mass. 
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with a distinct philosophy and organization, but it was to 
be organizationally affiliated with many diverse in¬ 
stitutions.^ 
Robert Woodbury, currently the Associate Provost 
for Special Programs at the University of Massachusetts, 
was involved from the beginning with the planning for the 
National University Without Walls. He described its ob¬ 
jectives as follows: 
The University Without Walls wanted to provide 
access to a college education, but they wanted 
to see if that college experience could be built 
without depending upon the capital expenditures 
of a campus setting or upon campus residency. 
They wanted to see if it was possible for a peo¬ 
ple to go through the college experience no 
matter where they lived. The second theme was 
3 
^Other educators, also recognizing the difficulties 
of achieving swift organizational change, were recommend¬ 
ing and establishing other types of alternative university 
structures during these years. External degree programs, 
open universities and other units were being talked 
about in nearly every state and a few were actually 
established. The unique asset of the University Without 
Walls program in comparison to these units is the fact 
of continued affiliation with more traditional institutions. 
This makes possible a reallocation of manpower and 
facilities to new purposes and theoretically does not re¬ 
quire major new expenditures. Other alternative structures 
were starting from zero as new institutions. Many of 
these have faltered while UWW has flourished. 
Ill 
that UWW would be a program that provided a freer 
structure for students to build their own edu¬ 
cation. This freer structure might be of interest 
to current students as well as non-traditional 
students.^ 
While the planning for the University Without 
Walls involved presidents, faculty and students from 
member institutions of the Union, and many community 
representatives, it was spearheaded and orchestrated by 
one man, Sam Baskin. Baskin was a faculty member of 
Antioch College and the president of the Union. Without 
his vision, persistence to the point of single-mindedness, 
and strong leadership, the difficulties of coordinating 
the many and diverse groups and institutions and of ob¬ 
taining sufficient financial support could never have been 
overcome. 
Baskin was able to obtain the financial backing 
of the Office of Education and the Ford Foundation. O.E. 
and Fbrd together gave $800,000 as seed money for the 
implementation of the idea, and smaller grants were re¬ 
ceived for the development of a plan for assessment and 
research, for overseas expansion of the idea, and for other 
special purposes. 
^Interview with Robert Woodbury, Associate Provost, 
March 30» 197^• 
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This level of support was important as it enabled 
the Union to cover the costs of coordination and also 
provide grants of approximately forty thousand to those 
colleges and universities which agreed to plan a UWW unit 
which would remain affiliated with their institution. In 
a sense it gave the Union the wherewithal! to buy themselves 
in.^ The University of Massachusetts was one of the twenty 
colleges and universities which received a planning grant.^ 
It was expected that each participating institution 
would plan a University Without Walls program that took 
advantage of the resources and responded to institutional 
needs and priorities, yet would remain distinct in structure, 
^It was also well known that the planning grants 
from the Union would not cover the full cost of planning 
efforts at participating institutions, contributions of 
time from a large number of faculty and administrators were 
an expected institutional commitment to the University 
Without Walls. 
^The other institutions participating in the 
University Without Walls as of 1970*"71 were the University 
of Minnesota, Antioch College, New College at Sarasota, 
Shaw University, the University of South Carolina, Roger 
Williams College, Bard College, Chicago State University, 
Goddard College, Howard University, Friends World College, 
Northeastern Illinois University, Stephens College, 
Loretto Heights College, Skidmore College, Morgan State 
College, New York University, Staten Island Community 
College, and Westminster College. These institutions 
have very different philosophies, goals and student 
bodies, but they shared a commitment to the UWW idea. 
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organization, and curriculum from the institution. The 
Union did not want to impose a single structure or edu¬ 
cational mode and encouraged diversity among the units. 
It did however want all units to be in accord with the 
basic UWW philosophy and organizational concepts. These 
were articulated in eight characteristics and disseminated 
widely on the campuses receiving planning grants. They 
are 
1. A UWW student body which includes students 
from the widest possible age group and reflects the ethnic, 
racial, and economic diversity of the United States. Older 
students and those from minority or highly disadvantaged 
population groups—while excluded from many more traditional 
structures of higher education—are encouraged to par¬ 
ticipate in the University Without Walls. 
2. Involvement of students, faculty members, 
and administrators in the design, implementation and 
governance of each UWW unit on the assumption that not 
only will the process be educational but the product will 
be a more viable alternative for those it is meant to 
serve. 
3. Development of special seminars and other 
procedures to prepare students to learn on their own and 
overcome the dependence and apathy that is often the result 
of traditional American schooling at all levels. Provision, 
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through seminars and other activities for continued con¬ 
tact among students and faculty members in order to allow 
for the kind of purposeful interaction which is important 
to the learning process. The development of special 
to prepare faculty members for the new 
instructional procedures. 
4. The elimination of a fixed curriculum or 
uniform time schedule for completion of a degree to allow 
for greater individualization in the University Without 
Walls. Flexibility not only in the amount of time required 
for each student to complete his own program, but among 
study programs to allow for individual differences, learning 
styles, interests, and outside responsibilities and 
activities. ' 
5. Use of a broad array of resources for teaching 
and learning inside and outside the regular university: 
internships, apprenticeships, and field experiences; inde¬ 
pendent study and individual group projects; field seminars 
and use of adjunct faculty; travel in this country and 
abroad; and programmed material, casette and other 
technologically aided materials. The development of a 
National Inventory of Learning Resources and inventories 
at each UWW unit to indicate possible resources for learning, 
and as a guide to program planning. 
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6. Use of an adjunct faculty of government 
officials, business executives, persons from community 
agencies, scientists, artists, and others as a regular 
part of the UWW's instructional staff in teaching, super¬ 
vising and advising roles in order to broaden the under¬ 
graduate experience and expand the definition of "educator" 
to include those with knowledge and experience in a wide 
variety of fields. Special seminars in the field conducted 
by adjunct faculty are an additional feature of the 
University Without Walls. 
7. Opportunities for students to use the resources 
of other UWW units thus significantly increasing the 
available resources per student and initiating a process 
of institutional cooperation. 
8. Concern for both cognitive and affective 
learning and the development of new assessment procedures 
more appropriate to different students with different 
learning styles and goals that do more than record time 
7 
spent in class, number of courses and grades.' 
These eight characteristics formed the basic 
philosophy and objectives of the University Without Walls 
’^"University Without Walls," Summary Statement of a 
proposal for an experimental degree program in undergraduate 
education issued by the Union for Experimenting Colleges 
and Universities (distributed to units in draft mimeo 
form in January 1971f in final form in June 1971)* 
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experiment and established guidelines concerning organi¬ 
zational structure, function, and clientele for each unit. 
The University of Massachusetts UWW unit was planned within 
these guidelines. 
The School of Education. The University of 
Massachusetts* UWW unit was also affiliated during its 
early planning phase with the School of Education. 
The School of Education through its Associate Dean 
for Special Projects was a member of the Union for 
Experimenting Colleges and Universities and had participated 
in the planning of the University Without Walls experiment. 
Woodbury had helped prepare the massive and complicated 
grant proposals for the Office of Education and the Ford 
Foundation, and had argued successfully that the University 
of Massachusetts—as one of the few large public universities 
in the Union—should receive the seed grant and plan a 
UWW unit. 
Most of those actively engaged in the planning of 
the University Without Walls unit were faculty and graduate 
students in the School of Education. While the Union and 
central UWW office established parameters and guidelines and 
encouraged collaboration among UWW planning units, the 
style and tone of the University of Massachusetts effort 
was more a reflection of the School of Education. The 
Dean of the School of Education was committed to innovation 
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at all levels of education. Students and faculty had been 
attracted to the School of Education because of this commit¬ 
ment, and most saw themselves as change agents committed 
to having the program serve as vehicle for reform within 
the University, and more generally, in higher education. 
Because of their interests in higher education they were 
perhaps more conscious as well of the factors that would 
influence the development and implementation of such a 
0 
program within the University. 
The School of Education had been engaged for two 
years in attempts to restructure governance. At a time 
when students were still excluded from most decision-making 
bodies in higher education, the School of Education had 
not only used students extensively in its own planning 
effort, but its new constitution included them in all 
committees and councils of the School including personnel 
committees.^ This emphasis on collaboration and partici- 
would not want to overstress this point. It 
may simply be that because of the author's own interest 
in higher education, there was during intepiews a compati¬ 
bility of language and concepts that made it appear that 
the fLuW and Itudents associated with UWW were more a^re 
of change factors than were those faculty associated with 
other programs. 
^Many would argue that despite the trappings of 
oarticipation and collaborative decision-making all authority 
SfpowS irthe School of Education remained the hands 
of the Dean. That may or may not be true, but what is o 
importance to the development of the University Without Walls 
program is the fact that the rhetoric and structures of 
participation were present at the School of Education. 
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pation was to influence the UWW planning effort. 
The graduate students in the School of Education 
were for the most part older students who represented 
ethnic, racial and economic diversity. This was the kind 
of student body that was to be sought by the University 
Without Walls at the undergraduate level. The School of 
Education thus not only created an atmosphere which would 
support the concept of diversity for UWW, it also provided 
a different group of planners for the program. 
The School of Education was engaged in a variety 
of attempts to provide greater flexibility in the structure 
and content of curriculum in order to enhance the learning 
opportunities for students. Systems of flexible scheduling, 
achievement monitoring, off-campus experiences, a modularized 
^^The differences in UWW units that resulted from 
the twenty distinct planning efforts resulted no doubt from 
a whole complex of factors. One of the most important 
however, was the difference in planning groups. There 
is no doubt that the involvement of a large number of 
graduate students—which was not possible in most other 
colleges, engaged in planning—was a distinct advantage 
for the University of Massachusetts unit. 
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curriculum and career opportunities programs^^ were being 
designed and implemented for other school systems or for 
undergraduate education majors in the School of Education. 
The influence of such programs and educational ideas is 
difficult to measure but it is clear that the University 
Without Walls program was being planned and developed in 
an environment that was fertile with educational reform 
ideas. 
One School of Education program that did have a 
direct influence was the Contemporary University Program, 
because many of the faculty and students associated with 
CU,later were affiliated with UWW. Contemporary University 
was a program funded by the Ford Foundation and directed 
^^The lack of a direct influence on UWW of the 
School of Education Career Opportunities Program is sur¬ 
prising considering the similarity of goals and clienteles. 
The Career Opportunities Program provided an educational 
career ladder to 200 para-professional leaders in New York 
City, and it was in its first year of operation under the 
sponsorship of the School of Education and its Urban 
Education Center, while UWW was being planned. While it 
was specifically designed for education majors who wanted 
teacher certification, nevertheless it did preceed UWW 
as a program committed to older, predominantly minority 
students who required a different educational format and 
content. The failure of the UWW planners to learn and 
build from experiences of COP and their reference instead 
to the Contemporary University Program, seems to this author 
to be unfortunate. It was probably the result of divisions 
within the School of Education into political interest 
groups——higher education vs. urban education. 
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by Tom Clark which gave approximately a hundred under¬ 
graduate education majors total freedom to design their 
own educational program, it also gave students direct 
grants with which they could buy whatever they thought 
they needed. CU students were xmaccustomed to such un¬ 
structured education and most did not use their time 
or money well. Many of them bou^t a bus and spent six 
months travelling around the country. The Contemporary 
University program was not re-funded by Ford, but the 
reactions to it had been diverse and in a sense formed the 
preconceptions about the University Without Walls. Woodbury 
and other Deans in the School of Education felt that CU 
had been a fiasco and were determined that UWW not turn 
out similarly. Many students were convinced that it had 
not gone far enough in its attempts at reforming higher 
education and giving students freedom, and wanted UWW to 
start from where CU left off. These differences would 
be important to the UWW planning effort. 
The School of Education would also become a negative 
factor when UWW sought approval as a University-wide 
program, because many faculty members in other departments 
and Schools of the University were suspicious of the 
"radical" ideas of the School of Education and were prone 
to disapprove any program that was in any way associated 
with it. 
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As one Academic Matters Council member and Whitmore 
Administrator put it, "UWW was disconcertingly close to 
the School of Education in terms of where it was and who 
was involved in it." Later in its development UWW would 
have to work hard to disaffiliate itself from the School 
of Education. 
For the most part, however, the School of Education 
provided a conducive environment in which to plan an 
innovative educational program like UWW, and it influenced 
in a positive way the UWW planning group. 
The Planning Process for the 
University Without Walls 
The Planning Grant. The University of Massachusetts' 
School of Education received a $40,000 planning grant from 
the Union for Experimental Colleges and Universities in 
the late Fall of 1970. The grant itself was an important 
factor in the planning process. Although the contractual 
agreements between the Union for Experimenting Colleges 
and Universities and the University of Massachusetts 
placed the University only under obligation to engage in 
a planning process for a UWW unit, and did not require it 
to establish one, nevertheless the fact of having received 
funds for UWW exerted a powerful pressure in favor of such 
^^Interview with David Bischoff, Associate Provost, 
March 20, 197^* 
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a unit. As Toro Clark put it, "the grant implied a vague 
cororoiiinent to carry through which produced a strange 
accountability which turned into a lever.This affected 
those who were involved in the planning of UWW as well 
as those in a position to approve it. It gave the planners 
a deadline against which to work and a sense that they 
were creating something that would be implemented, both of 
which were positive influences. It also led to a willing¬ 
ness to compromise. According to Ed Harris "There were 
some people that would have preferred to design the perfect 
program and if U.Mass. didn't accept it then that was it, 
l4 but most were willing to compromise «" in order to get 
something going. 
Tom Clark Named Director for UWW. The Dean of the 
School of Education asked Tom Clark to head up the 
planning effort. Clark was the Director of the Higher 
Education Program in the School of Education, and his field 
of special interest was non-traditional higher education. 
He had been very much involved in the planning and forma¬ 
tion of the "New" School of Education. He had been in¬ 
volved, too, in a series of innovative and experimental 
^^Interview with Tom Clark, Director, March 31» 
197^. 
^^Interview with Ed Harris, April 12, 1974. 
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programs in the University including Residential Colleges, 
the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program, 
and the Contemporary University Program. He was a good 
teacher and had a large following of graduate and under¬ 
graduate students who were interested in educational reform. 
Tom Clark said when interviewed, that there was a 
natural link between the interests of students and faculty in 
the higher educational program, and the University Without 
Walls experiment, and he saw the planning grant as a way to 
support graduate students. Clark started by spending time 
reading the Union grant proposals in the studying Office of 
Education and Ford, the UWW summary statement, and talking 
with Bob Woodbury. He went with Woodbury to meet Sam 
Baskin and others connected with the Union. He decided to 
build the initial planning efforts around a course he was 
teaching on non-traditional higher education. 
The Collaborative Planning Process and A Strategy 
for Planning. The UWW summary statement had called for 
involvement of students, faculty and administrators in the 
planning of units, and the School of Education had developed 
a "tradition” of student participation in decision-making; 
so Clark had strong precedents for a collaborative planning 
model. The philosophy of the process that Clark initiated 
was described as follows: 
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The need was to provide for a group of planners 
who could share both responsiblity and authority, 
and to provide a climate for various interested 
people to participate in trying to achieve our 
intended goals—in content, philosophy, and 
process for a University Without Walls. Students, 
Faculty, community and resource people were in¬ 
volved in this process as an attempt to design 
an environment conducive to creativity, change, 
efficiency, and diversity , , , 
Clark's class was the first step of the collaborative 
planning effort and it ensured the participation of a large 
number of students. The second step involved open dis¬ 
cussion meetings on the University Without Walls that were 
held at the School of Education Marathon in February 1971• 
Marathons were semi-annual events in which the School of 
Education attempted to open itself up to the community 
through five days of workshops, seminars, fairs, films and 
other "happenings." The marathon sessions on UWW were 
attended by a large number of community people who were 
not students but who were interested in education and con¬ 
cerned about the fact that universities were not providing 
adequate access. Many of those who attended the marathon 
sessions were interested enough in the potential of a 
University Without Walls program to join Tom Clark's class 
and participate in the Wednesday night Town Meetings. 
^^"University of Massachusetts, University Without 
Walls Discussion Paper No. 2," (May 26, 1971)• 
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The Town Meetings were the third piece of the initial 
planning effort. They provided a continuing open-forum for 
discussion on the University Without Walls. The first 
meeting was held in February and they continued weekly 
throughout the Spring. Initially they were well attended and 
lively, but they grew smaller as the end of the school year 
approached. 
The involvement of faculty members was also sought 
for the planning effort, and several bag lunches were 
arranged during which faculty from throughout the University 
were invited to discuss the program. Although these lunches 
were not initiated until somewhat later in the Spring, they 
could be considered an important fourth step in the 
collaborative planning process. 
All of these pieces were one part of an overall 
strategy for planning that Tom Clark said "had been clearly 
thought out in advance, carried out as planned, and proved 
effective in getting the program off the ground.They 
were calculated efforts to involve in the planning process 
'•aL3_3. groups who would be potentially interested in the 
„17 
outcome or who would affect the outcome." 
^^Interview with Tom Clark, March 31. 197^‘ 
^"^Ibid. 
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The Steering Committee, Task Groups, and Staff» 
After the first month of rather free-wheeling marathon 
sessions, town meetings, and classes, it was agreed that 
more structure was needed for the planning effort in order 
to get down to the "nuts and bolts" issues of program 
development. Two people—Ed Harris and Gail Kauffman— 
were brought on as staff members, and a Steering Committee 
and Task Groups were created. The Steering Committee 
was described as 
a non-anxiety/paranoia-generating group that 
could function expeditiously yet, insofar as 
possible, involve the entire MW community 
in immediate decision-making.^® 
Task Groups were formed to pursue particular areas such 
as admissions, independent learning skills, evaluation, 
faculty involvement, program funding, management and 
learning resources. 
The functions of the Steering Committee were to 
assure that the task groups did not duplicate efforts, 
issue a weekly bulletin, "Supersheet," "make recommendations 
to community," and coordinate preparation of the UWW pro¬ 
posal to be made to the University.While the task 
I8"uww Supersheet," Newsletter issued approximately 
weekly from March, 1971 to May, 1971* No. 1. 
^^From Propsoal to Town Meeting, made by Manage¬ 
ment Task Group. 
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groups were quite active in the beginning, they lost 
momentum as the spring wore on, and most of their functions 
were taken over by the Steering Committee, Quickly the 
Steering Committee began to focus on those things that most 
needed attention for a program to be implemented by the 
Fall including advising, evaluation, faculty recruitment, 
admission, and management. 
Tom Clark, Ed Harris and Gail Kauffman were active 
throughout the Spring. They put together the discussion 
papers; met with faculty members, administrators, and 
potential students; and put together a brochure on the 
program. They served on the Steering Committee, spread 
themselves out among the task groups, and attended Town 
Meetings. They also kept in touch with the Union for 
Experimenting Colleges and Universities and other UWW 
planning units by attending a number of meetings organized 
by the Union. Some felt that there was surprisingly little 
cross-fertilization of ideas among UWW planning units 
although others felt that other units and the Union had 
strongly influenced the development of the University of 
?o Massachusetts unit. The Steering Committee and full- 
^^The story of the first meeting for planning UWW units 
in the Northeast illustrates the distinctiveness of the Uni¬ 
versity of Massachusetts unit. The meeting was held at Roger 
Williams College. In attendance were one representative 
from each planning institution—invariably a faculty member/ 
administrator, all white males and all suited and tied. 
In attendance was a busload of bearded, scruffy students 
from the University of Massachusetts. The U.Mass students 
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time staff members carried out the second part of the 
implementation strategy. Tom Clark recruited a small number 
of faculty members to serve as the first group of faculty 
sponsors. These included respected faculty from diverse 
areas including Psychology, English, Botany, Anthropology, 
and Education. Tom and staff members also met with key 
administrators to get help and approval for different 
aspects of the program. Charlotte Rahaim, Assistant Dean 
of Admissions and Head of Transfer Affair^ agreed to handle 
all admissions procedures and in effect gave a number of 
admissions positions to the program. All of those in¬ 
terviewed felt that Carlotte Rahaim's help was absolutely 
crucial to the program. David Bischoff, Associate Provost, 
was also critical as the Academic Administrator who was 
the gatekeeper to the approval process. Bischoff was not 
overly enthusiastic about the efficiencies of the planning 
group. 
repeatedly challenged the assumptions of the "educators” 
around the table. As Bob Woodbury, who attended the meeting 
put it: "There was a real cultural gulf between institutional 
types . . . and students who wanted a very different pro¬ 
gram." U.Mass remained out of favor for at least a year 
after that, but by the end of the 1971-72 academic year, it 
was considered one of the most successful units by the 
Union. 
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The planning group had the cart ahead of the horse. 
They had gone way down the road in terms of planning 
—talking about students, etc.—when they came to see 
me but they really had no idea of what they were 
doing.21 
According to all of those interviewed, however, Bischoff 
was crucially helpful in getting the program started. 
The Pilot Program. Because it was so late into the 
spring when Clark and others began meeting with him, and be¬ 
cause it was clear that everyone wanted to have a program 
up and running by the fall of 1971* Bischoff took the step 
that may have been the most decisive one for the program. 
He gave administrative approval to a small pilot 
program for the 1971-72 academic year by convincing the 
Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program 
and the School of Education, to serve as academic covers 
for thirty students. He insisted that UWW go before the 
Academic Matters Countil and the Faculty Senate during that 
22 
year, but he gave them the chance to begin the program. 
21 with David Bischoff, March 20, 197^* 
^^The organizational flexibility to allow trial ex¬ 
perimental programs was an important feature that separated 
the University of Massachusetts from most other 
of its type. It was also a feature recommended by the Car¬ 
negie Commission, the Newman Commission, and others as o®" 
SenUal ^ the ability of colleges and 
to respond to different purposes and priorities. It is im 
nortant to note that the Associate Provost had not appro- lllTtel ^he^acldLic perogatives of the 
Tor students participating in UWW. ^PP^°;;tuher 
name of the Provost and Chancellor, although neither 
Gluckstem nor Tippo were involved at P^is time. pp 
did not promise University support Woodbury 
period, either. Bischoff was aware at the time that Woodbury 
Sould be coming as Associate Provost in the fall and ex 
pected him to deal with these details. 
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Clark and others have called the pilot program part 
of the planning strategy and design, others attributed 
it to the supportive decisions of administrators, but all 
agree that it was a critical, positive factor for the 
program. UWW was given the opportunity to bring in real 
students and work with them to learn what educational 
vehicles were appropriate, they were given time to recruit 
faculty members as sponsors and to build a support base 
among faculty, they were able to work out appropriate process 
and procedures with offices representing student support 
services of financial aid, counselling, records, admissions, 
registration and others. In a program that required as many 
changes as did UWW, having real data to learn from and time 
was very helpful. As Gail Kauffman put it: 
The fact of the pilot year was crucial to the 
program. It gave us a chance to really get 
it started and to prove that it could work to 
ourselves and to the faculty. 
Assessments of the Planning Process and Leadership. 
There were very mixed views about the effectiveness of the 
collaborative planning process. Bob Woodbury felt that "as 
an educational experience it was probably extraordinary, as 
a planning process it was questionable." Dave Bischoff 
felt that it had been enormously inefficient and counter¬ 
productive. Tom Clark said that there was "no question 
jji-fcerview with Gail Kauffman, March 28, 197^* 
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that the process was not efficient” but felt that it had 
been important nonetheless. Ed Harris felt the same way. 
"A large number of people does provide more feedback and 
criticism and a healthier process. It can lead to better 
decisions which create a more responsive program." 
Ironically, several people associated with the planning 
felt that it had not been as collaborative as was claimed. 
Mark Cleron felt that "UWW went through the motions of 
involving lots of people in planning, but the structure 
that emerged was pretty conventional and not effective." 
Jean Carritt did not think there had been a planning 
strategy but that "what was done was entirely random with 
decisions made by a few individuals—-there was sort of a 
power elite within UWW planners. While information seemed 
to flow up the communications network from task groups to 
Steering Committee, and Town Meeting to Whitmore Administra- 
„24 
tion Building, it did not seem to flow back down again. 
A review of the documents tends to support the 
view that there was not a great deal accomplished in terms 
of program planning through collaborative efforts. All 
critical decisions in terms of clientele, organization 
^^Quotations and opinions 
views with Bob Woodbury, David Bischoff, Tom Cl 
Harris, Mark Cleron and Jean Carritt. 
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and structures seem to have been made by five peoplei 
David Bischoff, Bob Woodbury, Tom Clark, Ed Harris, and 
Gail Kauffman (two of these were not actively involved in 
the planning). Despite the lack of accomplishment, however, 
it was probably important to have a process that was open 
to those who cared to participate and who would be effected 
by decisions. This view is held by most change theorists 
and was expressed, perhaps most directly for this study, 
by Warren Bennis when he showed that the radical reform 
programs failed at Buffalo because they represented the 
ideas of a handful of newcomers and could not be forced 
onto unwilling faculty and students. ^ 
The person in the leadership position throughout 
this process was Tom Clark. It was his job to try to 
orchestrate a collaborative planning mode and at the same 
time get a dramatic educational departure off the ground 
in six months. There is no question that that was an 
enormously difficult job. Tom Clark saw himself as 
"mediator within the (planning) group but spokesman for 
the group to others." All of those interviewed felt that 
^^See Chapter I for review of Bennis' The Learning 
Ivory Tower. 
^^Interview with Tom Clark, March 31» 197^* 
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leadership had been a critical factor in the development 
of UWW but there was some disagreement about the effective¬ 
ness of Clark's leadership. Planning group members, 
faculty, and administrators generally agreed that he had 
good ideas, but did not follow through so that others— 
staff members, Woodbury, Bischoff—had to pick up after 
him. Students and staff members generally saw him as 
successful in recruiting faculty, and working with ad¬ 
ministrators saw him as generally ineffective at that, 
but felt that he was managing well the planning process 
that he had begun. It is difficult to assess Clark's 
leadership separately from the process itself. As in the 
case of the planning effort where there were inefficiencies 
which were outweighed by other considerations, Clark's 
leadership may have often appeared haphazard or non¬ 
existent, but the program was planned and implemented in 
a surprisingly short period of time. 
Summary of Process. During the Spring of 1971 
through an elaborate collaborative effort including open 
meetings, a course in non-traditional higher education, 
steering committee, task groups, faculty lunches, and 
countless meetings involving a large number of people, 
the UWW unit for the University of Massachusetts had 
been planned. The Steering Committee had prepared dis¬ 
cussion papers to define the program; an admission task 
13^ 
group had defined the clientele, obtained permission to 
admit thirty students, and recruited those students; 
enough faculty had been successfully recruited by Tom Clark 
to serve as sponsors; the needed resources for staffing 
costs had been saved from the initial planning grant from 
the Union; and the Associate Provost had authorized a small 
pilot planning program under the rubric of BDIC for the 
year I97I-72. Clearly, a great deal had been accomplished. 
Major Objectives and Issues 
Throughout the planning semester and the pilot year, 
the major objectives of the UWW program were in the process 
of definition, evolution and modification. The most impor¬ 
tant had to do with clientele and academic program. 
Clientele and Access. The UWW summary statement 
had called for a student body characterized by ethnic, 
racial, economic and age diversity, but this had been one 
of eight potential emphases and the central UWW office had 
left it to individual planning units to determine priorities. 
From the beginning, it was assumed that UWW would 
be a special focus program which could decide on a target 
student clientele. Bob Woodbury in a memo to the planning 
group on January 22, 1971 § niade it clear where his prefer¬ 
ences lay for that clientele. 
135 
Participation in the University Without 
Walls gives us the opportunity to respond to 
some very real needs in Massachusetts and to 
experiment with some new ideas which could 
have far-reaching consequences in higher edu¬ 
cation. 
I would suggest that the UWW component on 
this campus focus on those people in the state 
of Massachusetts who for reasons of economics, 
physical handicap, prison terms, home responsi¬ 
bilities, discrimination or past or present 
circumstances are unable to contemplate full¬ 
time residency at a college or university such as 
U.Mass. Generally speaking these students would 
be older than average college age. 
The admissions task group, however, recommended 
something different. The task group met several times 
during February, and on March 3rd recommended to the Steering 
Committee and the Town Meeting that the first admissions 
group to the program be all current University of Massa¬ 
chusetts undergraduates. The decision resulted from the 
fact that task force members were for the most part 
j_v0i*sity students who wanted a more flexible degree pro¬ 
gram and therefore wanted UWW to be something they could 
enroll in. As Ed Harris put it, "UWW became a focal 
^"^Bob Woodbury, "Memorandum on University Without 
Walls." January 22. 1971. The Woodbury 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is the only explicit 
reference to service to the Commonwealth during the 
first year, although service will become an important 
UWW theme later on. 
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point for a lot of bright, alienated, disaffected, younger, 
? R 
educational reform oriented students." 
Core UWW staff and faculty had differing opinions 
concerning the clientele for the program. Ed Harris, and 
Gail Kauffman agreed with the Woodbury position. As Gail 
Kauffman said, "Ed and I didn't feel necessarily compelled 
to provide an educational alternative to U.Mass. kids, 
but Tom (Clark) in many respects did, because he had been 
talking about the University's failure to provide alterna¬ 
tives."^^ Bob Woodbury felt that "Tom Clark agreed with 
the objective of non-traditional students, but had allowed 
himself to get caught in the process which inevitably 
skewed the results in favor of the predominantly on-campus 
planning group.Tom Clark did not mention this diffi¬ 
culty. He said that "the title addresses itself to the 
access question—that is creating for people who could 
not engage in a residential learning experience the option 
to, in fact, pursue an experience in post-secondary 
31 
education at U.Mass."^ 
There is no question, however, that the question of 
^^Interview with Ed Harris, April 12, 197^* 
^^Interview with Gail Kauffman, March 28, 197^* 
^^Interview with Robert Woodbury. 
3^Interview with Tom Clark, March 31, 197'*- 
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who the program would serve dominated discussion throughout 
the Spring and was as Shapiro put it "a source of potential 
32 
confrontation." Shapiro also agreed with the Woodbury, 
Harris, Kauffman position that the program should be for 
students who were non-access because of age, or job 
responsibilities. 
A compromise was finally reached. Of the thirty 
33 
admission slots for the pilot year, fifteen were to go 
to on-campus students and fifteen to "non-access" students. 
Even with the compromise, the precise definition of non- 
access was difficult to achieve. During the planning 
period, the distinction was simplistically drawn between 
insiders—usually young, resident, U.Mass. students who 
wanted a more flexible and self-initiated academic program— 
and outsiders—those who did not live in Amherst and/or 
had jobs and could not attend during the day. During the 
^^Interview with Seymour Shapiro, April 30» 197^* 
^%o one knows exactly where the number thirty came 
from. Apparently Bischoff, Woodbury and Rahaim determined 
that a certain number of admission slots be set aside and 
that UWW would be allowed to determine the criteria and 
handle the process. This was a perogative not enjoyed by 
other University special programs. 
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pilot year in discussing admissions for the following year, 
the distinction was drawn between physical non-access—those 
who had jobs, lived far away, etc.—and psychological 
non-access—those who could not accomodate themselves to 
traditional academic modes even though they might have the 
flexibility to live in Amherst and attend as a full-time 
regular undergraduate. 
The experience of the pilot yeai; added interesting 
data to the discussions on clientele. Many of the edu¬ 
cational reform activists who had been so much in evidence 
during the planning semester and who had secured fifteen 
admissions positions, lost interest in the program and 
either failed to enroll or complete any work. The "non- 
traditional," non-access students were more highly motivated 
and used the program to greater advantage. By the end of 
the pilot year, it was agreed that only non-access students 
(as variously defined) would be eligible for the UWW 
program. 
Academic Program. The second major issue during 
the planning and pilot semesters had to do with program— 
what kind of educational alternative would the University 
Without Walls offer ? 
The UWW summary statement had mentioned the 
elimination of a fixed curriculum, greater flexibility of 
time and place for learning, greater individualization. 
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use of a broad array of resources and a broad definition 
of faculty to include people with experience in a variety 
of fields. Most of the U.Mass. planning groups were students 
interested in educational reform*and Tom Clark encouraged 
them to think creatively in designing the program. Several 
alternatives were suggested and discussed during the planning 
semester. 
Several planners recommended that UWW should become 
an experimental learning community with the emphasis on 
community. They wanted UWW to sever itself from the 
University so it could allow greater freedom and would not 
have to compromise its values. It would offer its own 
degree with the backing of the Union for Experimenting 
Colleges and Universities,^^ and have its own financial 
base as a result of income and cost sharing. 
Others, however, felt that the major reform task 
had to be within the University, and that one of the major 
goals of the program had to be to change the system. They 
felt, moreover, that the credential from the University of 
Massachusetts meant something to non-traditional students 
^^Some other UWW units around the country went this 
route and offered a Union Degree rather than the degree 
the sponsoring institutions. 
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whereas that from UWW alone might not. This group 
recommended an experimental educational program in which the 
program elements would be individualized to the educational 
needs and life style of the students, and the degree would 
be based on competency. They were less concerned with 
community and more concerned with such issues as finding 
faculty members who could engage in more sophisticated 
advising as part of the instructional process and defining 
assessment and evaluation procedures. Tom Clark, Ed Harris, 
Gail Kauffman and Bob Woodbury all supported this position. 
Other groups felt that the program should remain 
affiliated with the University, but that it should have 
a single academic focus and draw into it only those who 
were interested in that focus. The theme orientation 
recommended was "Ecology and Social Action." The purpose 
would have been to respond to the need for relevance, and 
allow an "educational institution to begin serving society 
in a real way." 
All of these possible educational emphases were 
discussed at length during the planning period, and by 
April, they had still not been resolved. Town Meetings and 
Steering Committee meetings were cancelled through much 
^■^James Higgenbottom, "Memorandum to the Steering 
Committee," Undated (Spring 1971)* 
of April, however, because of the student strike, moratoria, 
spring marathons, and other activities. By the time things 
got back together again, the core staff had already decided 
to remain affiliated with the University and opt for 
individualized programs. What was left of the planning 
group (several students and others had more or less dropped 
out by this time, which made the choice of program emphasis 
somewhat easier), began to work on the nuts and bolts 
issues of admissions, brochures, etc. 
Although the permission for the pilot year and 
the admissions slots gave UWW the opportunity to recruit 
some non-traditional students, they had very little 
programmatic flexibility. They had to follow the pro¬ 
cedures of the BDIC program,and students for the most 
part had to enroll in regular courses. The UWW staff worked 
at finding good faculty sponsors so that students would 
have something more than an accumulation of courses, and 
Shapiro felt that this was one of the critical positive 
aspects of the program. 
The pilot year did, however, provide the staff 
the opportunity to learn from students what programmatic 
aspects were important. In their proposal to the Faculty 
Senate in the spring of 1972, UWW sought: 
^^See Chapter IV concerning BDIC. 
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A. Transferability of a significant amount of 
academic credit from other institutions with no time 
restrictions; 
B. latitude in the use of UWW course numbers to 
cover experiences not usually recognized in departments; 
C. the ability to satisfy the "spirit" of a 
requirement through an examination or equivalent experience 
instead of specific courses fulfilling core requirements; 
D. permission to waive core requirements for 
students if the program felt the courses were superfluous 
to a student program; 
E. ability to accredit prior learning resulting 
from experience as well as that received through course 
work; 
F. use of adjunct faculty and others as "instructional 
personnel." 
With the exception of core requirements, most of these 
academic provisions were approved by the Faculty Senate, and 
the program was able to offer flexible and individualized 
academic programs to non-traditional students. In this 
respect, too, it was a unique program at the University 
and among UWW units across the country. 
The individualized academic programs did make the 
program expensive to operate however, so it is hard to ima¬ 
gine UWW as other than an alternative for a relatively 
37 
small niimber of students. 
^"^The same will be true for BDIC. See Chapter IV. 
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Major Change Factors 
The University Without Walls sought and received 
Faculty Senate approval (with a two year mandate) for its 
experimental program in the Spring of 1972. Both the 
Spring semester of 1971 in which planning was undertaken 
within the School of Education and the academic year 1971/72, 
in which a small University-wide pilot program was operated, 
could therefore be considered the planning and developmental 
period for the program. 
The planning effort was influenced by the Union 
for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and the central 
UWW Office which provided the initial philosophy, organi¬ 
zational concepts, guidelines and funding for the UWW unit 
at the University of Massachusetts. It was also influenced 
in terms of participants, ideas, tone and style by the 
School of Education which was involved in a vast array 
of educational reform attempts during that period. 
The initial planning semester for the program 
under the leadership of Tom Clark, was guided by the 
philosophy of collaborative decision-making and a strategy 
for program inplementation that involved a selected 
approach to those University offices and personnel who 
would become involved with or in some way approve the 
program. ThosBfactors which most influenced getting the 
program off the ground that semester were the planning 
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grant, a large group of committed and enthusiastic workers, 
a sense of timing, and a commitment to have a program 
implemented by the fall. The major accomplishment was 
the definition of a distinct student clientele. 
The pilot year itself became a crucial element 
in the strategy to obtain full-fledged University approval 
and support. During that year, the major aspects of a 
unique educational program were defined for a now wholly 
non-traditional student body. Those who helped to define 
the program included non-traditional students, staff, and 
faculty from throughout the campus. Only after this process 
was UWW ready to articulate to the Academic Matters Council 
and the Faculty Senate what the program should be. The 
major factors in getting the program approved and implemented 
on a wider scale this year were resources, the negative im¬ 
pact of the program's close affiliation with the School of 
Education, and support from a number of key individuals 
among faculty and administrators. The major accomplishement 
was the definition of a distinct educational program. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE BACHELOR'S DEGREE WITH INDIVIDUAL 
CONCENTRATION PROGRAM 
The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration 
Program is the response of the University of Massachusetts 
to the mission of individualization as defined in Chapter I, 
because it allows students to pursue their own academic, 
intellectual, and professional interests by designing their 
own major programs of study. This chapter describes the 
history of BDIC from 1968 to 1971• It traces the slow 
evolution of the idea from its source at a student-organized 
conference through myriad committees, conflicts, and com¬ 
promises, to its realization as an experimental pilot 
program. It relates this development on the University of 
Massachusetts campus to national student trends and the 
academic reform movement. The chapter also looks at the 
implemented form of the idea—the BDIC program, from two 
perspectives, that of the faculty supervisory committee of 
the program, and that of a student participant. Finally, it 
describes the process through which the program gained 
permanent approval and the factors important to that process. 
Chapter IV will analyze and compare these change factors. 
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The Evolution of An Idea 
Emergence on the Amherst Campus* The BDIC program 
was not a transplanted program from another college or 
university. It was a program which emerged as a response 
to the interests and needs of students on the Amherst 
campus. 
The original idea for the program had come from the 
1968 SWAP conference. The SWAP conference was a new 
"tradition" at the University—a weekend organized hy 
students, when students, faculty members, and administrators 
came together to talk about issues of education and the 
educational environment. The discussions at the 1968 
conference had focused on the students' feelings that the 
lindergraduate curriculum was too rigid and irrelevant. 
Someone (no one remembers who) suggested the idea of an 
individualized major program of study in which the student 
would be allowed to make the critical decisions. A group 
of students and faculty got excited about the idea and agreed 
to keep working together on it after the conference. 
This group became the first planning committee 
for what was to become the BDIC program. It consisted 
of three faculty and five student members^ with Bernard 
^The first planning committee members were: 
Bernard Fleischman, Arthur Kinney, Joyce Berkman, Howard 
a™. Hedy Kaplan. Celia Mandel. Susan Tracey, and 
Robert Ross. 
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Fleischman, a faculty member, taking the leadership 
position. The committee met several times that spring 
and issued a one-page "report." The "report” was in fact 
a statement of need rather than a recommended program or 
policy change, so no action was taken at that time. The 
report focused on the shared student and faculty feeling 
that the needs of many students were not being satisfied 
by current departmental offerings. 
National Trends Among Students. Although the idea 
of a student-designed major was not transplanted from 
outside the University of Massachusetts, there is no doubt 
that both students and faculty were being affected by a 
national mood which influenced in many ways the discussions 
at the SWAP conference and the first BDIC planning 
group. Many college students and faculty members were 
exerting pressure for change. The student pressure was 
less clearly articulated but more powerful. The years 
1967 and 1968 had been busy on college and university 
campuses throughout the country with many students engaging 
in political activism centered around the war in Viet Nam, 
and the Presidential election of 1968. While it is true 
that the highly publicized activity at Berkeley was not 
typical of other universities, students generally began 
to recognize the enormous power they had vis a vis social 
institutions when they chose to exercise it. Concurrent 
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with their political activism, many students became in¬ 
volved with academic reform movements. Students began to 
criticize colleges and universities for antiquated rules 
and regulations, dehumanizing procedures, and irrelevant 
curricula. They felt that the organization of the 
curriculum with prescribed distribution and major re¬ 
quirements and courses offered only in disciplinary areas, 
was not responsive to their own needs. They were interested 
in more broadly-defined issues and social problems and in 
examining their own role in relation to these issues. 
Such interests were not represented in the course offerings. 
As one student interviewed put it: 
Many people define education as courses, people 
don't define education (in terms of) individual 
students and they don't assume the responsibility 
for helping students define their own program as 
a coherent whole.^ 
A few students formed free universities which operated 
outside the structure of the University, but offered 
courses of broad interdisciplinary nature. Most, how¬ 
ever, began to work within the system for curricular change. 
University of Massachusetts Students. While students 
at the University of Massachusetts were more apathetic than 
those at Berkeley or Wisconsin in a political sense, they 
^Interview with Janet Sheppard. 
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were active and vocal concerning campus educational matters. 
The Student Senate Academic Affairs Committee became in¬ 
volved in a number of academic policy decisions and began 
to work closely with the Faculty Senate Academic Matters 
Committee. The Student Academic Affairs Committee issued 
a report in 19^9 which was to influence the planning group 
of the BDIC program. 
The overriding theme of the report was individuali¬ 
zation. "Our central principle has been that of facili¬ 
tating, as best we could, the process of individualized 
education."^ The authors of the report wanted "to color 
every academic endeavor with a new regard for the personality 
.4 
and sovereignty of the individual student." 
One of their major recommendations was for the 
creation at the University of Massachusetts of the equivalent 
of Berkeley's Board of Educational Development. The Board 
would consist of a committee of faculty and students and 
be responsible for the encouragement of experimental courses 
and programs. Although the report did not call explicitly 
for a program such as BDIC it did call for interdisciplinary, 
3Friimation for T.iving! A Program 
Renort of the Academic Affairs Committee of the Student 
Senate. Lch^d Story. Chairman (Amherst. University of 
Massachusetts, 1968), p. 6. 
'Ibid. 
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multidepartmental programs and greater choices for indi¬ 
vidual students.^ 
Students had strongly supported the creation of 
Orchard Hill and Southwest as Residential Colleges, and many 
had been instrumental in the creation of Project 10, an 
experimental living-learning community in Pierpont Dormi¬ 
tory. 
National Trends in Curricular Reform. While students 
on the Amherst campus were responding to national trends 
by’ becoming involved in efforts at curricular change and 
focusing on individual student needs, many University of 
Massachusetts faculty members were similarly joining a 
national academic reform movement. This was not exactly 
a "new" movement; there had always been debate over the 
curriculum among teachers, and the history of American 
higher education reveals a pattern of gradual—very gradual— 
curricular change in response to the needs of society. 
The "Academic Revolution," however, with its acceleration 
of the production of knowledge, its ever greater disciplinary 
specialization, and the increasing student outcry against 
those specializing trends seensto have quickened the pace 
^The report was to be quoted in the BDIC formal 
proposal to the Academic Matters Committee. 
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and altered the tone of the curricular debates of the late 
sixties. Paul Goodman's diatribes were in vogue among 
students and faculty during this period.^ 
The demands for change were strident but without 
a great deal of substance and the actual changes were few 
in Colleges and universities during the 1960's. Paul Dressel 
investigated curricular practices in higher education over a 
ten year period, 1957-196?# in order to give a then current 
curricular profile and to show curricular trends."^ His 
profile provides an interesting benchmark against which to 
view the idea for the BDIC program. Dressel's sample 
included over 300 institutions of various sizes, affiliations 
and clienteles, and he found remarkable similarity in 
curricular mode among institutions of size or type. All of 
them had three elements—a series of general or divisional 
requirements designed to provide the "breadth" experience 
and composing an average of forty per cent of the total 
undergraduate education? a major field of study occupying 
^Paul Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education and The 
Community of Scholars. 
"^Paul Dressel and Frances DeLisle. Undergraduate 
Curriculum Trends (Washington, D.C.: American Council 
on Education, 19^9)• 
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approximately thirty per cent of the curriculum and 
associated almost invariably with departments; and elec¬ 
tives or courses chosen by the students and comprising 
approximately thirty per cent of the curriculum. 
Dressel's study also contained a chapter, "Pro¬ 
visions for Individualization," which focused on curricular 
features "which provide for individualizing and a personal 
o 
integration of learning." By individualizing, Dressel 
meant "permitting students to select (curriculum) on the 
basis of personal interests or goals, rather than because 
of faculty determined principles."^ Table 2 lists those 
curricular features or instructional methods which 
promoted individualization and shows their occurrence in 
322 institutions in 1957 and I967. 
It is interesting to note that in 1967 there was 
no provision in any of the sample institutions for a 
student-designed major program of study such as the BDIC 
program. 
Dressel finds that "despite all the talk about 
innovation, undergraduate curricular requirements as a 
..10 
whole have changed remarkably little in ten years. 
®Ibid., p. 
^Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. 75* 
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TABLE 2 
TYPES OF DEVELOPMENTS FOR INDIVIDUALIZING 
AND INTEGRATING LEARNING EXPERIENCES 
(1967) (1957) 
INSTRUCTIONAL CURRENT PRACTICES TEN YEARS AGO 
METHODS N I0 N % 
Advanced placement 274 85.1 117 36.3 
Honors programs 212 65.8 103 32.0 
Independent study 188 58.4 90 28.0 
Seminars 165 51.2 80 24.8 
Study abroad 151 46.9 36 11.2 
Comprehensive 
examinations 129 40.1 107 33.2 
Tutorials 72 22.4 25 7.8 
Senior thesis or 
project 48 14.9 26 8.1 
Field Work experience 42 13.0 21 6.5 
Residence hall programs 34 10.6 5 1.5 
Interim terms^ 20 6.2 2 .6 
Work study or coopera¬ 
tive programs 18 5.6 11 3.4 
Community service 13 4.0 7 2.2 
Off-campus or non¬ 
resident terms 7 2.2 2 .6 
^Periods of shorter duration variously related to 
longer terms, and usually used for special programs. 
SOURCE': Paul Dressel, Undergraduate Curriculum 
Trends, Ibid., p. 39* 
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He postulates some change theory to account for-this. 
. . .faculty interests, publicity, institutional 
prestige, opportunism, and expediency in responding 
to pressures or to availability of financial re¬ 
sources are more potent determiners of specific 
change than is deliberation based on educational 
goals, social needs, and the abilities and aspira¬ 
tions of students.il 
Dressel thinks that faculty and professional associations 
have exerted a pressure for stasis in the curriculum that 
exceeded the pressure for change coming from students 
and/or outsiders. He concludes, however, 
. . . that there are signs, both in the trends 
and in the comprehensive patterns, that the 
student may become—as indeed he should—the 
focal consideration in curricular planning.12 
The University of Massachusetts and Academic Reform— 
Continued Evolution of an Idea. Nearly all the instructional 
methods listed by Dressel as contributing to the individuali¬ 
zation of curriculum were in evidence at the University of 
Massachusetts by the spring of 1968.^^ Yet the students 
and many faculty felt that these curricular features 
were not enough. They usually served only a small number 
^^Ibid., p. 2. 
^^Ibid., p. 77. 
^^The exceptions were interim terms, work study or 
cooperative programs and off-campus or non-resident terms. 
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of students and they did not provide an alternative to 
the basic departmental requirements. 
The goal of the BDIC program, according to one of 
its planners was "to provide a mechanism for students who 
were being turned off by college and for whom departmental 
l4 
requirements didn't meet their needs." 
Designing appropriate mechanism, however, especially 
given the lack of models in other colleges and universities, 
was a difficult task. The group that had been excited by 
the SWAP conference and had met throughout the 1968 spring 
semester, lost momentum over the summer. Many of the 
students graduated or became interested in other things, 
and the faculty had other commitments as well. The group 
that reconvened in the fall was smaller and met less often. 
One reason for the slow pace may have been that there was 
no sense of a deadline and no urgency to have a specific 
^ 15 program in operation by a certain time. 
One of the students who had been active, left the 
planning group out of frustration with its slowness. 
^^Interview with Antlnony Borton. 
^^This is in sharp contrast to the University 
out walls program in which the sense of timing and deadlines 
provided a constant and positive dynamic. 
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Mark Cheren, a graduate student in the School of Education 
had also had some conceptual disagreements with the planning 
group. The faculty members all agreed that the fundamental 
core of a program that was an alternative to an academic 
major had to be a close student~faculty relationship. 
Cheren had argued more for a group orientation in which 
students would help each other learn to use the freedom to 
make educational decisions. In Cheren's view, the faculty 
occupied a less central place. 
Cheren began to work for a student-designed 
program within the School of Education. At that time, 
the School of Education was engaged in a massive effort 
to redesign its entire academic program for undergraduate 
and graduate students. Many of the radical ideas for 
educational change were beginning to seep out of the School 
of Education and infiltrate the campus. 
The BDIC planning group was kept somewhat informed 
of ideas at the School of Education by Tom Clark, a faculty 
member in the School who occasionally participated in BDIC 
planning meetings. The pace of the planning group, however, 
continued to be slow and no documents or reports were 
produced for many months. 
In the spring of 1969, the BDIC planning group was 
in a sense beaten to the punch. The School of Education 
brought its entire “package" before the Academic Matters 
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Council for discussion and submission to the Faculty 
Senate. The package contained an entirely new academic 
program for the School of Education. One of the items in 
the package was a proposal for a student-centered Bachelor 
of Education degree. It had been prepared by Mark Cheren 
and a small number of other graduate students, but it had 
the support of Dean Dwight Allen. 
The Academic Matters Council had not been confronted 
before by such a curricular package, and did not quite know 
how to proceed. The Coimcil did, however, single out the 
student-centered Bachelor of Education proposal for discussion 
and invited Dean Dwight Allen and Associate Dean Carl Seidman 
to appear before Academic Matters on its behalf. The Aca¬ 
demic Matters Council members were quick to agree that the 
idea had merit, but they suggested that the degree should 
be university-wide, and not limited to the School of 
Education. The Deans of the School of Education recog¬ 
nized the need for a university-wide option, but felt 
that their proposal ought to be approved as well. The 
Academic Matters Council did not approve it. Instead they 
created an ad hoc subcommittee to draw up a proposal for 
an all-university, student-centered degree. 
The motivation of the Academic Matters Council in 
this unprecedented action is subject to various inter- 
pretations. Academic Matters Council members describe 
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it as an example of that group's initiative in achieving 
academic reform.Others described it as a backlash 
against the School of Education—taking its best ideas 
but not allowing the School of Education to implement 
17 
them. The issue was further complicated by the fact 
that the chairman of the Academic Matters Council—Richard 
Ulin—is a professor in the School of Education. The 
author did not have the opportunity of interviewing 
Dr. Ulin, but others have suggested that his move to 
appoint a subcommittee was in fact an effort to save a 
good idea—a student-centered degree program—from almost 
18 
certain defeat in the Faculty Senate. 
point made in interviews by Leigh Short, 
Anthony Sorton, and David Bischoff; all Council members. 
^"^A point made in interviews with Tom Clark and 
Bob Woodbury. 
^^This point was made by David Bischoff, Arthur 
Kinney, Leigh Short and Anthony Borton. In fact, however, 
the rest of the School of Education package was eventually 
approved by the Faculty Senate so it's likely that this 
particular segment would have been approved as well. 
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Further Conflicts and Compromises as the Idea Moves 
Toward Institutional Reform. In any event, Dr. Ulin created 
an ad hoc subcommittee. Ulin had been aware of the faculty- 
student group which had been meeting since the SWAP 
conference to discuss alternatives to departmental require¬ 
ments, so he intentionally chose Arthur Kinney, a faculty 
member from this group, to chair the subcommittee. Under 
19 Arthur Kinney's chairmanship, the two groups became one. 
The new committee met several times during the 
spring of 1969 and continued into the fall without losing 
a great deal of momentum. In December 19691 "the group 
submitted a five-page proposal to the Academic Matters 
Council. The proposal reiterated the goal of having 
students design their own major programs and spelled out 
in some detail the mechanisms for them to do this. It 
called for a bachelor's degree to be awarded to seniors 






who have completed no fewer than four academic 
terms at the University which demonstrate, 
courses each term, an 
academic program of 'designed coherence.'20 
It was assumed (but not required) that programs of coherence 
would cut across departmental lines, but the ad hoc committee 
felt that the student working with the faculty advisor was 
the responsible party for defining that coherence. They 
felt that the 
yo-lidity of the 'designed coherence' of each 
individual program will be determined by the 
student's own faculty advisor in consultation 
with the student and finally by the director 
of the program.21 
According to the proposal, any undergraduate in 
the freshman or sophomore year who had a 2.0 average and 
was willing to define a program, work with a faculty 
sponsor; and prepare reports and evaluations at the end of 
each term, could be admitted to the program. 
Thus, the mechanism proposed by the ad hoc committee 
was a new program. As one faculty member said in praise 
of the planning committee's efforts. 
on 
'Troposal for a New Bachelor's Degree with In¬ 
dividual Concentration,” proposal submitted to the Academic 
Matters Council by the Ad Hoc Committee, Arthur Kinney, 
Chairman (Undated), p. 1. 
21 Ibid. 
I6l 
. • . there had been the idea of providing some 
flexibility for students, but before that (BDIC) 
it had had a negative caste to it—you released 
an individual student from requirements . . . 
BDIC turned the psychology around—from being 
something you wanted to get out of into something 
to get into. The program was a positive thing 
for students.22 
The ad hoc committee proposal was less clear about 
the organization of the program and its relationship to the 
University. It called for the College of Arts and Sciences 
to offer the option of BDIC to students. It called as 
well for a Director of the program, but the reporting lines 
were unclear. It was to be the Director’s responsibility 
to recruit faculty advisors, to recruit students and 
oversee programs, to establish interdepartmental and 
interdisciplinary courses. In its closing paragraph the 
committee asserted that "(BDIC is not conceived as an honors 
degree and there should be no overlapping of responsibility 
here). 
When the report was submitted to the Academic 
Matters Council in December, however, it was the potential 
overlap—or threat—to the Honors Program that was the item 
of most intense debate and conflict. The Director of the 
22with Dave Bischoff. 
^^Proposal for a"New Bachelor’s Degree with Indi¬ 
vidual Concetration," Ibid., pp. 4, 5. 
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Honors Program—Everett Emerson—was a member of Academic 
Matters and he was opposed to the program as a separate 
entity* He felt that a student—centered degree program 
should be one of the available options within the Honors 
Program* Arthur Kinney, on the other hand, was strenuously 
opposed to this. He felt that the students for whom BDIC 
had been designed were not those who would identify them¬ 
selves as Honors students* The students he had in mind— 
stemming from his experience as a faculty resident in 
Southwest Residential College—were those who were bright 
and capable, but who had been tumed-off by the university 
experience, and therefore had mediocre to poor academic 
records. He was seeking a vehicle to reinvigorate and 
"turn-on" these students to education* 
In addition to the substantive differences over 
program orientation that existed between Everett Emerson 
and Arthur Kinney, there emerged as well questions of 
leadership and power* Emerson as Director of Honors— 
then the only free-standing nondepartmental degree 
program—did not want another, and Arthur Kinney who had 
for a year and a half been developing the idea for BDIC 
and had conceived of a separate organizational unit headed 
by a director, was not interested in merely a sub-unit 
of another program* These differences, however, are hard 
to document* 
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The Academic Matters Council had other questions 
about the proposal as well. It asked for a university¬ 
wide program, because it felt that this proposal was too 
affiliated with the College of Arts and Sciences. In 
response to this objection, the ad hoc committee revised 
its proposal to call for a free-standing program called the 
Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration. It would 
have a director responsible to the Provost's Office. The 
revised proposal encouraged the participation of other Schools 
in addition to the College of Arts and Sciences. 
The revised proposal was discussed again at a 
February meeting of the Academic Matters Council. Council 
members--principally Everett Emerson--were still not satis¬ 
fied with the program. The issue of the cost of such a 
program was raised. 
In an action quite separate from the BDIC proposal, 
the Academic Matters Council had decided that it should 
investigate the cost implications to the University of any 
new policy or program before it recommended action to the 
Faculty Senate. Accordingly, it established occasional 
ad hoc committees for this purpose. Several members of 
the Council objected strongly to the budget review committees, 
because they felt that the Council should concern itself 
with academic and not budgetary issues. Because of this 
difference of opinion, the ad hoc budget review mechanism 
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was only occasionally used. When it was called up in the 
BDIC case, therefore, it could have been for either of 
two reasons: a) to seriously consider the cost implica¬ 
tions because the proposal called for a director on released 
time, and secretarial support, or b) to side-step the Kinney- 
Emerson split by creating in effect another committee to 
revise the Kinney proposal. 
Although the documentary evidence is unclear, 
the second notion seems the most plausible because the 
new subcommittee chaired by Professor Leigh Short not 
only considered budgetary implications, but proposed a 
24 
number of important revisions to the program. 
The review committee accepted the basic idea and 
objectives of the program, but changed many of the specifics. 
Most importantly, they saw the program as an experimental 
or pilot program and therefore recommended a limited number 
of students and a pilot period of two years. They saw 
the pilot notion as a strategy for gaining Faculty Senate 
approval, but also as an opportunity for testing the 
validity of the core idea and for experimentation with 
^^The members of this committee included: Leigh 
Short, Chairman, Tony Borton, Everett Emerson, Hugh Mi¬ 
ser, John Zahradnik, and John Kendall. It is interesting 
to note the elimination of student participation. Of this 
group, none was a student. 
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the mechanics of the program. 
In order to strengthen the notion of a university¬ 
wide program, the subcommittee replaced the director with 
a four-person supervisor's committee. The committee would 
include a student and the chairmanship would rotate among 
the members. It was understood but not stipulated that 
the committee membership would represent various pro¬ 
fessional Schools as well as the College of Arts and 
26 Sciences. This supervisory committee structure rather 
^^This in fact extended the planning period of 
the program two years, but gave more clear focus to the 
efforts because the pilot program would have active students. 
^^Perhaps the reason it was not stipulated was 
that it was clear by then who the first supervisory committee 
would be (assuming Academic Matters Council and Faculty 
Senate approval.) The supervisory committee would include 
Leigh Short, the chairman of the budget review sub¬ 
committee and professor of Engineering,* Tony Borton, 
professor in the then college of Agriculture and member of 
both the ad hoc committee and the budget review commitee 
created by the Academic Matters Council; and Arthur Kinney, 
professor of English, Chairman of the ad hoc committee 
and one who had been involved with the program from the 
initial SWAP conference. It is also interesting to note 
that the notion of a student committee member althoiAgh 
part of the proposal was never acted upon. 
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creatively solved the leadership conflict between Everett 
Emerson and Arthur Kinney while appealing to the university¬ 
wide nature of the program. 
The committee changed too, the notion of the student 
clientele. While supporting the idea that BDIC would not 
be an Honors College it made it clear that the program 
was for students ready to undertake the major rather than 
for entering freshmen. It minimized the departure from 
existing university requirements stressing that students 
entering the program would have completed distribution 
requirements and that BDIC in fact offered only an alterna¬ 
tive way of meeting core requirement F—intensive or 
specialized work constituting a major. The committee 
also put the responsibility of finding a Faculty Sponsor 
onto the student rather than the Director of Faculty 
Committee and articulated a very stringent set of procedures 
for students to follow during the pilot phase: 
1. With guidance from the chairman, a student 
who wishes to be a candidate for a degree in 
the program first seeks to locate a member of 
the faculty who is willing to serve as his 
sponsor. If the student is successful, he pre¬ 
pares with his sponsor's help a unified program 
of studies for at least two semesters and a 
rationale for the four semesters of his program. 
2. The student then presents his proposal to the 
Committee and stands prepared to defend his 
proposal. 
3. With the aid of appropriate consultants who may 
serve as ad hoc members, the Committee reviews 
the proposal and decides whether the student may 
be authorized to undertake the program. When it 
16? 
is approved, the student becomes responsible 
for preparing periodic written self-evaluations 
with his sponsor and for planning with him the 
remainder of his academic program, subject to 
the approval of the Committee chairman. 
4. The student who successfully completes the major 
will be awarded his degree by the University of 
Massachusetts upon the initial recommendation of 
the Committee.2/ 
One of the more important strategies of this 
Committee's proposal to Academic Matters was to include 
sample programs of study. Table 3 lists these sample 
programs. These, more than anything else perhaps suggested 
what the program would be like. It is interesting to 
note that the core idea of the Bachelor's Degree with 
Individual Concentration program is a combination of 
courses. This core idea will continue to evolve during 
the pilot phase of the program. The subcommittee's 
proposal was accepted by the Academic Matters Council on 
March 5, 1970. It had previously been presented to and 
/ 
approved by the Student Senate Academic Affairs Committee.' 
Proposal to Establish a Program for A Bachelor's 
Degree With Individual Concentration,” proposal submitted to 
the Academic Matters Council, March 5t 1970, Leigh Short, 
Chairman, p. 1. 
28, 
-^Arthur Kinney had felt that it had been important 
to get formal student backing and support for the program so 
had gone to the Student Senate first for approval and re¬ 
turned to Academic Matters with their backing and support. 
Others including students felt that that had ^een some¬ 
thing of a phony process—a last minute appearance befor 
^hrftSLntf rather than actual student participation. In 
either case it was symbolically quite important. 
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It was forwarded to the Faculty Senate and approved at their 
April 2nd meeting. It was approved at a May meeting of the 
Board of Trustees. 
°?P®t«ith Individual Concentration 
During ps Pilot Phase: Perspectives from 
a Student Participant and from 
the Supervisory Committee 
By the Fall of I970, then, the BDIC supervisory 
committee had been formed,program had been given 
a two year experimental mandate, and it was finally 
ready to admit its first students. The objective of the 
program was to provide for individualization by allowing 
students to develop their own major program of study. 
The first part of this section depicts what that meant 
for an individual student. BDIC was also a programmatic 
or organizational vehicle for meeting this objective and 
the two year mandate afforded the supervisory committee 
the opportunity to experiment with that vehicle. The 
supervisory committee during this period was concerned not 
only with individual student programs, but with a variety 
of programmatic issues relating to the implementation of 
29 
^The supervisory committee members were, as had 
been predicted, Anthony Borton, Leigh Short, and Arthur 
Kinney. 
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the program. The second part of this section deals with 
those issues from the perspective of the supervisory 
committee. 
Janet Sheppard—A BDIC Student. Janet Sheppard 
was one of the first ten students in the BDIC program. 
She applied and was accepted during the fall of I970 and 
her program beg.an with the spring semester of I971. 
Janet had come to the University of Massachusetts 
as a freshman with a clear idea of what she wanted for 
herself. She wanted to be a lawyer and she wanted the 
University of Massachusetts to help her learn what she 
needed to get into law school, what she needed to practice 
effectively, and how to keep the study of and practice of 
law in a broader perspective. She quickly learned that 
there was no particular Department, School or program at 
the University of Massachusetts to directly help her with 
her objective. According to Janet, "the majors would not 
have prepared (me) for anything but that academic 
discipline--would not have helped me in terms of skills 
for law school.Janet's motivation was strong, however 
and she began to pursue her objectives on her own. 
^^Interview with Janet Sheppard. While this state 
ment is clearly inaccurate, what is important to the point 
are Janet's perceptions about the University and her 
motivations for joining BDIC. 
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One feels that "you have to really fight for an education 
at U.Mass, (but) you can get what you want."^^ She 
joined the Honors Program because she had become convinced 
that good teaching was more important than content of 
courses, and the Honors courses were offered by many of 
the best professors in the University. Honors also allowed 
her to get out of University core requirements, which she 
considered useless. She joined Project 10 "because 
it seemed different from all other places in the University, 
and because it too had good faculty associated with it. 
By the beginning of her sophomore year, she still 
had to choose a major and she heard in Project 10 about 
a new program which allowed students to structure their own 
majors. 
According to Janet, "it was strange to think about. 
I was going to design my own education. I wasn't sure I 
wanted to do that."-^^ She decided, however, to investigate 
the program and went to see someone in the office to ex¬ 
plain about wanting to go to law school and the skills 
she felt she needed to learn at U.Mass in order to get there. 
Tony Barton talked with her and said that what she wanted 




to do was important and that she should find a faculty- 
sponsor and apply to the program. Janet felt that his 
encouragement during that meeting was crucial. She went 
to a faculty member—Richard Harzler, a lawyer affiliated 
with the School of Business Administration—informed him 
of the new program and invited him to be her sponsor. 
After checking out the program, he agreed. 
They worked together to prepare the program of 
Study and Rationale required of applicants to the program. 
Janet's program statement had emphasized her professional 
goals: 
My professional goal is to be a lawyer. In 
order to have a useful background, I . . . . 
want to study law specifically, but I would 
also like to study the things that influence 
the law. I think politics, culture, history and 
social grouping influence the law, and in turn 
are affected by the law.3^ 
The courses listed for her first year of the program in¬ 
cluded American government. Political Novel, Criminology, 
the Individual and Society, the Law and Judicial Behavior. 
Janet and Professor Harzler went together to be 
interviewed. Janet found the process strange. The inter¬ 
view seemed to focus more on the specific combination of 
courses than on her rationale and objectives, and most 
3^Janet Sheppard, "The Bachelor's Degree with In- 
dividual Concentration," Program statement, undated but 
contained in her academic folder. 
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questions were directed to Professor Harzler rather than 
to her. She was nervous about locking herself into the 
program for two years and wanted to be assured that her 
program could remain flexible. 
The supervisory committee said she could change her 
program if she felt she needed to and accepted her into the 
program. 
BDIC did allow Janet to change her program. Her 
report at the end of her first term stated that "I have 
added the goal of acquainting myself with the aspect of 
the law which deals specifically with women.More 
fundamentally, it allowed her to do something more than 
just combine University courses. In the Summer of 1971, 
a new program had been started at U.Mass called the Univer¬ 
sity Year for Action in which students spent a full year 
in community anti-poverty work. Janet convinced Professor 
Hartzler that a year spent working with the Community and 
Regional Legal Assistant Program in Holyoke would give her 
practical legal experience and insights into the sociology 
of law. Together Janet and Professor Hartzler convinced 
^^Sheppard, "Program of the Bachelor's Degree 
With Individual Concentration, End of Term Report,'" May 
28, 1971. 
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The BDIC program to allow Janet to participate in the 
Action program as part of her BDIC major. They put to¬ 
gether a reading list designed to help Janet understand 
and clarify her day-to-day experiences. 
At the end of one semester in the program, Janet 
felt that it had "sharpened my insights into the social 
problems related to the law and given me a better per¬ 
spective from which to plan my career.She also felt 
that she had gotten a much clearer perspective on a law 
office, on lawyers, as professionals, and on ways in which 
their attitudes shaped the profession. Because she was 
concerned with ways of articulating what she had learned 
and in some way bringing it back to the university, Janet 
taught a University course during her second semester in 
the Action program and her third in BDIC. She appreciated 
Professor Hartzler's and BDIC's willingness to let her 
teach what she had learned in order to learn from that 
process. During her second semester with Action, Janet 
also co-authored a pamphlet on Landlord-Tenant Rights and 
Duties, which he felt was a valuable learning experience. 
Hartzler in his memo to BDIC evaluating Janet's 
experience in the Action program says: 
^^Sheppard, "End of Term Report, Fall 1971»" P* 3* 
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In summary, her educational experiences 
in the Action program brought her to the point 
where she is now—a respected teacher. This 
respect comes from the lawyers with whom she 
worked, their clients, the personnel of the 
courts, her student peers and even a few pro¬ 
fessors; and law school is still to come .... 
I am becoming more convinced than ever 
that at least some students don't need as much 
traditional formal education as we presently 
have structured into our system. T think BDIC 
and Action are good things ... .37 
Janet felt that the most important things about her 
BDIC program had been her experiences in Action, her 
teaching, her reading, and her close relationship with 
Professor Hartzler. She felt that she had learned a great 
deal from keeping in close contact with him over two years 
and she felt that the most important thing that BDIC had 
done was facilitate that relationship. 
Janet finished her final semester in the BDIC 
program by taking and teaching additional University 
courses and she was accepted into law school. 
Arthur Kinney, when asked what had made BDIC 
a successful program, had said: 
I want to say that the most important thing— 
in a kind of naive and adolescent way, was the 
^"^Richard Hartzler, memo to the Committee on 
Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration concerning 
Janet Sheppard, found in Sheppard's academic folder, p. 2. 
177 
wisdom of the student programs, that is, the 
purposes they came up with, the combinations, 
etc. (Students) were what made the program 
successfully.38 
I think that Janet Sheppard's experience proves Arthur 
Kinney's point. Janet's program attests as well to the 
fact that BDIC fulfilled its main objective—that of pro¬ 
viding individualized education. 
The Su-pervisory Committee and the BDIC Program. 
When the BDIC program was approved by the Board of Trustees 
in May of 1970, the supervisory committee began spending 
time together immediately. They were an impressive group 
and nearly all of those interviewed concerning BDIC felt 
that the most important factor to the quick acceptance 
university-wide of the BDIC program was the "academic 
respectability" of the first supervisory committee. Arthur 
Kinney was seen as the program's leader from the beginning 
of the planning period and all of those interviewed felt 
he had been very effective. His success was attributed to 
his energy and dedication, and the fact that he was well 
known and respected throughout the campus. Arthur Kinney 
typified what Lindquist and others referred to as a 
"cosmopolitan local* because he had been involved in a 
large number of activities on the campus that made him 
well known beyond the confines of the English Department. 
^^Interview with Arthur Kinney. 
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He was respected by both the faculty and the students at 
the University. He had been a faculty resident in South¬ 
west, had participated in the SWAP conference, and had 
organized a student-faculty teach-in in May 1970 about the 
invasion of Cambodia in addition to well-known scholarly 
activities. His experience prior to coming to the 
University of Massachusetts had been at Yale where he 
had been involved with the collegiate system. 
The other faculty members on the first Supervisory 
Committee were widely respected as well. The Academic 
Matters Council was an established academic campus group 
and Leigh Short had been a member for some years.He 
was well known within and without the School of Engineering. 
Tony Borton, also a member of the Academic Matters Council, 
had been at the University for many years, knew a large 
number of faculty members and had been actively involved 
in undergraduate curriculum development in the College 
of Agriculture. 
The supervisory committee accepted six students into 
the program for the fall of 1970 and another thirty for 
the Spring semester. They worked hard to achieve diversity 
among the students and their programs, to foster creativity. 
^^In fact, when BDIC was to come up at the end of 
its trial period for permanent approval, Leigh Short 
was serving as chairman of the Academic Matters Council. 
179 
and to interest students who were cap>able but had pre¬ 
viously been academic underachievers.^^ 
The preliminary report described the range and 
diversity of programsi 
The most popular areas in the first year of the 
program are: pre-law (5), natural science (4), 
environmental science (4K urban studies (4), and 
mythology and folklore (3). Other students have 
combined speech therapy and physical education 
work for a career helping the profoundly re¬ 
tarded; work in philosophy, creative writing, 
theatre, and dance for a study of aesthetics; 
work in engineering, film, and music theory and 
composition for composing and scoring for mass 
media; work in government, history, sociology, 
English, and economics, combined with employment 
by the state legislature and the Democratic 
Party for a study in professional politics .... 
The supervisory committee at first required that 
students combine existing University courses, but as the 
program progressed, they found that University courses did 
not always fulfill the educational needs of students in 
the program. The supervisory committee petitioned the 
Academic Matters Council for special course numbers which 
^^This nonmeritocratic emphasis was one of the unique 
things about the BDIC program as compared to programmatic 
attempts in other colleges and universities. 
4liiprogram of Bachelor’s Degree with Individual 
Concentration: A Preliminary Report—April 19711" 
mitted by Anthony Borton, Arthur Kinney, and Leigh Short, 
supervisory committee, p. 3* 
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would serve as academic umbrellas under which BDIC 
students and their sponsors could design directly relevant 
educational experiences. These courses became widely 
used. They also began to allow more field work and off- 
campus experiences as students and their sponsors sought 
to build these into their programs. 
The supervisory committee asked students to ar¬ 
ticulate both a personal and professional goal- for their 
studies, and they found that the program tended to attract 
ambitious, aggressive and industrious students. Students 
often used the BDIC program as a way to undertake much 
more specifically career-related studies than usually 
available within Departments. Some excerpts from student 
proposals are illustrative: 
The purpose of my individual concentration 
will be to prepare myself in the field of 
East Asia Journalism, centering around Japan. 
I have proposed a program to acquire many 
of the skills essential to the positions of 
the Software Design Specialist and Management 
in that field (Computer Science). My pro¬ 
posed study consists of at least seventeen 
interrelated courses covering Mathematics, 
Software Systems, Hardware and Cybernetics. 
This program is designed to provide a founda¬ 
tion for graduate study and research in both 
mythology per se manifestations of 
myth in literature. 
^^Ibid., Appendix IV: Selected Case Studies 
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Just as the first students were important to the 
implementation of BDIC, as a program, so too were the 
faculty sponsors. The Supervisory Committee paid close 
attention to its initial group of faculty sponsors. They 
made it very clear that they were accepting or rejecting 
students to the program according to their judgments about 
the faculty sponsors and the quality of the faculty-student 
relationship as well as on the coherence and viability 
of the student program. In their proposal for permanent 
status they defined their criteria for student acceptance 
as follows: 
Approval and acceptance is dependent on the 
Committee's evaluation of: (1) the need for an 
individualized major in consultation with the 
sponsor and on occasion other faculty, (2) the 
faculty-sponsor's ability to advise the student 
effectively, (3) "the student-sponsor relationship, 
(4) the academic merit of the proposal, and \^) 
the interrelationship jnd coherence of the pro¬ 
posed course of study. ^ 
During their first year they attracted faculty 
sponsors from twenty-six departments and colleges. The 
sponsors were well respected as a group, by other faculty 
and administrators in the University. The BDIC supervisory 
committee did not interfere with faculty judgments and 
^^MpT-onosal to Award permanent Status to the 
ry1h2 su^fr^”’ 
visory committee, p» 
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expected the faculty member to take responsibility with 
the student for the student's program. They felt thati 
The ultimate success of the BDIC program is 
dependent on the individual faculty-sponsor 
who is the key to a successful independent 
major. The sponsor counsels and advises the 
student, makes academic decisions concerning 
the major (pass-fail courses, pre-requisites, 
etc.), certifies the student as a candidate 
for graduation and in the final analysis, pro¬ 
vides the academic credibility to the BDIC 
major.^^ 
The Supervisory Committee also worked hard at 
establishing harmonious relationships with University 
Departments. They made it clear that they did not intend 
to challenge or undermine existing Departments or majors 
and that the program was only for those few students who 
wanted an academic program that was not otherwise available 
through existing departmental major offerings. 
As BDIC moved into its second year of the pilot 
program, another major objective began to be articulated 
45 
for the program—that of academic experimentation. 
^^Ibid. 
^^Arthur Kinney, when interviewed stated that this^ 
objective had been present from the beginning of the planning 
period, but there is no documentary support for this posi¬ 
tion. The documents and most of those interviewed testify 
that the sole purpose of the program in the beginning was to 
respond to the pressure for individualization of the 
curriculum by allowing students to design • 
program of study. I would agree with Kinney that inviduali- 
zed majors do, in fact, constitute an academic reform, but 
would agree with the others that the program was not ini¬ 
tially viewed as a vehicle for continual curricular ex- 
perimentation. That the program in fact turned out to be such 
a vehicle could only be attributed to serendipity. 
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The BDIC supervisory committee began to allow 
groups that were planning new academic programs to use the 
rubric of BDIC as a vehicle for their program development 
and experimentation. For example, the fact that BDIC 
allowed UWW students to enroll under its major was crucial 
to the development of the University Without Walls program 
for it gave UWW a year of working with real students, and 
faculty members while it designed its program. In addition, 
BDIC became a vehicle for ^u.ging student academic in¬ 
terests and this information was useful to the university 
for curricular planning. Students joined the BDIC program 
in order to design a major program of study that was not 
available to them in any other way at the University. As 
the BDIC enrollment grew, student programs began to cluster 
in certain areas such as urban studies, environmental 
studies, or legal studies. As one faculty member put it: 
46 
"Students, in a sense, voted with their feet. The 
supervisory committee watched student program patterns 
closely and suggested new majors for the University. 
The concept was best stated by Arthur Kinney: 
ty\ +hp best sense of the word, BDIC is really 
i se5^ioe for the University in general 
U J^sfespefially for the Academic Matters 
46j^terview with Robert Woodbury. 
184 
Committee itselfj a program which tests certain 
possiblities which are raised as academic matters 
on our campus. 
In addition to encouraging experimentation and new 
major programs, BDIC began to have an impact on Departmental 
curricula. Departments began to revamp their course 
offerings and to allow greater flexibility to students in 
fulfilling major requirements. The Biology, Zoology, and 
the College of Agriculture were three examples cited often 
during interviews. 
The Success of an Idea—BDIC Moves 
For Permanent Approval 
From its inception as a pilot program in 1970, 
the BDIC program had grown rapidly, so that by the spring 
of 1972, it had 134 students. As its two-year experimental 
mandate was to expire in May, the BDIC supervisory committee 
decided that the program had proved successful in providing 
individualized majors and that permanent status for the 
program should be sought from the Board of Trustees. 
While the process for planning and gaining approval 
as a pilot program had taken two years the process for 
gaining permanent approval seemed quite simple. The 
supervisory presented a tried proposal to the Academic 
^"^Arthur Kinney, letter to Ernest Buck, Chairman 
of the Academic Matters Committee, March 1973* 
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Matters Council. The Council voted unanimous approval 
and supported the proposal in the Faculty Senate. The 
Senate also voted its approval and supported the program 
before the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees voted 
its approval and BDIC became a permanent academic option 
for students. 
The critical supporting factors in the first 
planning stages of BDIC had been leadership in the involve¬ 
ment and support of a few well-respected faculty members 
and a genuine concern on the part of students and faculty 
for finding an academic mechanism for meeting students 
needs. The important factors in the process of gaining 
permanent approval were somewhat different. Due to the 
successful experience with an experimental pilot program, 
BDIC had achieved a critical mass of support from students, 
and faculty. The students had for the most part come up 
with serious and exciting alternative programs and the 
faculty responded to the students. The large number of 
faculty members who supported the program before the 
Faculty Senate were according to one supervisory committee 
member "strange bedfellows." BDIC appealed to both extremes-- 
liberals for its reform potential and conservative^ 
academic s because of the flexibility it gave students to 
follow their own particular line." The effective leader- 
48 Interview with Tony Borton. 
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ship of the well-respected supervisory committee was 
still a critical factor, but the University environment 
was more conducive to academic reform in 1972 than it had 
been in I969 and 1970. 
An important element in the planning and imple¬ 
mentation of BDIC from I968 to 1972 was the fact that it 
did not appear to be a program of radical change. Allowing 
students to make all the decisions concerning a major pro¬ 
gram of study was a fundamental departure from prevailing 
attitudes about the relative roles, responsibilities, and 
competencies of faculty and students, but within the context 
of BDIC this departure was not immediately apparent. A 
BDIC program for a few students did not appear to alter in 
any way the basic missions or functions of the University; 
this was the most important reason for its swift and wide¬ 
spread acceptance, but as an approved program, it did 
allow for the assumption of the mission of individualization. 
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CHAPTER V 
INSTITUTE FOR MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT 
The Institute for Man and His Environment was 
formally approved by the Board of Trustees of the University 
of Massachusetts on April 26, 1971* I'ts establishment as a 
distinct research unit attests to the intention of the 
University of Massachusetts to assume the mission of social 
problem-solving. The story of its development over a two 
year period, however, shows how difficult it is to alter the 
basic missions of the University, and on another level, how 
difficult it is even to create a new unit within the Uni¬ 
versity where an altered mission could be apparent. Its 
history also reveals some of the complex aspects of the change 
process and suggests a number of factors that were important 
to its creation as well as many that prevented its realiza¬ 
tion in the grandiose terms envisioned. This chapter traces 
the development of the Institute from the fall of i960 to 
the spring of 1970* 
Objectives of the Institute 
The concept of the Institute grew out of a wide¬ 
spread feeling among many members of faculty 
that a great state university had a responsibility 
to employ its resources to help cope with the 
worsening problems of the environment. 
^Bernard Berger, "A Chronological Account ^e 
Development to Date If the University of Massachusetts In- 
stitue^for Man and His Environment, Amherst, 16 March 
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In the late sixties and early seventies environ¬ 
mental problems such as pollution, overpopulation, and 
resource depletion were the center of a great deal of 
attention and public concern. It was felt that the 
University ought to take an institutional role about the 
issues of knowledge and its application to environmental 
problems. 
There was a growing feeling on the part of the 
activists among the students and faculty that 
the University should get involved in social 
problems, that they should get themselves in¬ 
truded into the social process and become an 
agent of social change in a much more active 
way. 2 
The concept of an institute was shared by many at 
the University; the entity of an institute, its structural 
and operational form, evolved over the two year period and 
was much harder to achieve. A recent brochure describes 
the goals of the Institute: 
The Institute for Man and His Environment has 
been established ... to meet the challenge of 
the many complex problems arising from the inter¬ 
action of people with the social and physical 
environment. Its main task, which no other 
single segment of the University is equipped to 
perform, is to bring together the diverse ents 
of the faculty and students to bear on problems of 
common interest. The Institute is designed to 
act, therefore, as a focal point for the 
^Interview with Carl Swanson, Associate Director, 
Institute for Man and His Environment, 2k January 197'*-- 
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recognition and delineation of areas of 
environmental concern which call for a 
multidisciplinary approach, and as a stimulus 
to the development of appropriate strategies 
for dealing with these concerns.3 
The documents pertaining to the Institute were 
quite eloquent about its goals. Those who were inter¬ 
viewed were less eloquent, but they revealed the fact 
that there were many perceived goals and objectives for 
the institute; these were not prioritized, and some of 
them were in fact contradictory. 
Of the thirteen people interviewed, all agreed with 
the generalized goal of meeting the challenge of complex 
environmental problems. They agreed that these problems 
stemmed from the interaction of man with the environment, 
and that the solutions had to involve both man and tech¬ 
nology—the social sciences, the hard sciences and even 
the humanities. 
Most agreed, as well, that the problems faced 
were of a kind that required some sort of multidisciplinary 
activity, and that no existing unit could mount such an 
effort. Therefore, they agreed that an institute should 
be created as connecting tissue between departments and 
schools and between teaching, research, and service in the 
environmental area. 
3Tnstitute for Man and His Environment. Informa- 
tional Brochure, 1972. 
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The objective of many to have an educational 
program that was closely tied in and that was available 
to undergraduate as well as graduate students at all 
levels of sophistication was a shared objective but one that 
was unique to this institute. One more cynical faculty 
member felt that the reason for the educational program 
was somewhat different: "We were Johnny-come-lately•s 
so we had to do something different." 
Another goal for the institute was that the 
institute should serve as a resource for state govern¬ 
ment. Agencies of the state government concerned with 
environmental problems ought to be able to call upon the 
institute for help. This goal was articulated by most 
of those interviewee^ although some claimed that the focus 
originated at a national level and only slowly shifted 
toward the state level. As one faculty member put it: 
We are a large state university. We have a 
unique responsibility—an obligation to respond. 
My feeling is that the state agencies were 
originally skeptical that the University could 
look on such problems in a realistic fashion 
and some state agencies still are skeptical.^ 
Many felt that the "real" motivation for the 
Institute had less to do with the environment and more to 
^Interview with Otto Stein, Head, Department of 
Botany, 1 February 197^* 
^Interview with Bernard Berger, Director, Water 
Resources Research Center, 31 January 197^* 
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do with money. As the Associate Director put it« 
. . . it was both in response to a very obvious 
social need « . . and it was also in response 
to the fact that there was money available through 
MND and NSF . . . there was in the air^the feel¬ 
ing that we had better get on the ball. 
A number of Federal agencies and large foundations were 
at that time making large grants to universities for work 
in the environmental area, and the University of Massachusetts 
wanted to be on the receiving end. The structural forms, 
the timing, and much of the energy and motivation seem 
7 
to have been related to "grantsmanship."' 
Those who saw monetary objectives as a goal for 
the Institute also saw political and personal ones. As 
one administrator said, "the Zeitgeist was in the 
environmental area so the University needed a labelled 
g 
entity in the environmental business." New presidents, 
new top administrators, and new deans all wanted to improve 
^Interview with Carl Swanson, 24 January 1974. 
"^The fact that over the years its major proposals 
have not been funded and few resources have come to it 
has been a severe blow to the inflated aspirations of 
those who saw it solving hosts of problems. 
^Interview with Richard Louttit, Head, Department 
of Psychology, 1 February 1974. 
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their power base through control over a visible and 
successful entity. 
These last conflicting motivations—not the generally 
accepted notion that the University ought to be working 
towards the solution of difficult environmental problems— 
led to the two year squabble over the forms and functions 
of the Institute. 
Planning Process for Institute 
Initial Stages—Faculty Meeting and External 
Influences. Concern over what the University was doing 
in the environmental area first was expressed in an 
organized fashion in the Fall of 1969* A group of 
faculty—mostly from engineering and business—had been 
meeting on Monday evenings to talk about what the Uni¬ 
versity could do about major social problems. At the same 
time the Dean of the Graduate School, his research 
associate dean and others were trying to think of ways 
to involve the University in areas that would respond 
to needs but would also produce funds. The catalytic 
agent between these groups was Bernard Berger who had 
spent the I968/1969 academic year as the water specialist 
on the Presidential Science Advisory staff in Washington, 
and who returned to campus convinced that the University 
should be doing something in the environmental area and 
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that there were funds available for such activity. Berger 
had been in a position in Washington to know what legisla¬ 
tion and appropriations were likely in the environmental 
areas so he was granted substantial credibility on campus. 
Berger met several times with the Graduate Deani and they 
planned a series of large group meetings where interested 
Q 
faculty and students could discuss the issue.^ 
The first meeting which was held on September 23* 
1969f was well attended. Close to one hundred people were 
there, including a smattering of "vocal” students and 
faculty from a wide variety of University departments. 
The agenda for the meeting was to discuss problems and 
what the University ought to do about them. There was a 
general consensus that something ought to be done about 
the environment by the University as an institution but 
considerable disagreement about what and how. As one 
participant put it "the humanists were talking about ethics 
and culture* and the engineers about waste treatment. 
^All of those interviewed attested to the initial 
leadership roles of M. Appley and B. Berger although there 
were differences of opinion as to who was really the prime 
mover. Clearly B. Berger as the Chairman of meetings and 
the Steering Committee was the most visible, but that was 
perceived by most as a justifiable strategy on the part of 
the Graduate Dean to put a faculty member in the visible 
position. 
^^Interview with Robert Gluckstern, Vice Chancellor 
for Academic Affairs and Provost, 22 March 197^• 
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A second meeting was held on October 16, I969 and 
an outside guest was invited. John Steinhart had been 
a colleague of Bernard Berger's in Washington, was 
associated with the Office of Science and Technology, and 
had recently completed a report to the President's Environ¬ 
mental Quality Council.Steinhart's visit was remembered 
by almost all of those interviewed, his report was dis¬ 
tributed on the campus and widely read, and he was quoted 
in all the major Institute documents. He was, therefore, 
the most important outside influence on the development 
of the Institute, and his input came at a crucial, early 
stage in the Institute's development. It is important, 
therefore, to review the major elements of Steinhart's 
Report. 
The Steinhart study set out to determine the 
appropriate institutional arrangements for environmental 
problem-solving. It started from some assumptions about 
the role of the university in society and claimed that 
"the ongoing discussion of problems" was the third major 
function of the university (along with education and re¬ 
search). Thus Steinhart made the transition from public 
^^John S. Steinhart and Stacie Cherniack, ^ 
Universities and Environmental Qualityj_Commitment ^ 
to Problem-Focused Education, A Report to the President's 
Environmental Quality Coyicil» Office of Science and 
Technology, September 19&9* 
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service to social problem-solving as a mission for the 
university. According to Steinhart: 
. . . society has a right to expect, as a part 
of the educational process, discussion of the 
prominent issues, problems and opportunities 
of the day, and training of professionals who 
can deal with these problems on a professional 
level. (Universities should also play) a 
prominent role in the long range public dis¬ 
cussion of alternative futures.12 
Steinhart studied a variety of institutional 
arrangements developed in universities to focus on en¬ 
vironmental problem-solving, but concluded that most 
had failed because they had been unsuccessful at providing 
a viable alternative to the departmental structure. 
Although federal money had encouraged the proliferation 
of institutes and centers, many of these according to 
Steinhart had become paper institutes to channel research 
13 
out to departments. 
Of these few institutes that Steinhart found to 
12 Ibid., p. 8. 
^^The basis of the Steinhart study was a sup/ey 
"Environmental Science Centers at Institutions of Higher 
Education" which had been prepared for the subcoimittee 
on Science Research and Development, U.S. House of Repre¬ 
sentatives, 91st Congress by The Environmental Policy 
Division of the Legislative Reference Service. The survey 
found a great number of institutes and centers and trie 
but failed to determine the most successful organization 1 
forms to deal with environmental problems; No 
answer exists to the mis-match of historical institutional 
organization and emerging social problems. The , 
Division survey recommended the involvement of more socia 
scientists and more operational relationships ^ ‘ 
ment agencies. Steinhart had selected twenty institutes 
from this survey for further study. 
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be successful, Steinhart delineated two factors that he 
deemed crucial to their success: 
1. They had substantial or complete control of the 
faculty reward structure and 
2. They had the freedom to be innovative in 
introducing course material, educational programs. 
work study programs, and curriculum requirements 
for degrees. (Emphasis in original 
Steinhart felt that control over the reward 
system—including hiring and subsequent promotion and 
rewards—was important as the only way to establish a 
viable alternative to the departmental structure and enable 
faculty to focus on problems rather than disciplines. 
Steinhart felt, as well, that one of the most valuable 
results of a program concerned with environmental quality 
was the education and training of students with a problem 
orientation. The appropriate educational program in this 
area, however, required new multidisciplinary and problem- 
focused courses, so Steinhart felt that the environmental 
unit/institute needed the power to create them. He also 
felt that they needed the ability to sponsor experience- 
based programs and confer degrees so that students could 
be freed up to pursue work in the environmental area. 
In addition to the crucial factors of control over faculty 
rewards and the educational program, Steinhart also found that 
the most successful institutes enjoyed the direct interest 
14 Steinhart, p.lO. 
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and support of one or more senior administrators. 
The Steinhart study concluded that the current 
federal funding policies were inappropriate and recommended 
that the federal government provide broad programmatic 
support (including developmental support) for environ¬ 
mental quality centers. 
The findings and recommendations of this report 
were the substance of Steinhart's speech to the faculty 
meeting on October l6, I969. The reactions to the speech 
were intense and conflicting. Mort Appley and others who 
wanted an environmental problem-focused unit that was 
large, visible and liberally supported from Washington 
heard in the Steinhart speech the future federal policies 
and patterns, and wanted to move at once for the creation of 
an institute along the Steinhart model. Those who had 
been primarily concerned with how existing faculty members 
from various departments and schools might come together 
^^In an appendix to the Steinhart report, D.E. 
Cunningham discussed the advantages and deficiencies of 
several federal funding patterns. Cunningham 
a universitv response to the complex problems of society 
luTtTeZnlloiA expressed through ^i-ncial interactions 
hptween government and universities. The details v,* o 
conditions, and patterns which these financial relationships 
assume is of abiding significance in the future structure 
InHuncUons of thf university.” Cunningham discussed 
the several different funding ^^^/^^^reolace 
recommended program funding to the university ^ 
individual research grants to faculty members, 
recommendation was reiterated by Steinha 
198 
to focus on environmental problems were very concerned 
with the notion of a separate unit with its own faculty, 
research projects, and educational programs. 
Formation of Steering Committee. The meeting 
with Steinhart and the reactions convinced the Graduate 
Dean that large group forums were not the most pro¬ 
ductive for pursuing complex questions, so with the 
agreement of a large number of faculty he appointed a 
Steering Committee and named Bernard Berger as its 
Chairman. The charge to the Steering Committee was to 
recommend shape and substance and to suggest a strategy 
for launching a program. 
The Steering Committee wanted to focus on the 
three major elements of education, research, and service 
or outreach, and established sub-committees in each of 
these areas. The Steering Committee itself continued 
to focus on issues of goals and structure. These four 
groups met often during the period November 19^9 "to 
April 19701 discussed a large number of questions, and 
put together a report recommending structure and function 
for an Institute. The Steering Committee drew its 
membership from different departments and schools in the 
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University.The motivations of those on the Steering 
Committee and subcommittees were quite diverse. Most 
of those interviewed felt that the primary motivation was 
one of "watch-dog-ism." Individuals joined the committees 
not out of desire to work for an Institute, but to be 
sure that their department or school did not miss any¬ 
thing. They represented units on the campus who had a 
stake in the outcome of the deliberations either because 
they wanted control of the Institute themselves (Engineering, 
G.raduate School) or because they would stand to lose power 
if an Institute were created (Agriculture). Therefore, 
’their positions on an issue regarding structure or function 
reflects their feelings about impact on their own unit 
^^The members of the Steering Committee were: 
Bernard Berger, Chairman, Director of Water Resources 
Research Center; Samuel Seeley, Secretary, Associate 
Dean, Graduate School; Kenneth Picha, Dean, School of 
Engineering; Lester Van Atta, Associate Dean, School of 
Engineering; John A. Naegle, Department of Environmental 
Sciences; Otto Stein, Head, Department of Botany; Irving 
Howards, Government Department; Robert McGarrah, Center 
for Business and Economic Research, School of Business 
Administration; Ervin Zube, Department of landscape 
Architecture; John Roberts, Department of Zoology; 
William Darrity, Dean, Department of Public Healtn; 
Ellis dim. Department of Human Development. 
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rather than on the Institute itself.As one person 
interviewed put it: "some strong people got involved 
who wanted to run with the ball and everybody was 
1 R juggling and pushing here and there." This political 
maneuvering was to be one of the major factors in the 
development of the Institute. Other motivations for in¬ 
volvement with Institute planning committees were more 
personal. Many second-rate faculty members tended to 
^The College of Agriculture especially viewed 
the Institute with some consternation, because they felt 
that they had been doing for some years in their Depart¬ 
ment of Environmental Sciences and in their Experiment 
Stations, the very things that the Institute was calling 
for. There was some legitimacy to this view, for the 
service mission of the University had evolved primarily from 
the Land Grant movement in the I860's, and the establishment 
of Agricultural Experiment Stations in the late l890's 
and early 1900's. 
With the exception of the Dean of the School 
of Engineering, all those interviewed pointed to the 
fact that Engineering wanted to gain control of the 
Institute. Most people tended at first to define en¬ 
vironmental problems as engineering technology problems, 
the School of Engineering had a division of Environ¬ 
mental Engineering and they were deeply involved in 
grantsmanship. 
^^Interview with Otto Stein, 1 February 1974. 
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attach themselves to the new enterprise as a vehicle 
to gain recognition they had failed to achieve in their 
home department. The majority of those seeking routes 
to legitimacy included faculty from Agriculture and 
Business, 
The Steering Committee had a great deal of diffi¬ 
culty focusing goals for the new Institute as well as 
deciding on its function. Generally its objectives 
for the Institute were similar to those mentioned during 
interviews; the Institute should serve as a vehicle through 
which the University responds to society, it should obtain 
financial support for projects, serve as resource to state 
agencies, and engage in multidisciplinary research, 
education and service projects that focused on environmental 
problems. 
There were differences of opinion as to the im¬ 
portance of such goals as compared with the other missions 
of the University, and therefore differing opinions as 
to the appropriate size and activity level. Many argued 
that the traditionally emphasized missions of teaching 
and disciplined-based research ought to continue to be of 
highest priority in the University because the university 
is the only and/or best societal institution for carrying 
out those missions. While a multidisciplinary, problem 
focused unit might be desirable—especially if it had 
202 
educational and training aspects—social problem-solving 
was performed by other agencies in the society and should 
remain a low-level University priority. Others argued 
that the educational and research missions were anachron¬ 
istic in contemporary societies and could be revitalized 
only through an emphasis on social problem-solving. They 
argued for a central place for an Institute for Man and 
His Environment. 
Lack of a coherent University policy on public 
service hampered the deliberations of the Steering 
Committee• 
The education subcommittee reviewed current 
environmentally-focused curricular offerings and recom¬ 
mended a number of new courses and seminars. The research 
subcommittee grappled with the problem of theoretical vs, 
applied research, disciplinary vs. multidisciplinary 
activity, and how to decide which research activities 
would fall under the purview of the Institute and which 
would not. They recommended research efforts which were 
multidisciplinary, problem-focused, and which brought 
together willing faculty members. The service-outreach 
committee focused on questions of what activity for whom, 
and articulated the notion of service to the state. 
They recognized the fundamental importance of outside 
funding to support the activities of the Institute. 
The Steering Committee had a number of alternative 
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organizational formats to choose from during this stage 
of the planning process. They could opt for the Steinhart 
model—a separate research unit with its own faculty, 
staff and educational program, they could argue for a new 
department or school or they could dispense with a new 
structural entity and recommend a series of committees 
or task forces. 
The deliberations of the Steering Committee 
were somewhat aided by a second visitor to the campus. 
Dr. John Buckley, ecologist on the staff of Dr. Lee DuBridge 
then the President's Science Advisor, spoke to a third 
large group meeting on December 2, 19^9 described 
the efforts of Executive agencies in developing programs 
in the environmental area. 
The Steering Committee pulled together reports 
from the subcommittees and incorporated them into one 
draft report proposing an Institute for Man and His Environ¬ 
ment. It recommended an independent Institute but one with 
only a small staff for coordination purposes. All projects 
and activities would be carried out by faculty and graduate 
students working with or for diverse state agencies. The 
Institute would report through the Graduate Dean. 
the time of the Steering Committee deliberations 
reportinrUnr?Srou^h ?he’^GraSuate°Dean.°b5rit'SL not a 
cri?icaf issSe at thit time. It later became one. 
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Although the Steering Committee recognized that 
its recommendations left unresolved some of the reward 
system problems for those faculty who might want to partici¬ 
pate in Institute projects, it was felt that the Institute 
would have to deal with these problems as they arose on a 
one-to-one basis. 
The Steering Committee's report was meant as an 
on-campus discussion paper and as a proposal for funding 
to the National Science Foundation. It was distributed to 
University faculty on March 27» 1970 f sind discussed at a 
fourth large faculty meeting on April 9‘th. Following that 
meeting, and with the general concurrance of the faculty 
attending the meeting, it was submitted to the National 
Science Foundation. It sought a development grant from 
the National Science Foundation for the creation of an 
^ a.-4. 4. 20 Institute. 
^^The struggle for control over the Institute was 
revealed once again in deliberations over who was to be 
principle investigator of the proposal. Both Bernard 
Berger and Lester Van Atta, Research Associate Dean of 
Engineering were likely candidates but the Associate 
Provost and the Graduate Dean were both concerned that 
that would result in the School of Engineering taking 
control of the Institute. In the end, the Graduate Dean 
himself signed on as principle investigator. 
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Recruitment of Director. With the Steering 
Committee's draft report In hand, the Graduate Dean re¬ 
quested three faculty positions for the Fall of I970. 
He wanted a Director and two Associate Directors for the 
Institute. The Provost and Associate Provost found such 
a request impossible, given the fact that the Institute 
did not then exist as a formal unit,^^ but authorized 
one appointment. The Steering Committee was transformed 
into an informal search group, and M. Appley took the 
initiative in late spring to recruit a Director for the 
Institute. 
There was immediate controversy over where to 
recruit. Some, including Appley and the Provost, felt 
that selection of an on-campus person would run the risk 
of a department or school assuming control over the 
Institute; others argued that if the primary task were 
to bring together and coordinate the faculty on various 
environmentally-related problems, a person who was known 
and respected on the campus would be best. Nevertheless, 
21 The Steering Committee Report had not gone 
to the Faculty Senate and Board of Trustees for approval. 
Although many felt that approval was important, they 
wanted the Report to go immediately to N.S.F. as a 
grant proposal and did not want to wait for formal 
approval. 
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an off-campus search began but was incomplete that spring 
and continued into the fall. The recruitment process had 
not been overly successful. The favorite candidate, 
Carl Swanson, refused the Directorship while agreeing 
to the Associate Directorship. Two other names had been 
put forward, and the Provost chose Dayton Carritt, 
he was a scientist with an established reputation. Every- 
agreed that it had been an unfortunate choice. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Carritt was offered a position and he 
came in January as Director of the Institute. 
Continued Planning of the Institute Under Carritt 
Directorship. Dayton Carritt's mandate was clear. He was 
to implement the proposal that had been completed the 
previous April by the Steering Committee by moving 
a) for Faculty Senate approval for the Institute, b) to 
bring faculty together and get them started on activities, 
and c) to push forward in the pursuit of grant funds. 
Dr. Carritt agreed that his mandate to implement 
the proposal had been clear but felt that the proposal 
was so vague and general that it could not be done. 
According to Carritt, the Steering Committee had avoided 
the really difficult implementation problems concerning 
resources, reward systems, and priorities for activities. 
In addition, Carritt felt that he had been mislead con¬ 
cerning the actual status of the Institute. He thought 
the Institute had been clearly established and had 
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campus-wide support, even though he was told that as a 
trivial matter it had to go through an approval process. 
Again, according to Carritt, he found himself, upon 
arrival as Director, in a position of trying to create 
an Institute from nothing and against the opposition of 
the Deans of the two most powerful professional Schools, 
the top campus administration, and the constituted aca¬ 
demic bodies on the campus. 
Whether the opposition was there when he arrived. 
whether it was generated by his actions during his first 
months, or whether it was generated by other forces such 
as opposition and antipathy for the Graduate Dean is a 
fascinating question to which, unfortunately, there are 
no clear answers. 
Carritt, upon his arrival, began a series of 
meetings with department heads. Deans, the Provost and 
Associate Provost, and the President. He began to lay 
out his notion of an Institute for Man and His Environment. 
The Institute was to be, according to Carritt, a large, 
liberally supported unit. Following the Steinhart model. 
^^There is unfortunately, no documentary evidence 
UJ. UIICOC nice U J. -^- _ 1, 4.^ 
Louttit, Picha, Gluckstem—were able to speak to the 
substance of those meetings from personal recollection. 
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it would have control over all grant funds and research 
projects concerned with environment-related problems, 
and it would have its own educational program. 
Carritt's conception was clearly different from 
that envisioned the year before by the Steering Committee 
and its subcommittees on education, research, and outreach. 
The difference could be explained in several ways; 
1. It could reflect Carritt’s sincere attempt 
to put specifics on the generalities of the Steering 
Committee's report by facing directly issues of reward 
system and control. 
2. It could reflect Carritt's own personal 
aspirations as Director of the unit. 
3. It could reflect M. AppJey's original, but 
skillfully hidden agendas. When interviewed, Appley 
stated almost in passing: 
One of the sub-interests I had—once we got the 
-thing going--was to incorporate those environ¬ 
ment-related activities on the campus Environ¬ 
mental Technology, Marine Science, Water ^©7 
sources, etc.—and to set up a university-wide 
structure .... This structure would have ,3 
liaison with the Bureau of Government Research. 
Most of those interviewed felt that Appley's aspirations 
were finally beginning to emerge through Carritt. As 
one person put it, "The Institute for Man and His Environ 
^^Interview with Mortimer Appley, Dean, Graduate 
School, 27 January 197't’" 
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ment was a real political issue from the start. The 
initial impetus was an attempt by Mort Appley to develop 
24 
a power base." As another put it, "Carritt didn't do 
anything that wasn't totally tied with Mort."^^ 
If the theme underlying Carritt's descriptions 
of the form and function of the Institute to department 
heads and deans was a political theme, that same theme 
was also important in their response. Most went immediately 
to Bob Gluckstern—who was Associate Provost at this time 
under Tippo—to voice their opposition to Carritt and his 
ideas. Most took the opportunity as well to voice their 
opposition to Mort Appley. It was clear that a unit with 
control over research proposals and grant funds in an 
area as broad and as yet ill-defined as "Man and the 
Environment" was an enormous threat to many of the research 
activities and aspirations in schools and departments all 
over campus^^^ and this was probably the most important 
^^Interview with Stanley Moss, Psychology Depart¬ 
ment, 6 March 1974. 
^^Interview with Robert Gluckstern, 22 March 197^• 
^^This would include Engineering, Agriculture, 
Botany, Zoology, Geology, Geography, Psychology and a 
large number of other departments. 
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reason for their opposition. 
Another clearly had to do with personalities and 
leadership style. Dayton Carritt was clearly insensitive 
to the concerns of those with whom he was meeting, and 
many found him both arrogant and incompetent. Most of 
those interviewed agreed that he was an ineffective leader 
at precisely the time when leadership was most crucial to 
the development of the Institute. A few however, claimed 
that Carritt*s ineffectiveness was due to circumstances 
beyond his control and laid most of the blame for in¬ 
adequate leadership onto Mort Appley. Everyone agreed 
that Appley was impossible. There was strong opposition 
to the fact that the Institute reported to Appley as 
Graduate Dean,and much of this opposition stemmed from 
the fact that other Deans and department heads found him 
difficult to work with. While a few excused Appley's behavior 
on the grounds of the difficult role of Graduate Dean, most 
27 
felt that the person, not the position was the problem. 
^"^Graduate Deans do not have the line of responsi- 
bility and authority of other Deans in the for^l 
organization. They are dependent on Provosts for their 
powe? and a^e able to ope?ate only through 
other Deans. Their power, especially during the sixtie , 
however! generally increased by the number of research 
grants they could bring to the University. 
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Bob Gluckstem did nothing at this time except 
try to maintain open communications so that differences 
over the form and function of the Institute could be 
settled. 
Carritt Moves For Faculty Senate Approval for the 
Institute. As a result of what he felt were disappointing 
meetings throughout the campus, Dave Carritt decided to 
move very quickly on the second piece of his mandate 
and obtain formal Faculty Senate and Trustee approval for 
the Institute. 
The approval process itself constitutes, according 
to Hefferlin, a crucial environmental factor in the change 
process. In the case of the Institute, it also allows one 
to view more clearly the political maneuvering, the inter¬ 
play of personalities, and the attempts to grapple with 
the difficult problems of reward, resources, form and function 
for the Institute. 
recent administrative reorganization had al¬ 
ready given Gluckstem control over several areas pre¬ 
viously handled by Appley, so Gluckstem was reluctant to 
move against Appley at this time. 
^^At the University of Massachusetts any new program 
which wanted to offer courses, degrees or proposed to hire 
faculty or staff, required Faculty Senate and Trustee 
approval. The Academic Matters Council, a standing committee 
of^the Faculty Senate, was the first step 
nrocess. It reviewed all academic programs and . 
those it approved on to the Senate, which forwarded those it 
approved administration and the Board of Trustees. 
^hftime required for the entire process 
to several years depending upon the 
level of consensus, and the nature of the program. 
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Dave Carritt in fact moved too quickly. He forced 
the issue onto the Academic Matters Council agenda in 
February and demanded an expedited process on the grounds 
the N.S.F. funding depended upon an approved Institute. 
He prepared a brief draft proposal for Academic Matters 
31 
which he did not circulate on the campus.-^ 
Carritt's draft proposal contained little rationale 
but moved for the establishment of an Institute for Man 
and His Environment: 
II. that will be a multidisciplinary, 
problem-solving component of the University 
having the capability to compliment and aug¬ 
ment existing discipline-oriented departmental 
programs in instruction, research, and public 
service which are concerned with the environ¬ 
ment . 
III. the Institute's functions include 
(1) the coordination and (2) reporting of 
existing environmentally-oriented programs 
in the University, and (3) the initiation and 
submission to the Academic Senate, the Graduate 
Council, and the Board of Trustees plans for 
such new programs of instruction and research 
as may be deemed necessary. 
^^There is no documentary evidence that N.S.F. was 
ready to fund the Institute at this time. It had had the 
U.Mass. proposal for more than ten months. Carritt, how¬ 
ever sincerely believed that something might develop at 
that time. 
^^Although Carritt and Appley worked quite closely 
together, Appley does not remember having seen a copy of 
the draft prior to Academic Matters. 
^^Dayton Carritt, "Draft Proposal for 
of an Institute for Man and His Environment. Submittt 
to the Academic Matters Council, 5 February 1971' 
213 
The proposal further anticipated an integrated educational 
program in environmental studies at both the undergraduate 
and graduate level, called for a staffing pattern that 
included University faculty, permanent Institute staff, 
and more temporary yet qualified workers from outside the 
University who would be associated with specific projects. 
The Institute was to group research activities into 
problem-centers and although it was not explicit, the 
presumption was that all environmentally-related research 
projects would go through the centers and report to the 
Institute. 
The draft proposal pleased nobody. Five days 
33 later Dayton Carritt provided a five page "rationale." 
It defended the proposed organizational format of the Insti¬ 
tute and by pointing to the inability of vertical, 
discipline-based Department and School structures to deal 
with multidisciplinary or horizontal problems, and pointing 
out the differences between the kind of research and 
theoretical work required for solving complex environ¬ 
mental problems and that associated with pushing back the 
frontiers of knowledge in a discipline. It quoted Steinhart 
at length and called for additional permanent staff members 
^^Dayton Carritt, "Institute Organization, 
elaboration on the draft proposal for the 
an Institute for Man and His Environment. Submitted to 
the Academic Matters Council, 10 February 1971* 
214 
and a separate reward structure. 
The rationale did not help convince the Academic 
Matters Council. They did not appreciate the fact that a 
Director for the Institute had been hired before the 
Institute had been formally approved. Niehter did it like 
being by-passed by the administration. Furthermore, 
the Council saw this as the work of one individual rather 
than a large group of interested faculty and it had 
serious misgivings about the organizational format pro¬ 
posed. The strongest opposition was voiced to the 
proposed umbrella function for research projects and the 
independent faculty. 
The Academic Matters Council would not approve the 
proposal. Instead, the Council sent it out to the faculty 
and asked for responses, and then set up a review committee 
34 
to study the matter further and report back. 
Leigh Short, a member of the Council was made 
Chairman of the Review Committee and he insisted that 
Bernard Berger also be on it. The subcommittee had many 
^\eain in this case, the role of the Academic 
Matters Council in the University is an interesting one. 
Tt nroves itself to be an open and flexible agent of 
rhanee Other groups would simply have rejected the propos- 
thfcLnril’^always attempted to give the proposer- 
or the new idea-the benefit of the doubt. It was flexible 
enough to create an ad hoc review group, faculty^ 
Review commixxee anu -- - . Mattprs 
Council in an interview claimed that the^Ac.^ universi 
Council cons 
in the last 
Si!o? chSle ?Slca“tn the University 
ive years. 
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heated meetings with concerned faculty and Deans, and 
reviewed the responses from faculty throughout the 
35 campus. 
The focus of the opposition was becoming clearer. 
A. Faculty did not want an umbrella unit through 
which all grants must pass. They wanted the faculty 
to be able to choose to participate or not in the 
Institute without any jeopardy to individual grants- 
manship.37 
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-'^-'^The members of the subcommittee to review the 
proposal were: Leigh Short, Chairman; Bernard Berger, 
Ernest Buck, Sheldon Goldman, Richard Louttit, James 
Ludtke, Claude Penchina, Skip Schuckman. 
^^Among those who voiced their opposition were: 
Ken Picha, the Dean of the School of Engineering; Warren 
Litsky, the head of the Department of Environmental 
Sciences in the College of Agriculture; Ervin Zube—that 
year on sabbatical but the year before chairman of the 
education subcommittee and the next Director of the Insti¬ 
tute. 
During these months (January, February, March 
1971), the School of Engineering was putting together a 
large grant proposal that would involve a multidisciplinary 
study of energy usage. Their involvement of faculty^ 
from all over the campus and their refusal to work with 
or through the Institute for Man and His Environment 
shows how strong the opposition to the umbrella function 
of the Institute really was. Engineering’s refusal 
in this case also infuriated Dave Carritt and hardened 
his position that it was necessary to mandate co¬ 
operation during the approval process. 
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B. Even in the environmental area faculty 
did not want the unit to be able to hire its own 
faculty and senior research staff independent 
of the departmental hiring process. Essentially 
departments wanted to maintain control over the 
reward system. 
C. Faculty did not like Dave Carritt and they 
did not like Mortimer Appley and they did not 
think the reporting line for the Institute should 
be through the Graduate School. 
D. They did not want the Institute to be able 
to create an educational program that they did not 
approve or that threatened their enrollments. 
Despite all of this opposition, however, there 
were still a large number of people who were supportive 
of the idea of an Institute. The faculty who had worked 
hard the year before still wanted an Institute created. 
The subcommittee of the Academic Matters Council began to 
revise Carritt's proposal into something more generally 
acceptable. 
In the midst of their work, the Provost decided 
to intervene and this intervention provided the most 
dramatic moment in the history of the Institute. On 
Friday, April 9th, Oswald Tippo cancelled a meeting of 
the subcommittee, called Mort Appley to his office, 
announced that he would not support the Institute, and 
asked Appley to withdraw his proposal from consideration 
before the Acadamic Matters and the Faculty Senate. 
Mort Appley refused to withdraw it and left. It happened 
that Carl Swanson, then a professor with a possible 
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position in the Botany Departmenti (Swanson had been 
approached a year before as a potential Director and 
refused, the Provost happened to be a Botanist), had 
dropped by that Friday afternoon to see the Provost. 
He was asked his opinions about the Institute. Swanson 
was very supportive of the concept of an Institute for 
Man and His Environment and implied that the existence 
of such a unit would make the University of Massachusetts 
O Q 
a much more interesting place for him to consider.-^ 
The Provost apparently changed his mind again 
and did not further block the Institute. 
Most of those interviewed felt that it was Carl 
Swanson who had turned the Provost around, others, 
including the Associate Provost, underplayed the importance 
of Swanson, but in any event, the Associate Provost 
arrived at the home of the chairman of the subcommittee 
the following evening and they spent Saturday evening 
revising the draft proposal. The revised proposal made 
participation in the Institute strictly voluntary on the 
part of the faculty; made any academic course or program 
^The Associate Provost and others remember Swanson as 
having been recruited as Associate Director at that time, 
Swanson remembers only vague mention of it and stated 
that in fact he was quite surprised—and 
turbed—to find that he had been ?^he had 
unon his arrival the following fall. He felt that he naa 
not been recruited in connection with the Institute, but 
as a Professor of Botany. 
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subject to further faculty senate approval; and changed 
the reporting lines from the Graduate Dean to the Provost. 
They added two additional twists. The Institute would 
have an Advisory Board, and it would have only a two-year 
mandate. At that time it would be up for review. 
Another subcommittee meeting was held on Monday 
and although members of the committee were angered at 
the intervention of the Provost, and at the fact that he 
almost summarily blocked the institute, they nevertheless 
liked the proposal as revised by Short and Gluckstern 
and recommended its approval by Academic Matters. 
The proposal as forwarded by the Academic Matters 
Council to the Faculty Senate was brief and to the point. 
It mandated for two years an Institute, with a Director 
and an Advisory Board which would: 
A. concentrate on the planningi development, 
and implementation of interdisciplinary edu¬ 
cation at both the undergraduate and graduate 
levels, and 
B. develop a programmatic approach to inter¬ 
disciplinary research and public service.-^ 
The Institute would not have a separate and 
distinct staff but would depend on University faculty. 
39"special Report of the Academic Matters Cotmittee,” 
A. William Plumstead. Chairman, presented to the 17^th 
Meeting of the Faculty Senate, April 15. 1971. (Senate 
Document 71”037)* 
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Individual faculty members could choose to 
participate or not and their ability to pursue independent 
research grants was preserved. Courses and academic pro¬ 
grams would require further approval, and the implication 
was that they would be few and far between. The reporting 
line was to the Provost rather than to the Graduate Dean. 
And there would be an opportunity to quash the Institute 
after two years if the faculty didn’t like its activities. 
For all these reasons the Institute did not seem very 
threatening. It was approved by the Faculty Senate on 
April 15, 1971. 
Dave Carritt and others felt that if anything this 
approved entity was even more vague than that recommended 
in April 1970. While he had wanted a formally constituted 
unit as a vehicle to insure faculty participation and en¬ 
hance funding potential, this approved unit did neither. 
It had no control over the reward system—it could not hire, 
promote, or tenure faculty members and thus could not 
counteract the fundamental orientation toward research and 
education that was required by discipline-based depart¬ 
ments. While almost all of those interviewed felt that the 
approval process and reward system were critical factors 
to the development of a new academic and organizational 
unit in a university, some felt that in the case of the 
Institute for Man and His Environment, these factors 
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had been inhibiting. Others who had originally had more 
limited aspirations for the Institute, and who had never 
seen it as a large, visible, independent organization, 
but rather as a facilitating vehicle for some multi¬ 
disciplinary environmentally-related problem-solving 
activity, felt that while the reward system was inevitably 
negative, the approval process had been a positive 
factor. 
Summary. With formal approval, the Institute for 
Man and His Environment could begin to engage in those 
activities for which it had been created—multidisciplinary 
research, education and action toward the solution of com¬ 
plex environmental problems. Thus it would serve as one 
vehicle through which the University of Massachusetts 
could assume the mission of social problem-solving. 
The long struggle over the creation, however, 
and the resulting weakness as an organizational entity 
would make it extremely difficult for the Institute to 
actively involve a large number of faculty and achieve 
any measure of fulfillment of the mission of social 
problem-solving. 
While a number of factors, including resources, 
leadership, external influence, reward system and approval 
process, had been important to the process of creating 
the Institute, the most important dynamic was a political 
one and lay in the moves for enhanced position power. 
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The Graduate Dearii the Deans of Engineering and Agriculture, 
and many departments and faculty interested in outside 
grants were all involved in the development of the 
Institute not only because the Zeitgeist was there-- 
environmental problem-solving was an important, new 
activity for a university—but because becoming the leading 
force in such a department could enhance personal, de¬ 
partmental, or school reputations. 
The opposing forces and competition, however, 
led to the creation of an entity that had very little 
independent power and support and that therefore had 
difficulty fulfilling its objectives. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Universities are complex institutions which are 
continually evolving in fune with a changing society. It 
was pointed out in Chapter I that it is difficult to know 
definitively who or what determines missions for higher 
education. A few individuals and study commissions, 
however, have been the most influential over the past 
quarter century. Clark Kerr, David Riesman, The Truman 
Commission on Higher Education, The Newman Task Force, 
and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education have all 
reaffirmed the traditional functions of higher education 
teaching, research, and public service--but they have called 
for new missions as well. They have said that colleges 
and universities should concentrate on providing access, 
individualization, and social problem-solving. Although each 
of these themes has also evolved in meaning and emphasis 
over the years, by the late sixties access meant the 
provision of educational opportunity to those who had 
previously been excluded from higher education: the poor, 
minority group members, women, and older students. The 
mission of individualization meant a concern for the needs 
of individual students by allowing them to choose their 
own educational programs. Social problem-solving was a 
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refinement of the public service mission which placed 
special emphasis on the application of university resources 
to the solution of complex social problems. 
Chapter II provided an overview of the history 
of the University of Massachusetts and focused specifically 
on the University's position with regard to the missions 
of access, individualization and social problem-solving. 
The University committed itself to each of these missions 
although there was considerable difference of opinion over 
the mission of social problem-solving. The means through 
which the University of Massachusetts proposed to assume 
these missions was the creation of specific units or 
programs which would take on the missions as specific 
objectives. 
Chapters III, IV and V were descriptive case 
studies of three programs, the University Without Walls, 
the Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration, and 
the Institute For Man and His Environment, whose objects 
were respectively, access, individualization, and social 
problem-solving. 
Chapter I discussed as well the influence of the 
organizational characteristics of universities on their 
ability to change and assume new missions. The review of 
the literature included a review of those factors 
resources, leadership, external influence, and conducive 
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institutional environment including reward system, critical 
mass of support, approval process, and communications 
which change theorists have determined to he the most 
crucial to the process of change in universities. The 
case studies on the University and the three programs— 
UWW, BDIC, and the Institute for Man and His Environment- 
considered these factors within the more general description 
of program development. 
This chapter will put the data from the review of 
the literature on organizational and change theory together 
with the data from the case studies at the University of 
Massachusetts. It will assess the characteristics and 
change strategies at the University of Massachusetts and 
analyze, using specific situations, the viability of the 
missions of access, individualization and social problem¬ 
solving. It will also analyze the change process by 
focusing on the factors of resources, leadership, external 
influence, reward system, critical mass of support, 
approval process, and communications in each of the program 
case studies. Additional change factors that emerged from 
the study of the development and implementation of the 
three programs will also he analyzed in their situational 
context. A comparison of change factors across programs 
will then be made in order to draw more general conclusions 
about the process of change at the University of Massachusetts. 
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Institutional Assumption of Missions 
of Access, Individualization, 
and Social Problem-Solving 
Characteristics of Vital Institutions and the 
University of Massachusetts. Institutional characteristics 
help to determine the possibilities for change in order to 
assume new missions. 
The University of Massachusetts was through the 
period of the sixties and early seventies what Lon 
Hefferlin would have termed a "vital" institution—able 
to face new social conditions, new types of students 
and new developments. Lon Hefferlin had spelled out 
ten characteristics of a vital institution. Table 4 , 
lists these characteristics and the corresponding 
attributes of the University of Massachusetts. 
The most important characteristics were new 
models, new personnel, major reorganization, and an 
avuncular environment. The University of Massachusetts, 
then, displayed most of Lon Hefferlin's characteristics of 
a vital institution. For the University of Massachusetts 
as a whole, the most important change factors were re¬ 
sources, new personnel, advocacy, and an overall environment 
conducive to changes. Thus it also corroborates those 
factors cited by Lon Hefferlin as important to the change 
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TABLE ^ 
CHARACTERISTICS OF "VITAL" INSTITUTIONS 
AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Lon Hefferlin Characteristics 
Attributes of the 
University of Massachusetts 
1. A market is essential— 
meaning both demand and reward 
for change. 
2. New Models are needed for 
emulation. 
3, Ideas need circulation— 
communication should be en¬ 
couraged by workshops, 
seminars, meetings, etc. 
4. A number of "marginal" 
members are helpful. 
1. Committee Reports called 
for a series of changes through¬ 
out the period and resources 
were available for these 
changes.^ 
2. The programs—U.W.W.— 
B.D.I.C.—and IME—served as 
important models for emu¬ 
lation and did inspire systems- 
wide changes.2 Other programs 
were created as well at U.Mass.i 
CCEBS, Residential Colleges, 
Project 10, Institute for 
Governmental Services, etc. 
3. Repeated meetings were 
held to discuss issues of 
missions and objectives for the 
University and to bring to¬ 
gether faculty, students and 
administrators from throughout 
the campus. Long Range Plan¬ 
ning Committees, student- 
initiated SWAP conferences, 
committees for improvement 
of teaching, etc. met often 
throughout the period. 
4. Marginal members in large 
numbers were not found at 
the University of Massa¬ 
chusetts . 
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TABLE ^ (Continued) 
Lon Hefferlin Characteristics 
5. For major reorganization, 
new members seem necessary. 
6. The right people must 
be retained. 
7* Initiative is de¬ 
centralized—individuals 
throughout the institution 
have a sense of power. 
8. Patriarchy is avoided. 
Patriarchy is power con¬ 
centrated in the hands of 
one individual, usually 
determined by seniority. 
9. Enforced collegial 
concensus is avoided. 
Attributes of the 
University of Massachusetts 
5. Spectacular growth during 
the period allowed for many 
new faculty and administrators 
to be brought to the campus.3 
6. Large numbers of new and 
young faculty members allowed 
for high rates of retention. 
7* At U.Mass., administrators, 
faculty, and students all 
felt that they had some power, 
and that they could make things 
happen. This was most obvious 
in the allocation of re¬ 
sources in the Academic 
Matters Council and in the 
student-run SWAP conferen¬ 
ces. 
8. Although leadership was 
strong at U.Mass. it was 
discontinuous throughout 
the period. Power was dis¬ 
tributed among large numbers 
of groups and individuals.^ 
9. It was possible at U. 
Mass, to initiate programs 
on a pilot and experimental 
basis without total con¬ 
sensus among the faculty. 
This allowed for more 
rapid and diverse respon¬ 
ses . 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Lon Hefferlin Characteristics 
10• The institution is 
avuncular. A large number 
of people help determine 
policy—status is assigned 
according to expertise. 
Attributes of the 
University of Massachusetts 
10. At U.Mass. rapid organi¬ 
zational and governance changes 
and new positions allowed for 
an avuncular institution. 
^See Chapter I for recommendations of major planning 
committees with respect to access, individualization and 
social problem-solving. 
^U.W.W. caused changes in policy and procedures in 
admissions, records, and transcripts, financial aid, housing 
and fee structures. It also caused a series of academic 
changes in core and major requirements, examinations and 
grading, and in credit policies. Most significantly i 
established the principle and practice of awarding credit 
for prior learning. B.D.I.C. caused academic 
a large number of departments and spun-off (by 197'+] five 
senarate degree programs. The Institute for Man and His 
Environment established models 
with state agencies that were emulated throughout 
University. 
^See Chapter I for growth statistics in enrollment, 
faculty and state appropriations. 
^See Chapter I for leadership. 
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process—extrainstitutional influence, resources, leadership 
or advocacy, and conducive institutional environment. 
Change Strategies and the University of Massachusetts. 
Jack Lindquist had considered the conducive institutional 
characteristics and change factors established by Lon 
Hefferlin and others and compiled a list of strategies 
that would be appropriate for universities interested 
in supporting change efforts. Table*5 compares his 
change strategies to those utilized at the University of 
Massachusetts. There is obviously considerable overlap 
between the Lindquist strategies and the Lon Hefferlin 
characteristics. While the University of Massachusetts 
utilized most of the strategies suggested by Lindquist, 
those that were the most directly effective in the assumption 
of the missions of access, individualization and social 
problem-solving were new personnel, alternative learning 
experiences, an educational development office (at the 
University the office of the Associate Provost for Special 
Programs), major self-studies, and joining consortia, 
particularly the Union of Experimenting Colleges and 
Universities. 
The STjecial Unit Change Strategy of the Universit^if 
nf Massachusetts. Although the University of Massachusetts 
displayed most of the characteristics of a "vital" in- 
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TABLE 5 
CHANGE STRATEGIES AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MSSACHUSETTS 
Lindquist Strategies University of Massachusetts 
for Change 
1. Workshops and 
retreats 
2. Faculty Seminars 
on teaching and 
learning 
3. New faculty 
orientation or in 
service training 
4. Student Orienta¬ 
tion to Learning 
Options and Problem- 
Solving 
5. Hire new per¬ 
sonnel and recruit 
new kinds of 
students 





1. A variety of workshops and con¬ 
ferences were held at the University 
throughout these years. Many were 
sponsored by Long-Range Planning 
Committees and most included students. 
2. A group of faculty at the Uni¬ 
versity established the Committee on 
Undergraduate Education which met often 
during this period. 
3. While U.Mass. did not have exten¬ 
sive orientation for new faculty, it 
did foster communication among them 
and across disciplines. 
4. Freshman Orientation programs were 
begun during these years, as well as 
comprehensive advising systems. Stu¬ 
dents were informed of program op¬ 
tions . 
5. Faculty and staff grew rapidly and 
the explicit choice of the Chancellor 
was to go after young faculty members. 
A diverse student body was beginning 
to be recruited. 
6. The University explicitly chose 
to create a number of alternative 
program options. 
1 7. Several governance models were 1 proposed over the years and prac- 1 tices were considerably altered. 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Lindquist Strategies 
for Change University of Massachusetts 
8. Build into the 
institution an Edu¬ 
cational Development 
Office and/or Research 
and Planning Committee. 
8. The University established a 
new top-level administrative po¬ 
sition with a respectable budget for 
new program development. 
9. Conduct a major 
self-study 
9. U.Mass conducted two major self- 
studies in a three year period. 
10. Bring in ex¬ 
perts 
10. Long Range Planning Committees 
and other planning groups brought in 
consultants and knowledgeable people 
from other universities. 
11. Visit other 
campuses 
12. Utilize social 
gatherings 
13. Utilize ad¬ 
ministrative per- 
ogatives 
14. Develop a change 
agent team 
15. Join a con¬ 
sortium 
11. Fiscal autonomy allowed some 
travel support for faculty and staff. 
12. The author did not find data on 
social gatherings but they were doubt¬ 
less used. 
13. U.Mass enjoyed a high level of 
administrative autonomy. Several 
new programs were started by ad¬ 
ministrative fiat. 
14. Although U.Mass did not develop 
an explicit change agent team until 
1973, a variety of ad hoc groups 
acted as such during the late sixties 
and early seventies. 
15. U.Mass. belonged to several 
associations—Association of Land 
Grant Universities, Union for^ 
Experimenting Colleges and Uni¬ 
versities, and Five College Incor¬ 
porated, to name only a few. 
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stitution as suggested by Lon Hefferlin, and employed change 
strategies suggested by Lindquist, Although reports and 
other documents over the period at the University of 
Massachusetts recommended a major reorientation of the 
University which would give more attention to a more diverse 
undergraduate student body and encourage greater public 
service and problem-solving activities* it is also true 
that a) the student body of the University continued to 
be largely white, middle class and between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-two; b) the curriculum was largely 
prescribed; and c) the level of public service and social 
problem-solving activities was low. The University of 
Massachusetts found it extremely difficult to effect change 
throughout the organization. 
In this respect, the University corroborates the 
findings of those organization and change theorists who 
describe organizational inabilities to change. Havelock 
had synthesized the literature on organizations and defined 
an organization as a group of individuals with a common 
task whose strongest impulses are toward routinization of 
activity, maintenance of status quo, and preservation of 
existing institutional members. He found that most 
structures and roles in an organization act as inhibitors 
of change. 
The inability to effect system-wide change was 
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counterbalanced in the University of Massachusetts through 
the creation of specific program units which allowed the 
University to be responsive to missions of access, in¬ 
dividualization and social problem-solving. In effect, 
the creation of UWW, BDIC and the Institute for Man and 
His Environment operated as a strategy to effect change in 
the total system,for these programs, once created, began to 
pressure for a number of more system-wide changes. 
Matthew Miles, Everett Rogers, Lon Hefferlin and 
Jack Lindquist had all recommended the separate unit 
strategy for change. They felt that it would be more 
possible to establish such units than effect system-wide 
change because such units would not be as threatening to 
institutional members. They felt that such units serve 
as models for emulation within the system and help en¬ 
courage innovativeness and a conducive environment for 
change. Such units, too, they recognized might bring 
pressure for further changes. The University of 
Massachusetts case supports their theory concerning 
separate units a.s change strategies. 
Generally, the method used to establish these 
units is similar to that described by Jack Lindquist in 
the "Political Linkage Model.” A generalized sense that 
the University of Massachusetts ought to assume the missions 
of access, individualization and social problem-solving 
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developed over time into planning committees and groups 
each of which recommended the establishment of a special 
program. Plans were debated and proposals prepared and 
submitted to the formal authorities for approval. In all 
cases the process could be termed a political one for it 
involved a dynamic interaction between individuals and 
interest groups and between forms and function. 
Special Programs for Access. Individualization, and 
Social Problem-Solving—An Assessment of the Viability of 
These Missions at the University of Massachusetts. The 
mission of access was assumed by the University of Massa¬ 
chusetts chiefly through the creation of the University 
Without Walls Program. 
It was relatively simple to initiate the University 
Without Walls Program for several reasons: 
A. It allowed the University to start with a small 
number of students and learn from them what adaptations would 
be necessary in the larger system. Not having to go for 
total systems change made the provision of access much more 
possible. 
B. As an option it required only a small number 
of faculty, staff and students to support it. It did not 
require agreen«nt and approval of the total faculty and 
student body. Such agreement is generally impossible to 
achieve in a large institution. 
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C. While the provision of real access in terms 
of education, attitudes, and procedures required of the 
institution and its faculty and staff a different conception 
of clientele and content, it still did not alter the basic 
teaching and research functions of the University. This 
consonance of function made it easy to accept and imple¬ 
ment the mission of access. 
The University Without Walls program was success¬ 
fully implemented at the University of Massachusetts, and 
it began immediately to exert positive pressures toward more 
pervasive changes in the University. The Admissions Office 
began slowly to recruit more diverse students, policies 
and procedures were devised to deal with them, and faculty 
began to become accustomed to working in a different in¬ 
structional mode. In part due to the changes brought about 
by the University Without Walls Program, the mission of 
access became feasible for the University as a whole. It would 
not be feasible for all students however, because the costs 
would be prohibitive. 
The University of Massachusetts is similar to other 
public, land-grant universities in size, organization, and 
basic philosophy. It would, therefore, be possible to 
assume that the mission of providing educational access 
would be appropriate for other land-grant institutions 
as well. 
The creation of a special program such as the 
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University Without Walls as a mechanism for providing 
access could be a useful strategy for other institutions 
as well, although this study did not generate enough 
comparative data to assert this as a fact. 
The mission of individualization was assumed by 
the University of Massachusetts in part through the creation 
of the BDIC program. 
Although it was a lengthy process, BDIC was not a 
difficult program to implement. This was true for a number 
of reasons. 
A. Even more strikingly than in the case of the 
University Without Walls Program, BDIC and the philosophy 
of individualization were not a departure from the basic 
functions of the University. Teaching was central to the 
University mission and, therefore, the fundamentals of the 
educational programs suggested by BDIC was something that 
would have been difficult not to accept. Individualization 
was a new mission in terms of actual practice because of 
the "academic revolution." but it was not a new role for 
faculty members. 
B. BDIC was a curricular reform but it did not 
alter the basic curricular structure of the University. 
Because it did not alter the offerings of departments and 
was seen as an option only for a relatively small number 
of students, it was much more acceptable. BDIC allowed 
the University to be responsive to some undergraduate 
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students' educational needs without overhauling the entire 
educational program. 
C. BDIC, like UWW, did not require total acceptance 
by all faculty members and students. If fulfillment of the 
mission of individualization had required curricular re¬ 
vision with the total agreement by all faculty in the 
University, it would never have been approved. BDIC 
asked that only those faculty who were willing participate. 
This made it acceptable to a much larger number than those 
who actually did participate. 
BDIC began immediately to exert pressures for 
greater attention to student interests throughout the 
University. Departments began to offer more student- 
centered majors, new major programs were approved, and 
faculty members seemed more willing to work with students 
on a one-to-one basis. In a sense, therefore, it could 
be argued that the BDIC program proved the viability of 
the "new" mission of individualization for the University 
of Massachusetts. 
In another sense however, it did not. While 
individualization is possible within the context of an 
optimal and small program like BDIC, it could be argued 
that it would not be feasible for the totality of the 
student body. The cost would simply be too high for 
individual students or the public taxpayer to bear. In a 
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very real sense, individually designed programs and one-to- 
one faculty/student relationships are only possible because 
of the mass production aspects of much of the rest of 
undergraduate education. At the University of Massachusetts 
only a small number of students in the total undergraduate 
enrollment could be handled this way. 
The BDIC program was a first of its kind and was 
not patterned after a program at another college or 
university. Nevertheless, a number of educational reform 
programs were being initiated throughout the country and 
student-centered academic programs were to be established 
at a large number of institutions within a very few years 
after I968-69. It is possible to assume from these reform 
activities that the mission of more individualized under¬ 
graduate education was a viable one for other universities 
as well as the University of Massachusetts. Other public, 
land grant universities which depend on state funds, how¬ 
ever, would no doubt experience the same difficulty as 
the University of Massachusetts in making individualized 
programs available to the entire student body. 
The University of Massachusetts paid lip service 
to the notion of social problem-solving over the two 
decades, but it is not possible to say that it clearly 
or unambiguously assumed this mission. 
While the number and range of service activities 
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increased faster than the growth rate would imply during 
the sixties and early seventies, it was also true that 
by the end of that period, the University was still 
struggling to define "appropriate public service." The 
lack of a clear definition hampered its effectiveness. 
The University attempted to respond to the mission 
through the creation of an Institute for Man and His 
Environment. The difficulties encountered by the Institute 
during its development period highlight the difficulties 
of implementation of the public service mission. 
A. The creation of a new unit which would have 
potentially its own staff and academic program threatened 
existing units in a way that UWW and BDIC had not done. 
Strong opposition was voiced--not against the concept, 
but against the organizational plans—by most of the schools 
and colleges in the University. The Institute required a 
larger scale change effort than had BDIC or UWW. 
B. The Institute for Man and His Environment 
brought sharply into focus issues of power and control. 
Who decides academic programs? Who hires faculty and 
professional personnel and to whom are they accountable? 
Who has the power and the exclusive authority to go after 
research grants? All of these questions were necessarily 
raised during the planning for the Institute, and since 
there was no agreement and no mechanism for reaching 
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agreement, it was very difficult for the Institute to 
begin its work. 
C. The Institute for Man and His Environment 
required developmental as well as program money and by the 
late sixties neither the federal nor the state govern¬ 
ments were eager to grant large sums for the creation of 
a vehicle or organization to focus on environmental 
problems. They wanted more immediate and visible impact 
for their dollars. Reallocation of resources within the 
University to cover the start up costs of the Institute 
was severely opposed by existing units. 
D. Social problem-solving in the environmental 
area often required different behavior of faculty members 
it required attention to detail, task orientation and a 
willingness to be one piece of a large effort and take 
directions. Faculty accustomed to abstraction and the 
right of pursuing their own interests found public 
service projects antithetical to their own scholarly 
interests as well as tedious and boring. 
E. The Institute planners were unable to agree 
on a precise focus for institute activities. This was due 
at least in part to the fact that clear service priorities 
had not been established for the University as a whole. 
The resources were clearly not adequate for all problems, 
but an inability to choose among several possible activi¬ 
ties led to a diffusion of energies and lessened impact. 
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The same difficulties experienced with the creation 
of the Institute for Man and His Environment and the 
assumption of the mission of social problem-solving 
would probably be experienced in other public universities. 
Research on the large number of problem-focused research 
institutes that were created in colleges and universities 
prior and subsequent to that at the University of 
Massachusetts shows for the most part a history of 
failure.^ 
It would seem, therefore, that the mission of 
public service and the University's responsibility in 
applying its knowledge production and educational resources 
toward the solution of social problems is the least viable 
mission at the present time. There is still considerable 
disagreement—within and without the academy—about the 
^The most negative assessment of research in- 
stitutes is found in Harold Orlans, The Nonprofit Research 
institute-I-ts Origin, Operation. Problems, and Prosp.e.c^. 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1972). Orlans concluded_that 
they had been overevaluated as organizational vehicles 
for focusing on complex problems. Paul Dr^sel, 
Craig Johnson, and Philip Marcus, in "The Proliferating 
Institutes," Change. Vol. 1, No. 4 (July-August 19d9)i 
also gave a negative assessment of research institutes 
as organizational structures. Ikenberry, however, f 1 
that they held out considerable promise as new or- 
ganizational structures which could ^ 
apply its resources to current social problems. ISee 
Chapter 1.) 
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responsibility of the University to society. Taxpayers, 
federal, state and local governments : students and some 
faculty, all demand that the University join the "real 
world" and help work on its problems. Other faculty claim 
that the University is the only institution in society en¬ 
gaged in basic research that produces knowledge for its 
own sake and for the long run benefit of society and that 
to divert to the short run would be a critical mistake. 
These positions, however, could be better represented 
as poles along a continuum, and there is no question that for 
many people public service is assumed to be the responsi¬ 
bility of the public university. 
Even when the concepts of public service and the 
mission of social problem-solving are generally accepted 
in public universities, however, the mechanics of follow- 
through are difficult for universities because of the major 
changes in organization, attitude and behavior that are 
required. Social problem-solving, therefore, will be a 
difficult mission for public universities to assume at 
this time. 
Conclusions Concerning Viability of Missions. From 
the experience with BDIC, UWW, and IME at the University 
of Massachusetts, it would seem that those missions are 
most viable which are closest to those functions already 
accepted by the faculty and embedded within the organizational 
structure-teaching and research. While public universities 
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in the 1970*s have accepted the missions of providing 
equal educational access and public service, current 
organizational patterns, attitudes and orientations make 
these objectives difficult to achieve. Continuing change 
efforts will be required. 
From the case study on BDIC it was clear that the 
mission of responsiveness to individual students is a 
mission that is easy to accept and put into practice, 
provided it is for a small number of students. The 
University Without Walls case showed that a student 
body of widely diverse backgrounds, ages, and interests 
requires the faculty and service units of the University 
to rethink some of their attitudes and behaviors. A 
different student clientele in response to the mission of 
access does not imply a drastic departure, however, from the 
traditional university function of teaching. The mission 
of access, therefore, is feasible for universities at 
this time. The case of the Institute for Man and His 
Environment showed that public service—especially in the 
area of utilizing university resources to solve complex and 
difficult social problems—requires a much greater departure 
from the normal behaviors and organizational patterns of 
the \iniversity. It is at this time a mission difficult 
to achieve. 
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The Process of Change at the 
University of Massachusetts 
Factors in the Process of Change« Lon Hefferlin 
and Jack Lindquist synthesized the research and theory on 
the change process in organizations and conducted research 
on change in universities. Lon Hefferlin found that the 
most important factors for change in educational in¬ 
stitutions were: resources, leadership, outside influences, 
support from campus groups, and institution-specific 
characteristics including reward systems, approval process, 
and communications. These factors, according to Lon 
Hefferlin, were foimd in various combinations depending 
upon specific institutional situations. 
This study analyzes the Lon Hefferlin factors for 
each of three programs at the University of Massachusetts; 
The University Without Walls, The Bachelor’s Degree with 
Individual Concentration, and the Institute for t.lan and 
His Environment. It analyzes, as well, additional factors 
that were important to the creation of each of the programs 
taken as case studies. 
Each person interviewed in the study was asked in 
an initial open-ended question to name those factors 
which were important to the planning and implementation 
process of the program with which they had Been associated 
They were also asked to assess 
the importance to the program 
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of each Lon Hefferlin change factor. 
It is important to note that factors are in a sense 
generalized concepts and that their meaning for a specific 
situation—e.g., the creation of the Institute for Man and 
His Environment—can vary considerably over time and from 
individual to individual. It is also important to remember 
that each change factor may be seen as either supporting 
or hindering (positive or negative) as well as more important 
and less important for specific situation.. For example, 
one respondent considered leadership a critical factor 
to the implementation of the Institute for Man and His 
Environment, but consider the actual leadership to have 
been a hindrance to its development ; another respon¬ 
dent, also convinced that leadership had been crucial, felt 
that the Institute's leadership had been quite effective. 
For each program, the combined responses of those 
interviewed provide sufficient data for an analysis of the 
change factors in that specific situation. Although the 
method of collecting data made it difficult to prioritize 
among factors, the author did so from the general sense 
of the interviews. 
Following the analysis of the factors for each 
program, a comparison across programs is made. Such a 
comparison provides for a more generalized view of the 
at the University of Massachusetts and change process 
246 
allows for a validation of the Hefferlin change factors. 
The University Without Walls. Those interviewed 
concerning the University Without Walls program showed re¬ 
markable agreement about those factors which had been 
important to the program, and considerable agreement about 
whether those factors had been supporting or hindering to 
the program. They also tended to define their terms 
similarly which may have been caused by the fact that many 
of them were either students or faculty studying issues 
of higher education. Table 6 summarizes their responses. 
The following emphases were placed during the 
interviews on those factors listed in Table 6. 
I. Resources. 
Twelve of the thirteen respondents considered 
resources as a crucial factor to the program. They all 
mentioned that the small grant received from the Union 
for Experimenting Colleges and Universities had allowed 
them to support the planning period and the pilot program, 
and most were convinced that a) the University would 
never have come up with that much money and h) that that much 
was crucial to the program. The grant was symtolically 
important as well for it signalled a commitment to a 
product or end-result of planning efforts and this helped 
to keep morale and energy levels high. It allowed them 
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II. Leadership 
All thirteen respondents agreed that leadership was 
a critical factor, and all agreed that Tom Clark had occupied 
the leadership position. There was some disagreement, how¬ 
ever, over the effectiveness of Tom Clark's leadership and 
over the appropriate style of leadership for a program that 
was attempting a collaborative non-hierarchical model. Tom 
Clark saw his role as two-fold* serving as the spokesman 
for the program to faculty, administration and other out¬ 
side groups in a role analogous to a program director or 
dean, and acting as a facilitator for the collaborative 
planning. Some felt that Clark had been effective as program 
spokesman, others that he had not been, because he failed to 
attract faculty and caused problems throughout the the campus. 
Most agreed that the collaborative planning effort had been 
educational for those involved, but that it had been don- 
fusing and cumbersome, and that Tom Clark's administrative de¬ 
ficiencies and inability to make decisions only made it more 
so. This perception was held by some who had been part of 
the planning effort and some who had not. Others felt that 
Clark had been very effective considering the difficulties 
of implementing a program that required as many changes as 
did the University Without Walls. 
III. Outside Influence 
Eight respondents felt that UWW had been influenced 
in many ways from outside the University of Massachusetts. 
The chief source was the Union for Experimenting Colleges 
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and Universities and the National University Without Walls 
Program. Most felt that this had been a positive influence_ 
it had set the broad parameters for the program but allowed 
UWV/ in Amherst to plan from the needs of the total situa¬ 
tion; it provided resources, and it helped keep the 
momentum of the program high. A more general yet critical 
outside influence was the general controversy over higher 
education—the role of universities in society and the 
functioning of colleges and universities. Most UWW planners 
were part of the educational reform movements, and its 
perspectives influenced UWW planning. 
IV. Environmental Factors: 
Reward System. There was some disagreement over the 
importance of the reward system to UWW. Six felt that it 
was an important hindering factor and five felt that it had 
not been very important. The size of the program was an 
important variable here—for a small program as UWW was 
at first, the reward system was not necessarily vital but 
most would agree that it became more of an issue as the 
program expanded. Many argued as well that the most 
difficult thing was locating faculty members with the 
ability to work in new instructional modes with non-tra- 
ditional students, and that the University of Massachusetts 
had shown a willingness to reward those who had become 
involved. 
Annroval Process. Ten of those interviewed felt 
that the approval process had been critical to UWW. They 
saw essentially two stages to that process: the first 
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stage was getting administrative approval to run a pilot 
year* and the second stage was obtaining formal Faculty 
Senate approval for the program. The first stage was seen 
as positive in that the administration allowed them to admit 
the non-traditional student grou^^ and the second stage for 
most was positive in that the Faculty Senate approved a 
flexible educational program. UWW planners had been aware 
of the importance of the approval process and had worked 
out a comprehensive strategy to get that approval. 
Communications. Six persons felt that communications 
had been important to UWW while six failed to mention it. 
Those who saw communications vehicles as important stressed 
the fact that UWW had had to create its own communication 
links to prospective students because of the inappropriate¬ 
ness of traditional admission office liasons. UWW planners 
also stressed that they had had to help build new communi¬ 
cation routes to faculty, and from students to faculty. 
V. Small Yet Critical Number of Active Supporters 
The word most often used during interviews was "com¬ 
mitment,” and eleven respondents felt that by far the most 
^Little was actually done to advertise ^^e^program, 
yet the applicant pool pfo^ide ade- 
tifies to the failures of u need for the mission 
quate educational opportunity and the neea 
of access. 
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important factor to the process of UWW effort had been a 
group of energetic and committed people—many of them 
volunteers--who believed in the program and wanted to see 
it work. 
VI. Larger Support Base 
Ten of those interviewed felt that a support base 
that included many faculty members and administrators had 
been very important to the UWW. Faculty support was seen 
as crucial to the approval process but also as fundamental 
to the program.for the willingness of the faculty to serve 
as sponsors and the interactions between sponsors and 
students were fundamental to the program. Administrative 
STjipport was seen as crucial in terms of resources. 
Other Factors 
1. Influence of School of Education. 
Ten of those interviewed felt that the School of 
Education had been critical to the development of the UWW 
program* eight felt that it had been a positive factor, and 
two that it had been a negative one.^ Those who talked of 
it in a positive sense felt that the ideas, energy, innova¬ 
tiveness, and values of the faculty and students in the 
School of Education had provided an essential background 
3t+ interesting to note that the two people who 
from ^tsi^: the rchoorf/rdioSir^^f "oth^—f of 
the Academic Matters Council. 
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for the planners of UWW. The commitment to institutional 
change and educational experimentation had been fostered 
in the School of Education. 
2. Strategy of the Pilot Program. 
Many of those interviewed felt UWW had gotten Faculty 
Senate approval and University resources in the spring of 
1971 as the result of a critical strategic move—the small 
pilot project during the 1970-71 year that had been supported 
out of planning grant funds. On a smaller scale this is the 
same strategy as that employed by the University of 
Massachusetts in the assumption of new missions. It tests 
out an idea in a real situation, allows planners to learn 
from it, and begins to put pressure for change on these 
units. UWW was able to learn from the students in the 
pilot year what kind of educational program and support 
services were needed. It also gave people a very important 
dose of reality—they knew they were not engaged in a 
theoretical or abstract process. 
3. Political Factor 
Seven of those interviewed felt one of the most 
important supporting factors of the University Without Walls 
program was the general political climate within the 
university and the state. It would have been difficult, 
this group argued, for the University to have disapproved 
of a program designed to serve students who had previously 
not had access to higher education. It would have been 
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particularly hard for the public University in the Common¬ 
wealth of Massachusetts to do this. 
4. Timing 
Seven of those interviewed spoke to the crucial 
factor of timing. The planning process was consistently 
informed by the fact that everyone was trying to get a 
pilot program implemented by the first fall, and a larger 
and formally approved one off the ground by the second. 
The planners had a strategy and time-line for achieving 
this goal mapped out,and were very sensitive to suggesting 
the right idea, in the right place, and at the right time. 
Prioritization of Factors. From the sense of the 
interviews, it is possible to list the factors important to 
the implementation of UWW in the following priority order; 
1. Small yet critical mass of committed supporters 
2. Resources 
3. Pilot Program Strategy 
4. Leadership 
5. Influence of School of Education 
6. Outside Influence 
7. Approval Process 
8. Larger Support Base of Faculty and Administrators 
9. Political Climate in State 
10. Reward System 
11. Timing 
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Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration* 
The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration was 
planned over a two year period,but a surprisingly small number 
of people were involved in that planning. The author was 
able to interview only nine people connected with the 
program,and some of these interviews were brief. There was 
not generally a high level of consensus concerning the 
importance of various change factors. Table 7 lists 
those factors. 
I. Resources 
There was substantial disagreement about the im¬ 
portance of resources to the development of the program. 
Four responded that they were critically important, three 
that they were important but not critical, one that they 
were not at all important, and one failed to mention them. 
The disagreement may have come in part from confusion over 
terms—most people took resources to mean money or released 
faculty time for coordination,and felt that since the 
program had very little of either, resources could not have 
been a major factor. Others defined resources to include 
faculty sponsor volunteer time, and saw that time as cri¬ 
tical to the program. They agree, however, that since the 
faculty commitment was voluntary, resources could not be 
seen as a hindering factor. Overall, then, resources were 
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Seven of those interviewed felt that leadership 
had been a critically important factor* and all agreed 
that Arthur Kinney's leadership style had been quite 
effective. Most mentioned the fact that he was respected 
by both faculty and students as having been especially 
important in attracting students and faculty sponsors to 
the program. 
III. Outside Influence 
All nine of those interviewed were aware that BDIC 
was the first of its kind in the country, and said that it 
had developed directly in response to perceived needs of 
students on the Amherst campus. The planning group had 
done its homework concerning academic reform efforts in 
other colleges and universities, and many felt that the 
program was clearly responding to something of a national 
movement calling for relevance in the curriculum and 
individualization,hut the most important influence had 
come from the campus. Arthur Kinney disagreed. 
Relevance doesn't mean anything unless it is 
in an individual situation ...» 
BDIC was really an attempt to provide what was 
fndivI^^Uy relevant to f 
response to a general mood that called 
relevance 
'•’interview, Arthur Kinney concerning Bachelor’s 
Degree with Individual Concentration Program, 
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Nevertheless, the BDIC case did not follow the 
conclusions of change theorists that the most important 
influences on the change process come from outside the 
institutions of higher education.^ 
IV. Environmental Factors* 
Reward System. There was disagreement about how 
important the reward system was to the development of 
BDIC. Five felt that it had not been particularly im¬ 
portant because* a) the program was small, b) faculty 
members could choose not to be part of it, c) those faculty 
who did get involved were people who did not jeopardize their 
own career by working in BDIC, and d) faculty tended to 
become involved in the program because they were interested 
in the students proposed program not because they expected 
rewards. Three of those interviewed did, however, feel that 
it was a very important and hindering factor. As one 
respondent put it, "more faculty would have become involved. 
^This issue is not that clear, however. Change 
theorists are referring to more broadly-based change efforts 
in institutions of higher education, and I would agree with 
them that at that level the most important influences have 
been external to institutions, and have been government funding 
policies, state legislatures, etc. This may be an instance 
where it is not appropriate to draw connections between 
change theory for institutions and change factors for 
particular programs. 
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but the departments and their ovm mind-sets made faculty 
think of research and publishing first." (Moss, Interview.) 
Approval Process. Seven of those interviewed felt 
that the approval process had been an important and positive 
factor in the development of BDIC. They spoke of the 
importance of the close relationship between the program 
proposers and the Academic Matters Council as having been 
very important. As in the case of UWW there were really two 
steps to the process, one involving approval for a pilot 
year, and another more formal process involving the 
Faculty Senate and Board of Trustees for permanent approval 
of the program. 
Communications. Only three people felt that 
communications were important to the program, and six either 
did not mention them or did not think they were important. 
The campus communications vehicles to faculty and students 
were obviously considered adequate. 
V. Small Group of Active Supporters 
Six of those interviewed felt that the work and 
dedication of a very small group of people over the two 
year planning period and the pilot program had been very 
important and positive factors. The academic respecta¬ 
bility of this group was so often mentioned that it has 
been listed as a separate factor. 
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VI. Large Support Base 
Those who planned the BDIC program felt that wide¬ 
spread faculty and student support would be crucial to its 
success because so much of the program depended on faculty 
willingness to spend time. They, therefore, started from 
a small group and gradually expanded in size to get that 
broad support. This strategy obviously worked, and eight 
of those interviewed felt that a large group of faculty 
supporters who were respected by other faculty members had 
been critical to the success of the program. 
Other Factors 
1. Academic Integrity 
Eight of those interviewed felt that the single 
most important factor to the BDIC program had been the 
academic integrity and respectability of those faculty 
members who had planned the program,those who served on 
the first supervisory committee, and the first group of 
approximately fifty faculty sponsors. Because of this 
trust and respect^the Academic Matters Council and Faculty 
Senate were much more willing to approve the program and 
allow the supervisory committee to encourage experimental 
student programs. According to one person interviewed. 
What was unique about BDIC was that it allowed 
facult^to feel that they were responsive to 
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student needs with a program that also had. 
high academic quality—a nice combination. 
(Woodbury - Interview). 
This factor corroborates Warren Bennis' admonitions 
concerning change in a university setting. 
. . . guard against the Crazies; build support 
among like-minded people and don't allow those 
who are opposed to change to appropriate such 
basic issues as academic standards.? 
2. Political Climate 
Eight of those interviewed felt that the sensi¬ 
tivities to the political climate of the planners of 
BDIC had allowed the program to be approved and implemented. 
BDIC planners had been very careful to start small and not 
threaten enrollments of any department or school. They had 
also been careful in reviewing student academic programs 
not to undermine or run around departmental curricular 
offerings or requirements. This sensitivity perhaps made 
BDIC more viable as a program than other more radical or 
visible student-centered programs. 
3. Pilot Strategy 
The planners of the BDIC program felt that the best 
way to get widespread support was to get a small pilot 
up and running. This proved to be an effective strategy 
^interview with Robert Woodbury concerning Bachelor's 
Degree with Individual Concentration. 
7Bennis, The Learning Tvorv Tower, Ibid., p. 
i 
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for it signalled to students that something was possible 
and attracted respected faculty members. During the pilot 
phasef the academic components of the program evolved 
to become something more than a mere rearrangement of 
courses. Seven of those interviewed spoke to the effective¬ 
ness of the pilot strategy. As one of those interviewed 
put it. 
Anything going has a bias for reapproval because 
it has begun normally to build its own con¬ 
stituency ... on the other hand, a good strate¬ 
gy to get initial approval is to sell it as a 
pilot .o 
This pilot strategy was referred to often in the 
literature on change theory especially by Miles, Lon Hefferlin, 
and Everett Rogers. 
4. School of Education 
Six of those interviewed paid particular attention to 
the positive effect the School of Education was having on the 
University at this time through its series of reforms and 
dehates on educational issues. Most were aware that the 
concept of student-centered learning and student designed 
programs of study had been part of the School of Education 
package and drew a direct connection between this and the 
BDIC program. 
^Interview with Robert Woodbury 
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5. Clear Objective—Minimal Departure 
Six of those interviewed felt that one of the most 
crucial factors had been the fact that the goals and ob¬ 
jectives of BDIC had been clear, simple, and shared by all 
of those involved with it. They also spoke to the fact that 
BDIC in fact involved only a minimal departure from existing 
attitudes and behaviors. This made its adoption very simple. 
Social scientists have generally agreed that what is diffi¬ 
cult about changing organizations is changing the behaviors 
and attitudes of organizational members, and therefore that 
changes involving only minimal departures are the easiest 
to achieve. 
Prioritization of Factors. While it is extremely 
difficult to prioritize the factors important to the 
development and implementation of BDIC, the following 
represents the author's attempt to do so; 
1. Academic Integrity 
2. Large Support Base 
3. Political Climate 
4. Leadership 
5. Pilot Strategy 
6. Small Group of Active Supporters 
7. Clear Objective - Minimal Departure 
8. Approval Process 
School of Education 9. 
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10. Resources 
11. Reward System 
12. Communications 
13. Outside Influence 
Institute for Man and His Environment. The responses 
on the Institute for Man and His Environment must be 
assessed quite carefully. In the cases of the University 
Without Walls and The Bachelor's Degree with Individual 
Concentration, there was general agreement that the programs 
had been successful,and the factors—whether supporting or 
hindering-“Were discussed with that assumption in mind. 
In the case of the Institute for Man and His Environment, 
there was no such agreement. Many of those interviewed 
felt that the Institute had been successfully implemented, 
and many others felt that it had been a failure. They 
tended, therefore, to assess change factors more as 
positive and negative causal factors than as supportive 
or hindering factors in program development. Table 8 
lists those factors. 
I. Resources 
All of those interviewed felt that resources had 
been critical, and all felt that resources had been critical 
as a motivational factor-an Institute to focus on environ¬ 
mental problems was planned because many people were 
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environmental area that year. The Institute was considered 
a failure by many because of its failure to attract grants. 
II. Leadership 
Nearly all of those interviewed agreed that leader¬ 
ship had been important. Over the two year period three 
people were cited in leadership roles—Berger, Appley and 
Carritt, and most felt that Berger had been effective while 
Apply and Carritt had not. Many had been opposed to 
Apply's leadership because they saw his moves as power 
plays; others felt that Carritt should have been more 
collaborative on campus and a more successful fund raiser. 
III. Outside Influence 
There were two major influences on the University 
at that time to create something in the environmental 
area. One was the national concern for the environment 
which was picked up with a vehemence by student groups; 
the other was a trend toward the creation of independent 
research institutes, especially among land-grant universities. 
It would have been difficult for the University of 
Massachusetts to have justified not becoming involved, al- 
though it was obviously difficult to spell out the specifics 
of that involvement. Eleven of those interviewed felt that 
these two outside influences were critical, and many felt 
that they were solely responsible because there had been 
little or no organic development of interdisciplinary 
activity on the campus. 
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IV, Environmental Factors: 
Reward System. Twelve of those interviewed felt the 
reward system was the primary impediment to a strong and 
viable institute. Interdisciplinary activity and task 
orientation toward problems was not rewarded by depart¬ 
ments, and they had control over such things as tenure 
or promotion. Discussions on the reward system had been 
lengthy during the planning, and a few felt that the In¬ 
stitute had failed because of its inability to counter the 
existing system with its own independently supported 
positions. 
Approval Process. Among the ten respondents who 
felt that the approval process had been very important to 
the Institute, half felt that it had been positive and half 
felt that it had been negative. The positive group talked 
about the enabling effects of a faculty senate mandate 
and the fact that the process had encouraged the proposers 
to clarify the crucial issues. The negative group felt that 
the Institute had emerged from that process in such a 
watered down form as to be nonviable, and therefore felt that 
the process had given power and control to all the In¬ 
stitute's opponents. 
Communications. Communications was not considered 
particularly important by those interviewed. They felt that 
enough information had spread about the Institute and its plans 
so that anyone who wanted to become involved had that option. 
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V. Small Yet Critical Group of Supporters 
Eight of those interviewed felt that the Institute 
had been implemented as a result of the volunteer efforts 
of a small but consistent group of people—primarily the 
Steering Committee members. Others argued that more crucial 
had been one or two individuals in power positions es¬ 
pecially Mort Appley. In the case of the Institute, both 
had probably been equally important, and the variousness of 
the responses probably depended on whether or not the person 
interviewed had been part of the Steering Committee. 
VI. Larger Support Base 
On this question there was considerable difference 
of opinion on whether there had been a critical mass of 
support and how many people determined critical mass. Most 
of those interviewed agreed that there had been few students 
who stayed involved throughout the process and that student 
support had not been critical. In terms of faculty, five 
felt that a large number of faculty wanted an Institute 
and this had been an important though not critical factor 
while two felt that it had been critical. Five others, 
however, felt that there had not been a large faculty 
support base and that this had been an important negative 
factor. These claimed that while faculty may have supported 
the idea of environmental problem-solving in the abstract, 
they did not support an Institute that threatened to take 
resources away from their own departments or potentially 
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limit their independent research activity and grantsman- 
ship. All agreed, however, that at the University of 
Massachusetts, it did not take faculty consensus to create 
an Institute—it took only a few faculty. Enough attention 
was given hy respondents to administration support, that I 
have listed that as a separate and distinct factor. 
Other Factors 
1. Lack of Clearly Defined Priorities at U.Mass- 
Lack of Focus for Institute 
Mentioned by twelve of the thirteen respondents as 
a critical factor that inhibited the development of the 
Institute was the failure of the University of Massachusetts 
to focus on and unambiguously state a position on what 
the University should be doing in terms of public service 
and social problem-solving. The lack of consensus in the 
University over priorities led to a lack of focus for 
the Institute. The planners wanted to consider all 
man/environment problems in their interrelationships; 
they wanted all urban and rural problems and just about 
everything else that could fall under the lahel-environment. 
This inability to focus—or diversity of functions 
to state it more positively-had been considered an 
essential definitional factor of a "multiversity" by 
Clark Kerr. Jack Lindquist, too, had talked about the 
extreme differentiation of universities as an obstacle to 
change, but I was surprised at the consistency of opinion 
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among respondents. It is true that there had been many 
public service activities and no clear policy statements 
at the University. 
2. Political Factor 
The second 'View" factor that emerged with a great 
deal of consistency during the interviews reaffirmed 
Victor Baldridge's and Jack Lindquist's notion of the 
importance of power and conflict in determining policies 
and activities in a university. A surprising number of 
people felt that the Institute for Man and His Environment 
was essentially a tool through which a number of people 
sought to improve their positions in the University— 
second rate faculty members sought routes to recognition 
and reward, entrepreneurs sought grant monies, and graduate 
deans sought more personal power vis a vis other administra¬ 
tors. It was this jockeying for position that lent the 
dynamic to the process. 
There were several factors mentioned during the 
interviews that fall within the larger notion of a political 
or power factor. Ten of those interviewed mentioned the 
importance of the controversy over the formal reporting 
line of the Institute. The Graduate Dean wanted it to 
report through him to improve his power position, others 
felt that it should report directly to the Provost or 
Chancellor because the Graduate Dean had no clout within 
the University. Several people mentioned the importance 
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of the interplay of personalities to the outcome. There 
were strong animosities between and among the major 
characters—Mort Appley, Ken Picha, Dayton Carritt to 
name only a few—that made agreements much more difficult 
to reach. At an institutional level, many people saw a 
competitiveness and a vying for institutional reputation 
and prestige. Two hundred other colleges and universities 
were creating institutes that year—how could the University 
of Massachusetts allow itself to fall behind the others? 
3. Administration Support 
There was surprising agreement that support from the 
top level administrators at the University of Massachusetts 
was a crucial factor in determining the viability of the 
Institute for Man and His Environment. Lon Hefferlin and 
Jack Lindquist both had pointed to the fact that it was 
helpful to have administration support for reform, but they 
had not emphasized it particularly. The Steinhart study 
on Environmental Science Centers had found that the most 
successful ones enjoyed administration support. Those 
interviewed took great pains to discuss Oswald Tippo's 
and Bob Gluckstem's (and for two Moyer Hunsberger's and 
Robert Woods’) attitudes toward research institutes, but 
they all recalled the famous Friday when Tippo withdrew 
his support. Those who saw the Institute as a failure 
blamed the administration. A few mentioned the fact that 
the University was experiencing many administrative changes 
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as having been important. 
4. Timing 
More than half of those interviewed mentioned timing 
as a crucial factor in the development of the Institute. 
They emphasized the timeliness of the idea of environmental 
problem-solving as a positive factor and Dave Carritt's 
lack of a sense of timing as a critical negative factor he 
approached Academic Matters too abruptly and lost support, 
and made many wrong moves at the wrong time. Mort Appley 
took a more general view: "institutes as new structures 
can be good if brought into the University at the appro¬ 
priate time in the life-cycle of the University. Institutes 
have been failures when introduced at the wrong time." 
Prioritization of Factors,. There was considerable 
difference of opinion among those interviewed on the question 
of whether the Institute for Man and His Environment had 
been a success or a failure, and therefore considerable 
disagreement over whether certain factors had been hindering 
or supporting factors in its development. Despite these 
disagreements, it is possible from the sense of the inter¬ 
views to prioritize the important factors to the planning 
and implementation of the Institute for Man and His En¬ 
vironment, in the following manner: 




3. Lack of Institutional Priorities 
4. Leadership 
5. Reward System 
6. Administration Support 
7. External Influence 
8. Approval Process 
9. Timing 
10. Small Yet Critical Number of Active Supporters 
11. Large Support Base 
12. Communications 
Comparative Assessment of Change Factors. A com¬ 
parison of the factors among the three case studies enables 
a validation of the importance of most of Lon Hefferlin s 
change factors and provides information on the process of 
change at the University of Massachusetts. Table 9 lists 
those factors for each case in priority order so that they may 
be compared and analyzed. 
From Table 9. a number of observations concerning 
change factors at the University of Massachusetts can be made 
that related the University of Massachusetts' situation to more 
gene 1^1 change theory. 
1. NO factor emerged as having been the single most 
critical factor to all three programs at the University of 
Massachusetts. This corroborates Lon Hefferlin's observa¬ 
tion that the change process in a university involves a 
complex interweaving of a larger number of factors. 
2. The factor that emerged as unequivocally 
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TABLE 9 
CHANGE FACTORS FOR THREE PROGRAMS AT 
THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Factors Critical 
To University With¬ 
out Walls Program 
Factors Critical 
to the Bachelor’s 
Degree with Con¬ 
centration Proeram 
Factors Critical 
to the Institute 
For Man and His 
Environment 
1. Small yet critical 
mass of active 
supporters 
1. Academic In¬ 
tegrity 
1. Resources 
2. Resources 2. Large Supprt 
Base 
2. Politics 




3. Lack of In¬ 
stitutional 
Priorities 
4, Leadership 4. Leadership 4. Leadership 
5. Influence of School 
of Education 
5. Pilot Strategy 5. Reward System 











8. Large Support Base 
of Faculty and Ad¬ 
ministrators 
8. Approval Process 1 8. Approval 
Process 
9. Political Climate 
in State 
9. School of 
Education 
9. Timing 




11. Timing 11. Reward System 
11. Large support 
_Base_ 
12. Communications 12. Communications 
12. Communications 
13. Outside In¬ 
fluence ____ 
27^ 
impor’ban't in all cases was leadership* yet in two of the 
three case studies there had been considerable agreement that 
the leadership in that program had been ineffective. 
3* The importance of the political climate within 
the University of Massachusetts is seen clearly in two of 
the cases. In the third case—UWW—the pilot program 
strategy which was viewed as a critical factor could be 
termed a strategy to deal with the campus political situa¬ 
tion, so politics like leadership, could be read as a 
factor important in all cases. This essentially affirms 
the image of the "multiversity" as portrayed by Clark Kerr 
and Victor Baldridge, and corroborates Baldridge’s theory 
of power and conflict and Lindquist’s Political Linkage 
Model. 
4. Resources emerge as high on the list of critical 
factors for two of the programs but quite low for the 
third—BDIC. This low ranking, however, probably re¬ 
sulted more from the small sise of the program at its 
initiation and hence a small actual dollar investment, and 
the confusion over terms in that faculty time was not 
considered by many as a resource for the program although it 
should have been. Therefore, despite the low BDIC ranking, 
the study can be said to corroborate the findings of those 
change theorists who claim that resources are the critical 
factor. Mohr, Lindquist, and Lon Hefferlin. 
External influence does not emerge as important 
5- 
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a factor to the University of Massachusetts situation as the 
literature on change would have suggested. This may be true 
because the literature was referring chiefly to the influence 
on overall direction and policy for higher education by 
groups other than higher education institutions j this 
study focused on external influences over specific programs. 
6. Communications as an environmental factor does 
not emerge as at all important in the University of 
Massachusetts situation even though it had been mentioned 
as critical by Lon Hefferlin. . The Lindquist study, too 
paid particular attention to the diffusion process. 
7. Timing emerges as having been particularly 
important in two cases, yet this was something that had not 
been mentioned in the literature on change theory. 
Validation of Hefferlin and Lindquist. It can be 
concluded that in most respects* the University of Massachusetts 
cases validate the conclusions of Lon Hefferlin and Jack 
Lindquist. Lon Hefferlin*s factors varied in importance 
with each case, but leadership, resources, approval process, 
and reward systems were central to the development and 
implementation of the University Without Walls, the Bachelor s 
Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for 
Man and His Environment, While external influence and 
communications did not emerge as particularly significant, 
that is probably due to the focus of the study on three 
specific programs rather than on the University as a whole. 
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Lindquist and Baldridge were also validated in this study 
because the importance of the poltical climate of the 
University and the dynamic of competing interest groups 
were marked causative factors in each case. 
While the data is not unequivocal, the study 
suggests that change theorists ought to pay closer attention 
to the factor and strategy of timing in institutional change. 
Hnnclusions on Change Process at the Universitx 
of Massachusetts. In this study, change factors were 
researched .and analyzed in relation to three specific 
program situations. Because all programs were developed 
at roughly the same time in one university, however, it is 
possible to "generalize" these factors to the process of 
change at the University of Massachusetts. The University 
of Massachusetts was a "vital" and change-oriented institution 
throughout the period of the fifties and especially the 
sixties, and those factors which were important to the dra¬ 
matic changes included resources, leadership, external in¬ 
fluence, and a conducive environment in which reward systems, 
approval processes. governance, and communications were 
used to encourage change. 
The most significant finding concerning the process 
+ +hp University of Massachusetts that emerged 
of change at the University ^ 
from the study was the finding that the creation of specia 
focus units is an effective change strategy. This strategy 
had been suggested by Lon Hefferlin and Lindquist, and was 
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used at the University of Massachusetts in order to assume 
three missions—access, individualization, and social 
problem-solving. The successful creation of the University 
Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Con¬ 
centration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment 
as programs provided an institutional and organizational— 
rather than rhetorical--method or vehicle for accomplishing 
organizational change. While specific change factors may 
vary from institution to institution, the strategy of special 




SUMMARY, SOME SPECULATIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This chapter contains a summary of the purposes, 
methodology, and findings of this study, and some specula¬ 
tions that it generated about missions, organizations, and 
change. It also contains several recommendations for 
further study. 
Summary 
This study focuses on three missions—access, 
individualization, and social problem-solving—that have 
been recommended as priority agendas for higher education. 
It also focuses on the process of planning and development 
for three special programs--the University Without Walls, 
the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and 
the Institute for Man and His Environment—which served as 
vehicles for the assumption of these missions in one uni¬ 
versity—the University of Massachusetts. The aim of the 
study is to provide information on the viability of the 
missions of access, individualization and social problem¬ 
solving within existing public universities, and to con¬ 
tribute to the study of institutional change. 
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In a review of related research and theory, special 
emphasis is placed on the articulation of new missions and 
objectives for higher education by educational theorists, 
including Clark Kerr and David Riesman, and several 
specially created study commissions and task forces, in¬ 
cluding the Truman Commission on Higher Education, the New¬ 
man Task Force, and the Carnegie Commission on Higher 
Education. Emphasized, as well, are the characteristics 
of universities as organizations and change theories as 
articulated by Ronald Havelock, Lon Hefferlin, Jack Lind¬ 
quist, Warren Bennis, Victor Baldridge, and others. 
Data for the study has been gathered from partici¬ 
pant observation, from University documents and from 
approximately forty interviews. Case studies provide 
descriptions of the University of Massachusetts and of the 
planning and implementation of three programs—the Univer¬ 
sity Without Walls, the Bachelor’s Degree with Individual 
Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment. 
Each case focuses particularly on those elements which could 
be considered important factors in the process of imple¬ 
mentation and institutional change. 
Each case is analyzed in order to assess the 
feasibility of the missions of access, individualization, 
and social problem-solving for the University of 
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Massachusetts and other public universities and to deter¬ 
mine and compare the factors important to the change 
process in the University. 
The study showed that all three missions have been 
considered priority agendas for the University of Massa¬ 
chusetts, and that special units have been developed and 
approved by the formal governance bodies in order to 
commit the University to the fulfillment of these missions. 
The separate program cases, however, reveal 
variations in the extent of the commitment. The Bachelor's 
Degree with Individual Concentration program shows that the 
mission of individualization was accepted and adopted. 
The University Without Walls program shows that although the 
provision of educational opportunity for non-traditional 
students and the fulfillment of the mission of access would 
require comprehensive changes, many at the University of 
Massachusetts were willing to make these changes. The case 
of the Institute for Man and His Environment reveals the 
difficult organizational, attitudinal, and behavioral 
changes that are required to adopt the mission of social 
problem-solving. 
The study corroborates the importance of those 
change factors which had been cited by Lon Hefferlin-- 
resources, leadership, support, and environmental factors 
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of reward and approval and showed very clearly the impor¬ 
tance of the political dynamic suggested by Lindquist and 
Baldridge. The study does not unearth new change factors, 
but suggests that timing might be a change factor deserving 
of more attention and study. It shows the advantage of 
creating special focus programs as a vehicle through which 
the University can accomplish change. It also makes clear 
that the process of change involves a whole network of 
factors and dynamics that cannot be easily isolated. It 
shows that it is difficult for universities as organizations 
to adopt new missions. 
Some Speculations 
On Missions. The author experienced considerable 
difficulty in attempting to identify the major missions 
and objectives for higher education over the past quarter 
century. It is surprising that despite huge expenditures 
of tax dollars at the federal and state levels for higher 
education, there is no one individual or group who has been 
delegated the power and the authority to determine priori¬ 
ties, missions, and objectives for higher education. In¬ 
stead, study commissions, task forces, institutions, 
political leaders, lobbyists, and thousands of individuals 
vie for attention to state their preferences about higher 
education. At one level this can be considered unfortunate 
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for ili lo^ds "to confusion Eind dolsiy. Collcgos a.nd univer¬ 
sities—not knowing who to listen to—do nothing. On the 
other hand, it can be considered positive, because it leads 
to greater participation and involvement which might insure 
that those missions which do emerge, represent a more 
widespread consensus. It is also possible that any group 
mandated to make decisions might itself become rigid and 
tend toward the status quo. The constant debate over the 
directions for higher education seems a healthy process. 
On Organizations. This study attempts to consider 
at the same time missions for higher education, and the 
implementation of those missions within universities. It 
is very difficult to keep the focus on both of these 
issues together, because the connections between them 
keep disappearing. This experience with the study, leads 
to some speculations on organizations. The data from the 
case studies revealed that once a planning and develop¬ 
ment process was set in motion, the original objectives 
for those programs began to be overriden by other, more 
organizational considerations. Individuals seemed to be 
more concerned with issues of power, status, and control, 
and the programs seemed to be interested more in growth 
for its own sake, rather than for the realization of any 
objective. In a sense, programs began to assume the same 
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characteristics as the organization as a whole. This 
experience suggests that no single format or structure will 
remain adaptive and that those interested in having 
institutions continually respond to the needs of society, 
should encourage organizational instability and conflict 
between old and new structures so that the whole gradually 
changes in the desired direction. Put another way, per¬ 
haps conflict ought to be one of the characteristics of a 
"vital” institution. 
On Theories of Change. The aim of this study was 
to contribute toward a theory of change that would be 
useful for universities as they attempted to be both 
responsive to social needs, and positive agents of change 
in society. In the final analysis a theory of change re¬ 
mains elusive. 
Universities have begun changing for centuries, 
and the pace of change seems to be accelerating, but in the 
opinion of this author, a theory has not been developed to 
adequately explain or guide that change. Lon Hefferlin 
was best when he observed that "a whole network of factors 
(attitudes, procedures, mechanisms, pressures), appear to 
be involved." The theoretical models offered by Havelock, 
Lindquist, and Baldridge are quite general and would not 
at this point really help to understand the change process 
in a new situation. Jack Lindquist's strategies represent 
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a conglomeration of ideas that may or may not be helpful 
in diverse situations. 
This study also provides little "generalizable" 
data. It was very difficult to separate change factors 
from the history of each of the programs for the more they 
became generalized, the more they became meaningless. 
The study does, however, suggest that a number of things 
operating together can be important to getting a change 
program started within a university. 
A. A small group of committed individuals is 
essential. 
B. The core group must like to work together, 
contain a congenial mix of personalities, and it must 
also be acceptable to the larger group which controls the 
approval process. 
C. The idea or program must carry enough moral 
weight to inspire people to work on it. 
D. The idea must also be provocative to a large 
number of people--it must be in tune with the times. 
E. The core group proposing the program, must 
have a sense of timing that is in tune with the campus 
and deploy a strategy for implementation. 
F. Resources are important, but are not alone 
sufficient. It can be more effective to start with a small 
program and allow it to grow organically, than to make 
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inordinate demands for resources given the present financial 
conditions. 
G. Granting the difficulty of changing basic 
behaviors and attitudes, it can be effective to underplay 
the extent of the change. 
It is hoped that this study will furnish case material for 
continued theoretical development. Like the case studies 
of Bennis and Baldridge, it attempts to consider important 
university issues in the full range of their complexity. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
In order to deal with what the author considered 
important present and future issues in higher education, 
this study focuses on broad issues and general theories. 
As a consequence, it suggests multiple areas and levels for 
further elaboration and clarification. The following 
represent only those which the author considers^to be the 
most crucial for higher education as a whole, or the most 
compelling in terms of the data from this study 
1. Study Relating Higher Education to Other Social 
Institutions. This study focuses on the missions of access, 
individualization, and social problem-solving in connection 
with institutions of higher education, but it does not 
consider these missions in their broader social context. 
A broader focus would be helpful. This study suggests that 
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social problem-solving is a very difficult mission to ac¬ 
complish in a university. It should, however, not follow 
from this study that recommended missions for universities 
should be revised to exclude social problem-solving. Rather, 
it follows that other social institutions should be examined 
to determine the possibilities of their taking on this 
agenda. If the university emerges as the most likely in¬ 
stitution to direct its attention to complex social problems, 
then that should remain a mission regardless of the diffi¬ 
culties. Similarly, the mission of access should be examined 
from a broader perspective. It seems far too simplistic 
for universities to congratulate themselves on their ability 
to make the procedural and academic changes required to serve 
a different study body who had previously been excluded from 
higher education, and yet neglect to consider the impact 
of their admissions policies on students and non-students. 
Recommending access, but encouraging non-attendance as the 
Carnegie Commission has done, does not seem an adequate 
solution to the problem. Further attention should be paid 
to the relationship between education, economics, and the 
social order. 
2, Study on Timing and Time as Factors of Change. 
One of the findings of this study was that a sense of timing 
on the part of program sponsors was essential to imple- 
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mentation. This factor needs more careful scrutiny than it 
has received in the research on higher education. Closely 
related to this factor is the more general sense of the 
times that influenced priorities and missions for higher 
education. Time in this sense also emerged as an important 
factor in the study. To illustrate the difference--an 
important impetus for the BDIC program was the student 
movement of the late sixties and a major influence for the 
Institute for Man and His Environment was the general feeling 
that the world has reached an environmental crisis-point. 
Both of these would be considered factors of time which were 
important. The supporters of BDIC displayed a sense of 
timing in their approach to faculty, to administrators, and 
to those groups which were part of the approval process. 
This sense of timing was also an important change factor. 
The Institute's supporters did not have this sensitivity 
to timing, and the Institute did not really get off the 
ground, despite the environmental crisis. Both factors— 
time and timing—deserve further study and clarification. 
A third time-related question is important, although 
it did not receive particular attention in this study. This 
is the question of whether changes are implemented swiftly 
enough to respond to the need. The study showed that the 
University of Massachusetts did respond to the demands for 
access, individualization, and social problem-solving 
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through the creation of special program units. The study 
did not, however, raise the important questions of whether 
the vehicles to meet the demands were adequate or whether 
they were implemented swiftly enough. UWW, BDIC, and the 
Institute for Man and His Environment were all finally in 
operation by the spring of 1972, but were they responding 
to the needs of 1972 or of 1962? 
3* Further Study on Special Programs at the 
University of Massachusetts. A number of important follow¬ 
up studies could be conducted at the University of 
Massachusetts. It would be worthwhile to examine the three 
programs—UWW, BDIC, and the Institute for Man and His 
Environment to see if their missions and objectives have 
changed with time. This study concludes that special 
program units serve as vehicles for change throughout the 
institution, so it would be important to examine more 
closely the impact of these programs on the university. All 
three programs were developed during a period of substantial 
growth and change at the University of Massachusetts. Since 
1972, the Amherst campus of the University has entered a 
no-growth period, and it would be interesting to study the 
development of special focus programs under these altered 
circumstances. The strategies for change in a game of 
zero-sum may be very different. 
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4. Further Research Related to Change Theory. 
Many researchers on organizations and change have pointed 
out that because of organizational impediments, more change 
was likely to result from external rather than internal 
pressure. The specific focus of this study on three cases 
did not allow for careful consideration of the external 
influence factor, but it could be argued from the data 
as a whole, that despite good intentions on the part of 
the University of Massachusetts to take on new agendas, 
the realization of these agendas was meager by comparison 
to the need. Thus further consideration of the ways 
institutions could be influenced to change could be more 
important and useful to institutions in the long run. 
APPENDIX I 
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FACULTY, STUDENTS, AND ADMINISTRATORS 
INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY 
I. Those interviewed regarding the University 
Without Walls Program. 
University position 
and 
Date Relationship to uww 
1. Leigh Short 12/28/73 Chairman of the Aca¬ 
demic Matters Council 
when UWW came up for 
approval. 
2. Otto Stein 2/1/74 Head of Botany Dept. 
Attended faculty 
lunches that were part 
of UWW planning effort. 
3. David Bischoff 3/20/74 Associate Provost— 
Member of Academic 
Matters Council. 




5. Charlotte Rahaim 3/27/74 Assistant Dean of Ad¬ 
missions, member of 
Admissions task force 
and UWW policy board 
6. Gail Kauffman 3/28/74 Staff member UWW from 
beginning of planning 
period. Commimi cat ions 
coordinator. 
7. Robert Woodbury 3/30/74 Associate Dean, School 
of Education during 
planning semester. 
Associate Provost for 
Special Programs to 





Date Relationship to UWW 
8. Tom Clark 3/31/7'f Director of UWW 
9* Mark Cheren 4/3/74 Graduate student, 
participant in initial 
planning effort, member 
of learning skills 
task group. 
10. Jean Carritt 4/8/74 Volunteer partici¬ 
pant in UWW planning 
effort, member of re¬ 
sources task group. 
11. Dee Appley 4/11/74 Faculty member. Psy¬ 
chology Department, 
one of first faculty 
sponsors and member 
of policy board. 
12. Edward Harris 4/12/74 Graduate student and 
staff member, UWW 
(would become Director 
in 1972). 
13. Seymour Shapiro 4/30/74 Faculty member. Botany 
Department—one of 
first faculty sponsors 
and member of policy 
board. 
II. Those interviewed regarding BDIC 
1. Leigh Short 12/28/73 Member of Academic 
Matters Council and 
review committee for 
BDIC, member of first 
BDIC supervisory 
committee, Chairman 
of Academic Matters 
when program came up 
for permanent appro¬ 
val. 
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2. Arthur Kinney 
3» Janet Sheppard 
4. Stanley Moss 
5. David Bischoff 
6. Robert Woodbury 
7. Tom Clark 











Relationship to BDTC 
Participant in BDIC 
planning effort from 
the beginning, mem¬ 
ber of all committees 
except Academic Matters 
ad hoc budget review 
committee, and Chair¬ 
man of first super¬ 
visory committee. 
Student in BDIC 
program. 
One of first BDIC 
faculty sponsors, mem¬ 
ber of supervisory 
committee, 1971-1972, 
and currently Chair¬ 
man of the supervisory 
committee. 
Associate Provost— 
member of Academic 
Matters Council 
Associate Provost for 
Special Programs. 
Faculty member. School 
of Education, member 
of BDIC planning 
committee. 
Graduate Student, School 
of Education, partici¬ 
pant in SWAP conference 
and first planning group 
to emerge from SWAP. 
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Date 
9. Tony Borton 4/9/74 
III. Those interviewed 
for Man and His Environment. 
University position 
and 
Relationship to BDIC 
Faculty member, College 
of Agriculture, member 
Academic Matters Coun¬ 
cil and ad hoc commit¬ 
tee to plan BDIC, mem¬ 
ber of first super¬ 
visory committee. 
regarding the Institute 
1. Leigh Short 
2. Carl Swanson 
3. Mortimer Appley 
4. Bernard Berger 






Member of Academic 
Matters Council and 
committee to review 
and revise proposal 
for Institute for Man 
and His Environment. 
Associate Director, 
Institute for Man and 
His Environment, from 
September 1971f faculty 
member. Botany Dept. 
Dean of Graduate School 
—responsible for ini¬ 
tial planning effort 
for the Institute. 
Director, Water Re¬ 
sources Research Center. 
Chairman, Steering 
Committee for the 
Institute. 
Head, Dept, of Botany, 
member of the sub¬ 
committee on education 
and the Advisory Board. 
University position 
Date 
and Relationship to 
the Institute 
6. Richard Louttit 2/1/74 Head, Dept, of Psy¬ 
chology, member of 
Academic Matters Re¬ 
view Committee and Ad¬ 
visory Board. 
7. Kenneth Pic ha 2/4/74 Dean, School of En¬ 
gineering, member of 
Steering Committee for 
Institute and Advisory 
Board. 
8, Dayton Carritt 2/5/74 Director, Institute for 
Man and His Environment 
Jan. 1971 to January 
1972. 
9» Erving Zube 3/5/74 Chairman, subcommittee 
on education and cur¬ 
rently Director of 
Institute. 
10. Stanley Moss 3/6/74 Chairman, subcommittee 
on research. 
11. Robert McGarrah 3/16/74 Directory, Center for 
Business and Economic 
Research, SBA, Member 
of Steering Committee 
and Advisory Board 
and Chairman sub¬ 
committee on outreach. 
12. Robert Gluckstem 3/22/74 Provost 
13. Seymour Shapiro 4/30/74 Acting Director, In¬ 
stitute for Man and 
His Environment— 




QUESTIONS USED AS BASIS FOR INTERVIEWS 
1. What were the original objectives of the (UWW, BDIC, 
IMHE) program? 
2. Will you describe the process through which the program 
was developed and implemented? 
3» What things or factors would you say were most important 
to the development of the program? 
4. What was happening at UMass at that time that made the 
program important? 




—application of knowledge to social problems 
were important agendas for higher education? 
6. Could the program have been developed as a result 
of what outsiders were saying? 
7. Who was the person in the leadership position in the 
program? 
8. How important was his/her status to the implementation 
of the program? 
9. Can you name the five most important people to the 
program? Why were they important? 
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10. In addition to the core group, how many people were 
supportive of the program in its early stages? 
11. Was their support necessary for program approval 
and implementation? 
12. Which was more important: faculty support, student 
support, or administrator support—or did it matter? 
13* How many people were significantly involved with the 
program during the planning and initial stages of 
the program? 
14. How many other resources such as money were availa¬ 
ble to the program during its initial phases? 
15• Just how important were these human and material 
resources to the program? Could it have been imple¬ 
mented with less? 
16. Was the reward system at UMass relevant to the 
program in its initial stages? Did it have a posi¬ 
tive or negative influence? 
17. Was the approval process at UMass a hindering or 
supporting factor to the program? 
18. How about the established communications vehicles 
—faculty to departments to students, etc. Were 
they helpful and important to the program? 
19. What other environmental factors might have in¬ 
fluenced the program in its development and imple¬ 
mentation? 
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20. How would you characterize UMass in relation to other 
universities in terms of missions and objectives 
and possiblities for effecting change? 
21. Why do you think UMass approved and supported the 
program? 
(Probe: Do you think the motivation was institutional 
image, response to external or internal pressure or 
what?) 
22. What in addition to those things we have talked about 
—external influence, resources, support, leadership 
and campus environment—would you say was important 




OVERVIEW OF MAJOR STUDY COMMISSIONS WHICH 
INFLUENCED POLICY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
AND MAJOR THRUST OF THEIR 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Truman Commission 
The President's Commission on Higher Education 
convened by President Harry S. Truman in 1946 stressed 
egalitarianism of access to higher education and set 
the stage for the spectacular expansion of higher edu¬ 
cation during the fifties and sixties. It also attempted 
to articulate the purpose of collegiate education, and 
establish a framework for curricular responses through 
the general education movement. According to Lewis 
Mayhew, "in many respects the Truman Commission may have 
been relatively more influential for its time than the 
Morrill Act of 1862."^ 
White House Conference on Youth 
The White House Conference on Youth was planned 
in 1971 as a forum whereby the youth of America could 
address the most pressing issues of the day. This group 
^Lewis Mayhew, The Carnegie Commission on Higher 
Education, p. 6. 
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suggested that education had emerged as the primary 
instrument for the solution of domestic social problems 
such as racism, pcverty, the city and the environment. 
Mayhew claims, however, that despite its "ringing ideals 
(it) has had little effect on the conduct of higher 
2 
education." 
Newman Task Force 
The Task Force on Higher Education established 
by the Office of Education and headed by Frank Newman was 
considerably smaller in size and budget than other study 
commissions on higher education. It also had a more 
liberal membership. 
The Newman Task Group looked at higher education 
as a broad total system and asked questions about its 
effectiveness in terms of society's needs. Its overall 
thrust was that much of what is going on in higher education 
today is not responsive to the needs of society; that 
institutions themselves are not likely to effoct the 
^Ibid., p. 9* 
needed changes; and that massive federal intervention and 
the creation of new educational enterprises are required 
in order to get a higher education system more in line 
with present national priorities. The Task Force placed 
emphasis on public debate as a force for change in higher 
education, and suggested that the federal government take 
the initiative through specific funding efforts. In 
1973f one might well question the viability of the notion 
of new alternative systems, but there is little doubt that 
the Newman Report with its able critique of higher edu¬ 
cation had a major impact on the educational debate both 
inside and outside of institutions. 
Assembly on University Goals and Governance 
The Assembly on University Goals and Governance 
established by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
in 1969 spoke to a large number of educational issues, 
and issued a series of recommendations, but its Report 
has been poorly disseminated. While it should have some 
impact within higher education circles—because of the 
prestigiousness of the group--it is not likely to have 
a major impact at broader national levels. 
Special Committee on Campus Tensions 
The Special Committee on Campus Tensions es¬ 
tablished in 1969 by the American Council on Education, 
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suggested remedies for many of the problems that were 
causing widespread disruption on campuses. They called 
for improved governance procedures, greater diversity 
among faculty, staff and students, and more flexible 
curricula. 
President's Commission on Campus Unrest 
Established in June 1970 in the wake of Kent State 
and Jackson State, the President's Commission on Campus 
Unrest suggested ways of dealing with campus disruption 
and a variety of reforms for higher education. 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education was 
established in I967 by the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching with support from the Carnegie 
Corporation. It was financed with five and two-thirds 
million dollars over a six year period. Chaired by 
Clark Kerr, the Commission's members included presidents, 
trustees^and professors associated with colleges and 
universities. Starting with the objective of studying 
the financing of higher education, the Commission eventually 
took under review almost every aspect of higher education- 
function, structure, governance, expenditure, technology, 
effective use of resources, and reform. The Commission 
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issued special reports, and sponsored a series of special 
studies appearing in over eighty publications. 
The work of the Commission is difficult to 
summarize, but the overall directions they suggest for 
higher education are, according to Clark Kerr, 
Toward social justice—provision of universal 
equal access to higher education (but not the 
encouragement of universal attendance) 
Toward more options. flexibility, diversity—a 
revolution of free choice for students of all 
ages. 
Toward more resources and their more effective 
use 
Toward reconsideration of purposes—though the 
functions of higher education may have multiplied, 
the purposes of higher education have not been 
deeply analyzed and redefined for nearly a century 
Toward improved governance 
We give high priority as well to constructive 
change3 
It is also difficult to evaluate the work of 
the Commission. Norman Bimbaum and others have been 
severely critical, maintaining that the Commission did 
not deal with matters of substance, and that it accepted 
too many educational assumptions as inherently good. 
Lewis Mayhew on the other hand is supportive: 
^Clark Kerr, "Viewpoint," Change,. (November 
1973). P‘5. 
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In total, the work of the Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education must be judged highly successful 
—virtually all of the policy recommendations and 
studies are sophisticated and tuned to prevailing 
knowledge about higher education ... it is 
possible that a substantial number of commission 
recommendations will become operative elements of 
public policy.^ 
Books 
In addition to Commissions, two books written in 
the last decade seem to have had a major impact on the 
debate about higher education. The Academic Revolution 
by Christopher Jencks and David Riesman is a comprehensive 
study of American higher education which pays particular 
attention to the relationship between education and society. 
Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University treats the role 
of the university in society and claims that the university s 
chief product—knowledge--is the most important factor in 
economic and social growth as well as "the most powerful 
single element in our culture."^ He sees the role of 
the university as that of "service station. 
*’Mayhew, Ibid., p» 
5Kerr, ThP Uses of the Universi;^, Ibid., p. vii. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
ON ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
This section contains an overview of the work of 
Ronald Havelock, who is the major synthesizer of research 
on knowledge diffusion and utilization, a general review 
of research on decision and change process in business, 
industry and other organizational settings, and a review 
of the work on planned change in systems, particularly 
elementary and secondary education. All of this work 
contributed in important ways to the perspectives of those 
focusing on change in institutions of higher education. 
Ronald Havelock—Research on Knowledge Diffusion 
and Utilization. Ronald Havelock's work in the area 
of knowledge diffusion and utilization is concerned with 
how ideas .spread among and within social systems. For 
this study, it is important because it speaks to the 
question of how concepts about missions and objectives 
diffuse from the level of higher education theorists and 
policy influencers into the university, how they diffuse 
among university members, and how they are utilized for 
program planning. The focus of Havelock's major work. 
Planning for Innovation through Dissemination and 
Utilization of Knowledge, was "to assess the current state 
of knowledge with respect to processes of dissemination 
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and utilization."^ He conducted a literature search of 
over four thousand titles and categorized the literature 
into three conceptual modelsi research and development, 
social interaction; and problem-solving. He felt that 
each of these models provided insights, but each was 
inadequate to explain the totality of the diffusion 
process. He, therefore, created his own conceptual 
model—the linkage model—to integrate the other three. 
These models were discussed in Chapter I because they 
were significant in the work of Jack Lindquist, and further 
elaborated upon in connection with their applicability to 
the study of change in colleges and universities. 
In summarizing his work, Havelock was able to 
identify seven "general factors" in knowledge dissemination 
and utilizations 
1. LINKAGE - Linkage means the degree of inter¬ 
personal or intergroup connection. "The more 
linkages there are and the stronger these 
linkages are, the more effective will be the 
day to day contact and exchange of information, 
hence the greater will be the mutual utiliza¬ 
tion of knowledge. Most importantly, the greater 
the number of overlapping linkages throughout 
the macrosystem of knowledge production and 
dissemination, the more frequent and the more 
effective will be the knowledge utilization 
by all."2 
^Ronald Havelock, Planning for Innovation Through 
Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge,Ibid., p. • 
^Ibid., pp. 11-21. 
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2. STRUCTURE - "The degree of systematic organization 
and coordination of elements strongly affects 
the utilzation process. The extent to which 
structuring takes place in the sender and receiver 
and in the message seem to be important correlates 
of successful dissemination and utilization."3 
3« OPENNESS - "Openness is the readiness to give and 
receive new information and is fundamental to 
effective utilization. It it a prerequisite to 
'linkage* and a necessary complement to 'struc- 
t ur e. 
4. CAPACITY - "This summary concept ties together 
the highly intercorrelated variables of 'wealth,' 
'power,' I status,' 'education,* 'intelligence* 
and 'sophistication* which are invariably good 
predictors of successful innovation and utiliza¬ 
tion. Those who already possess the most in the 
way of resources and capabilities are the most 
likely to be able to get even more."5 
5. REWARD - "It is a fundamental psychological 
fact that rewarded behavior tends to be re¬ 
peated. 
6. PROXIMITY - Closeness to resources, people and 
knowledge mades their use more possible. Proxi¬ 
mity is a factor closely related to linkage. 
7. SYNERGY - Havelock uses the English and English 
definition of synergy: "exerting force together 
or in combination, or upon the same point."? 
^Ibid., pp. 11-23* 
^Ibid., pp. 11-24. 
^Ibid., pp. 11-25* 
^Ibid., pp. 11-26. 
"^Ibid., pp. 11-27* 
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For knowledge diffusion and utilization the 
concept of synergy suggests the need for 
"purposeful redundancy" and the need for 
leadership. 
Although Havelock found several other important 
variables in his study| he thinks that these seven factors 
seem to account for the bulk of diffusion and utilization 
as a phenomenon. 
Research and Theory on Decision and Change Processes 
in Business and Industry and other Organizational Settings. 
> 
A great deal of research has been done on the process of 
change in the organizational settings of business and 
industry. Benne, Bennis, and Chin review the social, 
psychological, and sociological literature pertaining to 
innovation and change in organizational settings in The 
Q 
Planning of Change. Warren Bennis in Changing Organi¬ 
zations^ summarized and categorized techniques used in 
organizational change efforts and advocated a theory of 
"planned change." Paul Mersey and Ken Blanchard in 
Management of Organizational Behavior^^ have attempted 
to synthesize a number of theories of change, motivation, 
and leadership behavior. They summarize Maslow's Need's 
^Warren Bennis, Kenneth Benne, and Robert Chin, 
eds.. The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
WinstonT 1969). 




and Ken Blanchard, Management of Organi- 
2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J** Prentice- 
Hall, 1972). 
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Hierarchy, Herzbug's Motivation-Hygiene Theory, Argyris's 
Immaturity-Materity Continuum, McGregor's Leadership 
Theory,- Likert's Theory of Management Systems, Schein's 
Motivation Paradigm, and Lewin's Change Cycle, and attempt 
these into their own Life Cycle Theory* 
Life Cycle Theory describes four phases of growth in an 
organization and suggests appropriate behavior for each 
growth phase on the part of the leader. It is meant to 
be useful to practitioners of change. 
Havelock devoted a chapter of his study to the 
organizational context of dissemination and utilization. 
He views the organization as a 
dynamic problem-solving system which maintains 
functionality and stability over time, by de¬ 
veloping and maintaining an internal structure 
and a protective skin to regulate and inhibit 
the flow of messages from the environment. 
He sees, however, two competing demands 
the drive to maintain order and certainty 
which tend to create structures, herarchies, 
requirements and screening procedures which 
act as barriers to knowledge flow; while the 
drive to innovate and improve tends to remove 
such barriers. 
He found that some organizational factors such as training. 
^^Havelock, Ibid., pp. 6-1. 
12 Ibid. 
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leadership styles, structure, and roles to have been 
crucial to the dynamic in organizations, yet Havelock 
concluded that most structures and most roles in an organi¬ 
zation act as inhibitors of change. 
Research and Theory on Planned Change in School 
Systems. In I962 Everett Rogers completed an important 
study, Diffusion of Innovation, which included a comprehen¬ 
sive review of the literature—chiefly from anthropology, 
rural sociology, medicine and education—and attempted an 
inter-disciplinary comparative approach to the study of 
diffusion. Roger's work led not only into Havelock's 
diffusion studies but also quite directly into the tradition 
of research on innovations in school systems. Rogers 
also attempted to define the characteristics of innovations 
that would make them more or less difficult to implement. 
These characteristics include. 
1. Relative advantage over existing practice 
2. Compatibility with basic values 
3. Complexity 
4. Divisibility 
13 5. Communicability 
Ibid. 
^^Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 
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Richard Carlson in I965 tried to relate Rogers 
characteristics to rates of adoption of an innovation. 
He showed that "innovations that were considered the best 
possibilities for more rapid diffusion • • • were those 
rated high in relative advantage, compatibility and 
communicability and low in complexity. Although he felt 
that there was no conclusive data on the relationship be¬ 
tween diffusion rate and characteristics, the characteristic 
that seemed to be most important was compatibility. Innova¬ 
tions must be compatible with cultural norms, existing values 
and past experiences of individuals and social systems. 
Matthew Miles' Innovation in Education (1968) 
provides an overview of research in the area of educational 
innovation and diffusion of innovations through school 
systems.He includes a series of case studies on 
specific innovations and provides a summary chapter that 
contributes significantly to the theory. Although its 
major thrust is on innovation at lower school levels, it 
does consider the process of change in higher education, 
and has become a base line for those interested in aca¬ 
demic reform in colleges and universities. In summarizing 
^^Richard Carlson, Adoption of Educational Inno- 
vations (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of 
Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 19o5)* 
^%atthew Miles, ed. Innovations in Education, Ibid. 
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the studies in his volume, Miles states that educational 
innovations are almost never started or installed on their 
merits. He feels that the characteristics of the local 
system, of the persons or groups involved, and of other 
relevant groups are the crucial factors. He also ad¬ 
vocated the use of temporary systems and linkages. 
Temporary systems are those that operate within an organi¬ 
zation or institution, hut have not been completely 
accepted as a permanent part of the organization. Special 
prograjns are examples of temporary systems within the 
organization. If the innovation is to spread from the 
temporary to the larger system. Miles felt that there had 
to be linkages—usually people—between those systems. 
Goodwin Matson and others built from Miles* work 
and attempted a fusion of theory and action in one pro- 
L 
ject. The Cooperation Project for Educational Development 
(COPED) was a three year project funded by the Office 
of Education which brought together scholars from several 
universities in an inter-university facility to develop 
models for planned change for twenty-five school systems 
in metropolitan areas.The papers from the project 
^^The project model was an interesting one which 
«as later ?o h? used by Lindquist.and others working on 
planned change for college and universities. 
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Concepts for Social Chanee^'^' and Change in School Systems?-^ 
although aimed at secondary systems, provided many insights 
for higher levels. Concepts for Social Change started 
from a broad theoretical view of the problem of knowledge 
dissemination and utilization, drew from a variety of 
disciplines, and developed the core ideas about planned 
change in education. Change in School Systems focused 
attention on the special properties and processes of the 
schools in the project and on strategies for change 
designed to test and develop the core ideas. 
The major barrier to change at secondary and 
elementary school levels was considered by most authors— 
in Miles' work and COPED—to be bureaucratic organizational 
pattern. In elementary and secondary schools, missions are 
somewhat clear, power is clearly located, and while conflict 
is apparent, it is responsive to interventions. Given this, 
the major change strategies suggested at these levels in- 
^^Goodwin Watson, Concepts for Social Change 
(published for Cooperative Project for Educational De¬ 
velopment by National Training Laboratories, 1967). 
^^Goodwin Watson, Change in School Systems 
(published for Cooperative Project for Educational De¬ 
velopment by National Training Laboratories, 1967). 
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volve personnel administration to provide effective 
leadership from the top and the use of outside consul¬ 
tants—as diagnosticians, and/or trainers of internal 
change teams. 
In colleges and xmiversities, however, where 
missions are unclear, power is diffuse, and the organi¬ 
zational structure archaic, the change strategies that seem 





This section contains an overview of work on the 
change process that was not considered in Chapter I. It 
reviews general attitudes toward change and the change 
process including those of the Newman Task Force and the 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. As was seen 
in Chapter I, these two groups were the most influential 
in determining the missions of access, individualization, 
and social problem-solving. They were concerned as well 
with how higher education might respond to these missions* 
and although their observations did not have a research 
base or contribute a great deal to the theory on change, 
the Newman and Carnegie groups have influenced the general 
attitudes and feelings about the process of change and the 
possibilities for change in colleges and universities. 
This section also contains a review of additional 
work on the process of change in colleges and universities 
that was published subsequent to Lon Hefferlin's synthesis 
of the change literature and was not considered by Jack 
Lindquist. 
General Attitudes Toward Change. In American 
society, change has traditionally been considered 
synonymous to progress and therefore good. Educational 
institutions, especially universities, however, were 
considered to have the major function of preserving the 
best of the culture. Therefore a great traditionalism 
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and ritualistic conservatism has been built up around 
them that makes changes seem almost impossible to achieve. 
In contrast to European universities, however, American 
universities have always been more pragmatic and utilitari.- 
an.. The history of American higher education is the history 
of the slow evolution of form and function in response to 
the dictates of American society. 
In the quarter century since World War II there 
have been two major trends. From 19^5 through the mid¬ 
sixties, higher education was almost universally considered 
a good in American society, therefore, the emphasis was 
not on changing its forms or functions but on providing more 
of it to more people. By the late sixties and early seven¬ 
ties, however, more people were criticizing higher edu¬ 
cation for its failures to respond adequately to society's 
or its own students' needs and were urging it to take on 
U 
new missions. Many were despairing that it could ever 
regain its place as a vital institution in American 
society. 
For those who remain positive about our educational 
institutions, "evolutionary" change has greater appeal, 
for those more negative, nothing short of radical change 
will do. 
John Gardner summed up well the general attitude 
toward change: 
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We do not need more change as such. We need 
more 'intentional change'—specifically, the 
kinds of change in our institutions that will 
enable them to adapt to the radically altered 
circumstances in which they are now forced to 
function.^ 
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. The 
Carnegie Commission was generally in favor of change, but 
not radical change. In its final report. Priorities for 
Action, the Commission lists "the enhancement of construc¬ 
tive change" as one of its seven "priorities for action." 
The Commission cited three reasons why change has 
been slow: a) higher education by nature has been oriented 
toward preservation of history and perpetuation of tra¬ 
ditions, b) faculty members have control over governance 
and as a professional group move very slowly and attempt 
where possible to achieve consensus before changing and 
c) continuity of academic mores including 'a sense of 
stability in structure" has in the past been deemed 
important for individual scholarly activity. The Commission 
felt, however, that "the period 1970 to 2000 may prove 




, "Universities as Designers of the 
Record (Fall 196?), PP* 315-319. 
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history of American higher education.”^ The reasons 
for this prediction about change include new types of 
students, new interests among students, new knowledge, 
new job market, new social problems, and new technology. 
Also "the most universally intense pressure for change may 
well turn out to be the shortage of students, as compared 
with places available for them, particularly in the 
1980*s."^ 
The Commission has favored reform in three direc¬ 
tions : 
toward more options for students in their 
attendance patterns; toward more diversity 
of programs both as among and within individual 
institutions, thus expanding the range of choice^^ 
for students; and toward enrichment of programs. 
They have recommended ways to encourage change at 
the system-wide and institutional levels mentioning 
specifically: 
A. The Fund for Improvement of Post Secondary 
Education to be created at the national 
level. 
^Priorities for Action, Ibid., p. 44. 
^Ibid., p. 46. 
4 
^Ibid. 
B. The creation of such funds at the state level. 
C. At the institutional level, setting aside one 
to three per cent of the budget to be directed 
toward new endeavors plus the creation of an 
office for improvement of undergraduate edu¬ 
cation. 
D. Assuring that new ideas be allowed trial on 
experimental basis before review by faculty 
members. 
E. Greater involvement of students in decision¬ 
making. 
F. The selection of activist presidents who will 
give forward-looking leadership. 
The Commission feels that higher education should 
take internal initiative as the basic pattern for change 
rather than simply respond to outside pressures, but it 
does not feel particularly confident about this likelihood. 
When all is said and done, however, more 
change is likely to take place on the peri¬ 
phery of higher education—in non-traditional 
programs and in further education—than in 
colleges or universities themselves.5 
While"the Commissions’ analysis of the change 
process is fairly unsophisticated, and their recommendations 
concerning change programs and strategies are fairly 
general, it is one of the few attempts to view higher 
education from a total system view and it does at least 
’ibid., p( 51. 
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encourage (or allow for) thinking about change process 
at the general policy level. 
Newman Task Force. The Newman Task Force whose 
first report was issued two years prior to the Carnegie 
Commission's Priorities, can nonetheless be taken as a 
rebuttal to the fundamentally positivistic and ameliorist 
stance of the Carnegie commissioni The Newman Task Force 
points out that: 
The beginning of the decade of the 1970's seems 
a time of unprecedented crisis for higher edu¬ 
cation .... Something has gone wrong .... 
There is growing recognition that higher educa¬ 
tion needs reform. 
The major impediment to change is the set of 
assumptions on which educational policy is 
based .... Thus it is argued that the task 
is: 
a. To expand our present system to provide each 
young American with a chance at entrance .... 
b. To maintain diversity by insuring that we 
continue to have both public and private 
institutions .... 
c. To meet the demand for relevance in educa¬ 
tion by developing new curricul\ims .... 
d. To continue to improve the level of 
professionalism, etc. 
To each of these recommendations (strikingly similar to 
those articulated two years later by the Carnegie 
Commission!), the Newman Commission provides a rebuttal. 
For Newman, simply expanding our system will not meet the 
educational needs of the new students that will be enter¬ 
ing; diversity cannot be maintained simply through the 
maintenance of public and private institutions, because 
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higher educational institutions of all current types are 
inexorably moving towards homogeneity. What is required 
are radically new institutions both public and private. 
Also, relevant new curricula can only be developed by those 
outside the present system, not by those inside. 
The Newman group feels that 
Today, the most pressing issues are not internal, 
within higher education, but involve broad social 
decisions regarding its role in contemporary 
America, decisions in which the public must have 
a voice.^ 
The Task Force found a compelling need for major structural 
changes and felt that there was a fleeting opportunity for 
effecting them provided that a) higher education was 
made an issue of serious and comprehensive public debate, 
and b) the federal government used its financial clout 
to encourage the major changes by creating new and 
competitive institutions. 
The Commission recommended a variety of changes 
ranging from the creation of new enterprises to reviving 
institutional missions, but other than federal funding and 
a reliance on making a problem a public issue* The Task 
Force did not suggest other strategies for effecting 
changes. 
^Report on Higher Education, p. 62. 
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Harold Hodghinson has some serious questions about 
the Newman change strategies. In a review of the Newman 
Task Force report in Change« he predicts that the 
Newman Task Force, 
. . . will have great difficulty in creating 
change and diversity at the campus level . . . 
few debates have taken place within institutions 
. • . yet it is at the institutional level that 
educational debate is most needed .... How 
does one engage the thousands on thousands of 
college and university faculty .„. . in the 
decisions of educational policy?' 
The Newman Task Force displayed a pessimistic view 
about the possibilities for change within institutions of 
higher education. Ironically, hosts of college and uni¬ 
versity faculty and administrators were profoundly affected 
by its report# and a series of changes and reforms were 
initiated within institutions as a direct response. 
Additional Research and Theory on Change iji 
Colleges and Universities. 
B. Richard Evans. 
In 1970, Richard Evans published a book entitled 
stance to Innovation in Higher Educatj^, in 
which he reported on a study which pursued the 
problem of faculty resistance to innovation 
^Harold Hodgkinson, "Reflections on the Newman 
Commission" Change. (May 1972), p. ir'. 
®Richard ^"®;,clicof''’joLey-Ba2sri97uT^ 
Higher Education (San Francisco: uu j 
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through a research case study. The study examines an 
academic community's response to a particular innovation- 
I.T.V. His few conclusions basically corroborated those 
of Lon Hefferlin but were far more limited in scope 
C. Dwight Ladd 
Another work published in 1970 that deals with 
institutional change is Dwight Ladd's Change in Educational 
Policy*^ Ladd looks at self studies made by a diverse 
sample of colleges and universities, tries to assess the 
changes that have resulted from the self-studies, and 
attempts to generalize some theories of change from these 
cases. Ladd concluded, 
The situations reviewed here suggest that these 
studies have rarely succeeded in bringing about any 
fundamental change in educational policies on the^ 
campuses involved except where a significant portion 
of the faculty had accepted the desirability of some 
change before the study began and where pressures 
for change from outside the faculties were much in 
evidence 
Ladd ascribed the resistance to change primarily 
to governance patterns which afford collegiality. 
, . • real change in educational policy will re- 
quire significant reallocation of resources, and 





^°Ibid., p. 200. 
^Dwight R. Ladd, Change in Education Po.^^ 
q+hHioq in Selected Colleges and Universities, The 
Commission on Higher Education (New Yori^ Mc^Graw- 
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the most part by those who most benefit from 
the status auo.ii 
Ladd did not see the institutional studies and 
reports as an effective strategy for change. 
E. Harold Taylor 
Harold Taylor wrote How to Change Collegesi Notes 
12 
on Radical Reform in 1971• It was "intended as a practical 
book or operating manual on how to put educational changes 
into effect.While it might prove helpful for a 
president of a small college, I did not find its suggestions 
adequate to deal with the complexities of large institutions 
such as universities. 
^^Ibid., p. 211. 
^^Harold Taylor, How to Change Colleges: Notes 
on Radical Reform (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1971). 
^^Ibid., author’s note 
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The Academic Matters Council had other questions 
about the proposal as well. asked for a university- 
wide program felt l;hat this proposal was too affiliated 
with the College of Arts and Sciences. In response to this 
objection, the ad hoc committee^ revised its proposal to 
call for a free-standing program called the Bachelor's 
Degree with Individual Concentration. It would have a 
\irector responsible to the Provost's Office. The revised 
proposal encouraged the participation of other Schools 
in addition to the College of Arts and Sciences. 
The revised proposal was discussed again at a 
February meeting of the Academic Matters Council. Council 
members—principally Everett Emerson—were still not satis¬ 
fied with the program. The issue of the cost of such a 
program was raised. 
In an action quite separate from the BDIC proposal, 
the Academic Matters Council had decided that it should 
investigate the cost implications to the University of any 
new policy or program before it recommended action to the 
Faculty Senate. Accordingly, it established occasional 
ad hoc committees for this purpose. Several members of 
the Council objected strongly to the budget review committees 
because they felt that the Council should concern itself 
with academic and not budgetary issues. Because of this 
difference of opinion the ad hoc budget review mechanism 
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H. Strong yet changing leadership throughout 
the decade. 
I. A number of institutional self studiesf 
committees on long range planning, and frequent open 
discussions on missions and the role of the university 
in society. 
J. An overall climate for change. Students, 
faculty, and administrators felt that it was worth 
working for change because change was possible. 
It would, however, be a mistake to oversimplify. 
Although campus leaders were prepared to place emphasis 
and^ prioritizethey were not ready to become one'dimen- 
siona^so the University of Massachusetts remained a 
complex institution with many missions and objectives. 
Also, the shifts in orientation from graduate to under¬ 
graduate education; and from pure research to applied 
research, public service, and social problem-solving/^ 
were shifts more obvious in the rhetoric than in the 
organizational structure, the allocation of resources^ 
or the activity levels. 
Special Unite as Vehicles for Change. The vehicle 
for change most often advocated and used at the University 
of Massachusetts was the creation of new programs or 
centers. Special programs were advocated and created 
as a means to be responsive to a new student clientele. 
3 ? 

